D. DORRY. MOI PUT ' V IRANISTIKU [MY PATH TO IRANIAN STUDIES], Moscow: Arktika 4D Publishing House, 2012, 158 p.

Monograph of the famous Iranian orientalist Dzhehangir X. Dorrie is mostly a memoir. At the same time, it contains very valuable and little-known data on the recent history of Iran, Soviet-Iranian and Soviet-Afghan relations. Many of them are published for the first time. They are especially valuable because they belong to the pen of not only a contemporary, but also a participant in many significant events in the political, scientific and cultural life of the Soviet Union, Iran and Afghanistan.

The autobiographical part of the work impresses the reader with unexpected twists in the author's fate. In the Soviet period, they were characteristic and typical of the fate of millions of young people-the same age as J. R. R. Tolkien. Dorrie. But his life in adulthood would obviously have been different if he hadn't married Tatiana Shaumyan in 1961. Her grandfather, Stepan Shaumyan, was once the head of the Baku commune and was one of the twenty-six Baku commissars who were shot by the British in 1918. Therefore, she and later her family were favored by A. I. Mikoyan, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Thus, J. Dorry writes that it took personal assistance of Anastas Ivanovich to get him and his wife T. Shaumyan permission to travel to Norway (p. 64-67).

One of the most significant events of scientific and cultural life, which was attended by J. R. R. Tolkien. Dorry and his monograph include the celebration of the 1100th anniversary of the birth of the great poet Rudaki , the founder of Persian-Tajik literature (pp. 53-54). The author devoted a lot of time and effort to compiling a two-volume Persian-Russian dictionary, which took ten years to complete from 1961 to 1970. The dictionary has been reprinted four times and continues to be used for over forty years.

In 1984, Dorry visited Afghanistan as a member of the delegation of the USSR Writers ' Union. Summing up his impressions of his stay in this country, he writes: "... And even though we were in Af-

Ghanistan is less than two weeks old, and this short stay gave us an opportunity to assess the current situation in the country. It was quite clear that this senseless war was endless and that therefore the only reasonable solution to the conflict, as it seemed to us, would be to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan. It wasn't just us who thought so. But then, in the Soviet Union, it was impossible to "deviate from the guiding line of the party and government" without risking being persecuted with all the consequences that followed " (pp. 81-82).

A separate section of the monograph is devoted to the author's meetings and cooperation with famous Iranian and Russian scientists and writers, such as Said Nafisi, Feridun Tonkaboni, Siyavosh Kyasran, Khosrow Shahani, Ziaolla Farushani, V. F. Minorsky.

The section "How Qawam es-Saltaneh outwitted Stalin" in the chapter "Moving to Tehran" (p.24-32) is of the most significant interest for historical science. In 1946, the then Prime Minister of Iran, Qavam es-Saltaneh, proposed to his father that J. R. R. Tolkien be released. Dorry went with him to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran.

It is known that under the treaty signed by the USSR, the United States and Great Britain with Iran, foreign armies had to leave its territory before March 2, 1946, i.e. no later than six months after the end of the war. US and British troops were withdrawn within the allotted time. However, Red Army units continued to remain in Iran. To this day, nothing is said about why their withdrawal was delayed for two months, even in such fundamental reference publications as, for example, the Great Russian Encyclopedia (Moscow, 2008, vol.11).

Based on declassified archive data, J. Dorry fills in this gap. According to these data, the Soviet leadership was preparing "a political action, the purpose of which could be the separation of Iranian Azerbaijan from Iran" (p.24). An important role in the implementation of this plan was assigned to the People's Party of Iran "Tudeh", founded in 1941 by Iranian Marxists. It "had the reputation of being a party closely connected with the politics of the USSR" (p. 25).

In February 1946, a new government was formed in Tehran, headed by Qavam es-Saltaneh, who enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union. Qavam said that he would like to visit the USSR to hold talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran.

On February 20, he headed a delegation that included Fr. Dorry, arrived in Moscow. Already on February 21, Stalin received Kavam, who raised the issue of the need to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran before March 2 in accordance with the agreements concluded. "Stalin justified the presence of Soviet troops in Iran by the treaty of 1921. Qavam replied that the treaty had a completely different meaning" (p. 26). In this treaty of February 26, 1921, in particular, it was stated that Iran would not allow the presence of foreign troops on its territory. This clause was directly directed against Britain, obliging the Iranian government to seek the removal of British troops from Iran. Stalin noted that the USSR had other interests that required the presence of Soviet troops in Iran. "... A day later, at a meeting with Molotov, "other interests" were identified as the desire for the Soviet Union to be granted a concession for the development of oil fields in the northern regions of Iran... Molotov repeated that "the troops will not be withdrawn from Iran for the time being" (p. 26).

J. Dorry writes: "Now, after the disclosure of the archives concerning Qawam es-Saltaneh's conversations with Stalin and Molotov, it has become known that they discussed the delicate issue of the abolition of the monarchy in Iran. At the same time, it was mentioned that the Soviet Union might support the alleged republican regime led by Qawam. Stalin was betting on a new government in Iran, which he made clear to his negotiator in a direct text. But Qavam did not agree to the deal, continuing to insist on the need for the rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran " (pp. 26-27).

What follows is a very interesting and fateful passage that reflects the true essence of Soviet-Iranian relations at that stage. The author writes: "Molotov prepared for Stalin a long report on his meetings with Qavam, in which he pointed out that Qavam rejected the idea of changing the monarchical rule in Iran, which was previously raised in a conversation with Stalin. After reading this report, Stalin wrote only one slash on the report instead of a visa - "Bastard", and this was an accurate indicator of the level of his disappointment in the Iranian prime minister: apparently, this politician did not justify the generalissimo's hope in some way" (p. 27).

On March 2, 1946, the day when the USSR, in accordance with international obligations, was supposed to completely withdraw its troops from Iran, TASS issued a statement stating that the Soviet Union was withdrawing its armed forces only from the north-eastern provinces

Iran's Mashhad, Shahrud and Semnan regions, and in other areas, troops will remain until " the situation is fully clarified."

It was this statement that TASS and the Soviet leadership behind it, as it is seen from modern positions, marked the beginning of the Cold War, although in the historical conditions of 1946, Soviet propaganda considered the reason for it to be the speech of W. Churchill at Westminster College in Fulton (Missouri, USA) on March 5, 1946. In this speech, he first used the term "iron curtain". This speech was published in the media, including in Russian, and thoroughly studied. In it, Churchill said in part: "Turkey and Persia are deeply concerned and concerned about the claims that are being made against them and the pressure they are being subjected to by the Moscow government" (cit. by site: www.coldwar.ru/rvo/).

Contemporary Russian researcher N. V. Zlobin notes Churchill's" foresight and political instinct " expressed in this speech. In his opinion, "his (Churchill's) foresight for the next 40 years of the structure and nature of international relations in general and Soviet-American relations in particular was fully confirmed"¹ (quoted by Wikipedia).

J. Dorry notes on page 28 that the TASS statement " caused a negative reaction in the world, and the US Secretary of State, on behalf of President Truman, sent a corresponding note to the USSR." And he adds a little lower: "Qavam, trying to achieve his goal of withdrawing Soviet troops from the country in any way, took another extraordinary step: he secretly agreed with Ayatollah Borujerdi, the head of the ulema (spiritual leaders), that the Islamic clergy should call on the people to ignore the elections (to the Majlis-the Iranian Parliament; the powers of deputies the previous 14th convocation ended on March 11, 1946), while "the country is under occupation by the Red Army." Ayatollah Borujerdi arranged the matter so that all the local ulama telegraphed their demands to the government: not to hold elections while there are foreign troops in the country. The protest of the clergy contributed to the creation of a new public front against the Soviet Union " (p. 30).

As a result, under the pressure of world public opinion and the growing protest of various segments of the Iranian people, the USSR withdrew its troops from Iran in May 1946.

The section ends with the author's principled conclusion: "Thus, Qavam managed to solve three very important issues for Iran, which were linked by Stalin in negotiations with him: the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Iran; the Azerbaijani issue was closed; the oil issue sank into oblivion" (p. 32).

Jehangir Dorri's monograph, thanks to its directness, authenticity and vividness of presentation, makes a worthy contribution to understanding the exceptionally complex mosaic of interstate relations in the Middle East during the first half of the past century and is of considerable scientific interest to Russian Orientalists.

¹ Zlobin N. V. Churchill's speech at Fultons on March 05, 1946. Unknown American archival materials / / New and recent history. 2000. № 2.

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