I agree with the authors ' tandem that at present it makes sense to double-check and adjust, if necessary, the available estimates of trends, components and factors of global economic development. Many researchers in the world are doing this. The question is how to eliminate some inaccuracies and (semi -) myths without inadvertently creating others. In the text proposed for discussion, it seems that (perhaps for the sake of enlivening the discussion) a somewhat embellished picture of Asian (Chinese) success against the background of a significant failure in the economic growth of Western countries and Japan. I will try to clarify a number of details of the overall picture of development.

1. The world has indeed been going through difficult times over the past three or four years, due to the causes and consequences of the current crisis, from which a considerable part of humanity has not yet really emerged. On this basis, excessively pessimistic conclusions and forecasts are often made. If you look at long-term global development trends, you can analyze the age-old trends in the style of F. Braudel and R. Cameron, to find that there is no real slowdown in global economic dynamics. The average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in the world increased by about an order of magnitude (as a result of the industrial revolution) - from less than 0.1% per year in 1700-1820 to 0.8-1.0% in 1820-1913. Then, despite two world wars, a deep depression, transformational and other crises, it almost doubled due to the information and communication revolution (ICR) and a number of positive effects of globalization (including the spread of modern economic growth to developing countries, etc.), reaching 1.7 - 1.8% in 1913-2010.

However, the growth rate of the global per capita product in 1980-2010 (1.9 - 2.1%) was perhaps 1 lower than in the first post - war decades (in 1950-1980 - 2.5 - 2.6%). At the same time, despite a significant reduction in the considered indicator in developed countries (for example, from 2.4% in the 1980s to 2.0% in the 1990s and 1.5% in 2000-2010), the acceleration of per capita GDP growth in the PC (including transition economies here) from 1.1 to 1.7 and 4.6 As a result, the average annual growth rate of the global GDP per capita indicator tended to increase - from 1.4 - 1.5% to 1.5 - 1.6% and 2.8-2.9%, respectively. 2 In other words, the last decade, the final years of which were overshadowed by the global crisis, turned out to be the overall growth rate of the global world economy. the economy is the "most productive" in the economic history of mankind.

2. Assessing the macroeconomic performance of the WG, I would like to emphasize that in general, during the post-war period, significant changes occurred in the economic structures of Western countries and Japan, the scale of which may be underestimated by modern statistics.-

Continuation. For the beginning, see: East (Oriens). 2011. N 5, pp. 72-83; 2012. N 1, pp. 82-108.

1 If calculations are made within the framework of the standard system of national accounts without adjustments for changes in product quality and production boundaries, more thorough monitoring of structural changes.

2 The calculation is based on PPP data from: [Maddison, 2007, p. 379; World Development Indicators, 2003, p. 16,40, 188; 2011, p. 12, 196; World Economic Outlook, 2011, p. 171, 181].

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coy [Melyantsev, 1996, p. 30 - 32, 205 - 206, 219; Zakaria, 2009, pp. 214-215] 3. As a result of the emergence of a new economy associated with R & D and globalization, the mobility of goods, services, capital, labor, technology, and information has significantly increased. A knowledge-intensive economy began to take shape in the Republic of Tatarstan, which is largely based on building up non-material wealth and human capital.

Total (accounted for) expenditures on education, health care, and science in the leading Western countries and Japan grew on average from 2.4 - 2.8% of their GDP in 1910-1913 to 7.5-8.0% in 1950, 14-15% in 1973, and 18-19% of GDP in 2006. human capital (expenditures on education, health care, and R & D) in their total expenditures on the formation of human and physical capital (excluding housing) increased from 1/5 in 1913 to 2/5 in 1950, half in 1973, and at least 3/5 in 2006 [World Development Indicators, 1998-2008; Human Development Report, 2000-2009; Melyantsev, 1996, pp. 114, 166]. The average number of years of education of the adult population, adjusted for quality, increased from 7.3 in 1913 to 10 in 1950, 12 to 13 in 1973, and 17 to 17.5 years in 2006.4 An impressive "creative class" was created in the RG [Florida, 2007, p. 60 - 61]. The share of skilled workers in the number of employees on average in the EU countries approached three-fifths, and in the USA it exceeded three-quarters [Vasiliev, 2006, p. 73]. In 1960-2003/05, the total computer power in the world increased by more than 10 billion times. The flow of information exchange on the Internet now doubles at least every 100 days. There was a significant intensification of world economic relations [Melyantsev, 2009(1), pp. 5-8; Akimov, 2010; Tsvetkova, 2011; Building with Big Data, 2011].

However, in recent decades, economic growth in the Russian Federation, as noted above, has slowed sharply, turning out to be lower than in the whole PC. In Western countries and Japan, there is a trend towards a significant increase in the marginal coefficient of capital intensity of growth (from 5.3 in the 1950s-1970s to 6.7 in the 1980s, 8.1 in the 1990s, and 12.7 in 2001-2010) [Melyantsev, 2009(2), pp. 179, 190, 204; World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 228-230, 254-256; World Economic Outlook, April 2010, p. 155], and the average annual growth rate of aggregate factor productivity (TFP) has tripled (from 2.9% in 1950-1973 to 1% in 1973-2010) [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p. 182; World Development Indicators, 2011, p. 48 - 50, 194 - 196, 226 - 227].

This paradox of growth inhibition in the RG can only be partially explained (by my calculations, by 1/4 - 1/3) by the achievement of a higher level of development by advanced countries [Melyantsev, 2009(2), pp. 24-25]. The phenomenon itself seems to have a complex character. To a large extent, it is associated with the rapid moral devaluation of technology and knowledge 5 due to the underaccumulation of physical capital (the rate of capital investment in RGS decreased by more than a quarter - from an average of 25% in 1960 to 17-18% in 2008-2010); stagnation of the level of R & D expenditures (after an increase of an average of 0.7% of GDP in 1950 to 1.6% in 1960, 1.9% in 1973 and 2.4% in 1990 to 2.2 - 2.3% subsequently), as well as spending on education (from 3.2% in 1950 to 4.6% in 1960).;

3 In a world where the speed of computers, software production, and information volumes in general are growing by 45-60% per year, and it is estimated that the quality of information systems and computers is not accounted for by at least 1/10 every year, it has become very difficult to sum up any final results of economic growth [The Data Deluge, 2010; Song, 2010, p. 193, 198]. However, at the same time, the growing share of so-called transaction costs in the modern economy is not taken into account, which, according to the methodology of the Nobel laureate in economics D. North, it is advisable to remove from GDP in order to determine net value added.

4 Compiled and calculated by: [Melyantsev, 1996, p. 145, 181-184, 202; Melyantsev, 2004, p. 11; Human Development Report, 2000-2010; World Development Indicators, 2008; 2010].

5 In our time, "technology often loses its relevance after 3 or 4 years, having at best only managed to recoup development costs" [Malkin, 2010]. There is evidence that depreciation of both physical and human capital is underestimated in the calculation of total factor costs (see [Wallis, 2009, p. 809]).

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6.2% in 1990 and 5.6-5.8% of GDP subsequently); a decrease in the demographic dividend [Gros, 2011]6 associated with population aging (the share of the population over 65 years is approaching 1/5, in Japan and Italy-to 1/4; the median age in Japan is 45 years, in Western countries - 39, in the United States and the United States). PC-28 years); the Baumol effect (in the 1950s - 1960s, the contribution of labor movement from low-to higher-productivity industries gave up to 10 - 15% of GDP growth, and now, when 3/4 or more employees are concentrated in the service sector, the contribution of labor movement has become negative, equivalent on average (- ) 3-7% of GDP growth); active relocation of production capacities and jobs in the region [Kollmeyer, 2009, p. 1667-1670; Still Full of Ideas, 2011; Rodrik, 2011]; slowing down of quality growth in the education system (every fifth school graduate in the UK, USA and France according to experts from the RG, he is functionally illiterate); inhibition of scientific and technological progress (according to the number of breakthrough inventions per 100 million people, the RG is at the level of the XVII-XVIII centuries) [Melyantsev, 2009(1), pp. 10-12].

The phenomenon of slowing growth is also caused by a decline in the prestige of work in the field of science and education, against the background of galloping income growth in the financial sector in the last two or three decades, 7 the share of which in the United States in total corporate profits increased from 1/6 in 1973-1985 to 2/5 in the mid-2000s [Brooks, 2009]8. According to one estimate, in the United States, the sector of the economy whose disproportionate development caused the recession (finance, insurance, housing) accounted for 1/4 of GDP growth in 1995-2009 [Botox and Beancounting, 2011].9 The growing scale of risky engineering in the deregulated financial sector10, which is estimated to have concentrated 80% of all bank loans in the United States in 2007 (and an increasing share of "smart minds") [Bezemer, 2009; Brooks, 2010], hindered the development of the real sector of the Russian economy and ultimately provoked the emergence of the global financial crisis.

Now, as is well known, Western countries and Japan are experiencing acute problems associated with sharply increased (public and private) debt, the size of which is at least twice or three times the volume of their GDP [Wolf, 2011; Plender, 2011]. There is a shift of private debts to society. Interest on debt (and relatively large military expenditures - 3.0% of GDP in the United States in 2000, 4.7% of GDP in 2009, and 5.4% of GDP in 2010 [World Development Indicators, 2011, p. 292; Scars, 2011]) reduce budgets for R & D, education, and infrastructure [Shushunova and Seyranyan, 2010]. The speculative nature of the economy, as the main cause of the latest crisis that has befallen the world, unfortunately, does not "resolve" quickly. This hinders the rapid overcoming of the crisis and seriously undermines such a valuable capital of society as trust [Johnson,

6 One of its manifestations is that now in Western countries and Japan, the costs associated with population aging are already 12-13% of their GDP, and in a few decades this figure will double [Szabo, 2009, p.369].

7 This has led to a sharp increase in inequality. In 1976-2007, the real average hourly wage of Americans barely increased, while 3/5 of GDP growth came at the expense of the richest 1%. As a result, the share of the latter in the total income of US residents increased from 8.9% to 23.5%, and the income gap between the top 0.1% of Americans and the bottom 90% of the country's population increased from twenty to eighty times [Frank, 2010; Unbottl, Gini, 2011; Atkinson, Piketty, Sacz, 2011, p. 9; Reich, 2012, p. 5, 21,66].

8 Although the United States experienced a significant economic slowdown, the share of the financial sector in its GDP at least doubled , from 4% in 1981 to 8% in 2008 (Kumhof and Ranciere, 2011).

9 According to some economists, in some segments of this sphere there was an illusory growth of utilities and a lot of "dubious added value" was created, which led to the growth of toxic virtual wealth [Stagnation..., 2011].

10 Deregulation was accompanied by a sharp increase in the scale of financial fraud (ponzi schemes, manipulation of accounting documents, camouflage of real credit leverage), often covered up by fancy mathematical calculations (see: [Stiglitz, 2011, p. 17, 204 - 209, 325 - 327, 350, 387 - 389]).

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2010, p. 15; Stiglitz, 2011, p. 344]. Although the relative scale of unemployment seems to be gradually decreasing, in the United States, unemployment and underemployment still affect about 1 / 6th of the labor force (Zuckerman, 2011) .11
At the same time, we would like to emphasize that despite the enormous difficulties faced by the WGS and their declining role in the global economy, they remain extremely competitive in terms of non-price. The United States, which is now being criticized by everyone, accounts for more than 1/2 of global military research spending, 16 of the top 20 universities in the world, 2/5 of global R & D spending, almost 2/3 of the most frequently cited publications, and most of the Nobel scientific laureates. In the USA, there are ten of the world's top ten computer schools [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p. 60; Alekseev and Malykhin, 2010]. Western countries and Japan have relatively high production costs due to their more expensive labor. But they have a strong intellectual and innovative potential [Wadhwa, 2011]and (as yet) a high level of quality of public institutions, which can allow them to pass through the test strip and reach higher technological development trajectories. 12 We should also not forget that the basis of the global competitiveness of Western countries and Japan is their companies, which often earn money from their external operations (in the United States in 2008). 3 times) more than from the export of goods and services (Crooks, 2011).

3. Globalization, no matter how much it may be criticized, has generally contributed to the accelerated growth of a number of developing countries, primarily Asian ones [Global Trends 2025, 2008; Stephens, 2008; Singh, 2010; Asia 2050, 2011], which are quite intensively involved in international value chains, with a strong pro-market state that conducts a balanced assessment of the global economy. In addition, the United States is committed to implementing macroeconomic policies (and avoiding premature liberalization of capital accounts) [Lin, 2010; Grabel, Chang, 2010], relying on advanced business-oriented elitists13, huge masses of relatively cheap, capable labor [Fen, 2011; Caldwell, 2011]14.

The rapid growth of major Asian companies has become the engine of the global economy. The shares of the United States, Japan, and Germany in global GDP growth declined from 25%, 10%, and 4% in the 1980s to 11%, 1.5%, and 1.1% in the 2000s, while for China and India they increased from 8%, 4%, and 27%, 10%. Their combined contribution to the growth of the global economy in the last decade was almost 3 times (!) higher than that of the RG leaders [Melyantsev, 2009 (2), p. 191; World Development Indicators, 2011, p. 192-196].

Much attention is paid in the literature to the success of the leading developing and emerging Asian countries in building up capital investment (KB), industrial and export potential. Let us emphasize that China ranked 3rd in the world in absolute R & D spending, while the Republic of Korea, India, and Taiwan also ranked in the top ten [Science Report..., 2010]. As of mid-2010, China ranked 2nd in the world in terms of overall performance of supercomputers.

11. If they want to remain globally competitive, they will have to curb the growth of their employees ' salaries, which, as already noted, has unpleasant social consequences. For the causes, scope, consequences, and lessons of the current economic crisis, see [Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011; Stiglitz, 2011].

12 If ("when everything calms down" and the impact of the crisis eases somewhat) the Americans, perhaps together with the Japanese and some Europeans, take on what is supposed to be a new mega-project-deep space exploration, many of the currently fast-moving countries, but with weaker research and institutional systems, will simply not be able to reach them [Pokrovsky, 2010].

13 Elites in fast-growing Asian countries are guided by the three-C principle proposed by former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (commitment, competence, consensus).

14 Among the factors that contributed to the growth of the so-called fast-catching economies, we can also mention the practice of undervaluing the exchange rate, intellectual piracy, low environmental and social standards, which contributed to reducing production costs and cheapening exports. This, however, is known to have significantly complicated the problems of the WG's balance of payments.

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US $ [Voronin, 2010]. China also ranked 1st in terms of the number of university graduates. China and India produce 1.5 times more ICT specialists than all Western countries. Approximately 1/4 of them are well-trained, and they pose a competitive threat to 1/5 of EU and US jobs. In addition, China and India are increasing their military spending at a rate 1.5 times higher than their economic growth [Melyantsev, 2007, p. 20; Jacobs, 2010; Hille, 2011].

According to our model 15, over the past two or three decades, rapid economic growth in the countries of East, South-East and South Asia has been determined by 1/3 of the relatively higher growth rates of their exports 16; by 1/2-by a more significant scale of accumulation of physical and human capital in these three regions, and by 1/5-by a more moderate, For example, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America (LA), there is a high level of inequality. In a number of new industrial countries, such as the Republic of Korea, the role of exports in GDP growth was particularly high, reaching 50-60% in the last two or three decades, while in larger countries such as China and India, it was less - 18-22% and 8-12%, respectively (this fact to some extent contributed to the fact that the decline during the global economic crisis in the last two countries was less)17.

Asian new-industrial countries, as well as China and India, despite considerable defects in their economic mechanisms, have managed to achieve an average annual growth rate of aggregate factor productivity (TFP) of 2 or even 3% per year in the last two or three decades, which is 2-3 times higher than in the previous period and significantly higher than in the previous period. than the average for the LA, SSA, and Arab states [Melyantsev, 2009(2), pp. 182,208].

However, before the global financial crisis, only 1/7% of all PCs were more or less steadily moving up to the RG in terms of per capita GDP. But even among the latter, the majority still does not reach even 1/5 of the US level [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p. 190].

In WGS that have made significant progress in the innovation economy in the two or three decades preceding the global crisis, the contribution of SFP to GDP growth in 1990-2007 (50-60%) was 2.5 - 3 times higher than in the whole PC (19-21%) and about 1.5 times higher than in the whole PC (19-21%). Average for China, India and Asian NIS (33-37%) 18. PC lag,

15 Y = 0.164*EXP + 0.150*NKH - 0.052*GIN - 0.873, R2 adjusted = 0.809, N = 43, L = 1980 - 2006

(p=0.0074) (p=0.0002) (p=0.0049)

Y and EXP are the average annual growth rates of per capita GDP and physical exports, respectively; NKH is the share of gross KB, education and R & D expenditures in GDP,%; GIN is the average Gini index for the period by income. The main parameters are statistically significant at the level of less than 1% [Melyantsev, 2008, p. 330].

16 Over the past 20-30 years, the correlation coefficient between the dynamics of exports of goods and services (as well as the KB norm) and economic growth rates in the PC has averaged 0.75-0.85 [Melyantsev, 2009(2), pp. 203, 205]. It is therefore possible that if the PRC moves to a model in which personal consumption, which currently accounts for only 35-38% of GDP, plays a major role, the growth rate of the economy may decrease [Wolf, 2010(1)].

17 Calculations are made using the following formula: ΔY = d1 • ΔS + ΔX + (d2-d1) • S2, where ΔY is GDP growth, S1 and S2 are the internal supply of resources (Y-X+M) at the beginning and end of the period, d1 and d2 - respectively, the share of domestic production (Y-X) at the beginning and end of the period in the domestic supply of resources -(Y-X)/(Y-X+M). GDP growth consists of three effects: an increase in domestic demand, export expansion, and the effect of import substitution (calculated from: [World Development Indicators, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2010]).

18 Over the past two or three decades, in the PRC, where the KB rate in GDP has reached about half of it, economic growth of about 3/5 was determined by an increase in the contribution of physical capital (which is unprecedented by world standards), and labor productivity growth of about 1/3 was "eaten up" by a decrease in capital productivity. As a result, only 1/4 of GDP growth was achieved due to efficiency (SFP) [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p.182, 208]. The relatively low productivity of the Chinese economy (and many other countries and countries with economies in transition) is caused by widespread corruption, inefficient functioning of state-owned enterprises, and the immaturity of the banking system. In China, state-owned enterprises, which in 2008-2009 had 43-47% of all assets, produced 26-30% of GDP and total profits, but received more than 4/5 of all loans. It is estimated that outstanding debts at the end of

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For example, the difference from the United States in terms of TFP19, which in 2005 - 2007 was, according to our approximate calculations, 7-9 times in Nigeria, 5-7 times in Egypt, China and India, approximately 3 times in Brazil, and 1.5 times in the Republic of Korea, was determined by low freedom characteristics business management, quality of infrastructure, institutions, and technologies.

Despite the fact that in 1980-2007, China and India narrowed their gap with the United States by about 1.5 times (from 4.4 to 2.7 and from 5.7 to 3.9, respectively, but the SSA increased it from 4.8 to 5.1 times), their gap with the United States in the expanded development index (taking into account the technological and institutional components) remained large: in 2007, the number of cases in the SSA was 8-9 times, in India-4-5 times, in China - 3-4 (in the Russian Federation - 2-3) times 20. In terms of R & D costs per capita, the gap between RG and PC is huge, 17-fold (for China-13, the Republic of Korea - 1.5-fold, but, for example, for India - 20 - 25-multiple values) [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p. 192].

The share of beggars, which, primarily due to China's economic success, declined on average across East and South Asia from 68-72% in the early 1980s to 26-28% in the mid-2000s, could have increased to almost 1/3 2% by the end of the last decade as a result of the global economic crisis'. The indicator of internal income inequality (Gini coefficient), which has grown in many Asian countries over the past two or three decades (in China-from 0.25 to 0.45 - 0.50%, approaching the level of LA and SSA), is almost 1/3 higher than the average for the Russian Federation (0.33 - 0.35). Resource - intensive economic growth in many Asian countries is associated with Growth in large, populous countries such as China and India has a significant impact on the environment and public health in these and surrounding countries. 23 The growing level of polarization in both communist China and democratic India can be counterproductive

In the mid-2000s, they were equivalent to about 10 to 15% of Chinese GDP, and the total amount of government debt (including debts of regional authorities and state - owned banks) in 2010-2011 reached 80 to 90% of GDP [Lee, 2010; Anderlini, 2010; Elliot, 2010, p. 113; Let a Million..., 2011; Anderlini, 2011(1)]. On the proportions and disproportions in the Chinese growth model (Berger, 2009; Gelbras, 2010; Huang, 2010).

19 - TFP, GDP, employment, and fixed capital levels in the United States and developing countries, respectively. The volume of fixed capital is estimated by the method of R. Goldsmith (continuous inventory). The labor and capital elasticities are assumed to be 0.65 and 0.35 [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p. 144].

20 In 2007, in terms of technological development, SSA lagged behind the United States by 50 times, India - by 16-17 times, China - by 8-10 times, and the Russian Federation - by 5-6 times; in terms of basic institutions, SSA lagged behind the United States by 8-9 times, China, India, and the Russian Federation - by 2.5 - 4 times [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p. 213].

21 The share of poor people in the two regions on average decreased by 2/5 over the period under review, but still exceeds, according to World Bank estimates, half of the population [World Development Indicators, 2011, p. 66].

22 In China, in 1998-2007, the share of wages in GDP decreased by 1/4 , from 53% to 40% [Zavadsky, 2011]. The real income gap between the top and bottom ten percent of Chinese society in the late 2000s was estimated to be more than 23-fold (Roberts, 2011; Lai, 2010, p. 828), adjusted for the under-reported shadow incomes of Chinese officials and entrepreneurs. Published data on inequality in India (in 2005, the Gini index for income was 0.37) are likely to embellish the situation [World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 95]. In India, according to some experts, the scale of corruption is underestimated. The wealth of Indian billionaires is equivalent to about 16-17% of the country's GDP, while in the whole world this indicator (the total wealth of billionaires to global GDP) is 2.5 times less. Indians account for approximately 4-5% of the world's billionaires [Sinha and Vashney, 2011; Rappeport, 2011].

23 China consumes at least 1/2 of the world's cement production, 1/3 of its steel production, and 1/4 of its aluminum production. Although China's energy output has grown 2 to 3 times faster than the global average over the past two decades, its GDP energy intensity (PPP) is still twice as high as the global average. The PRC, while increasing its CO2 production at an almost six percent rate, has managed to keep up with the United States in terms of volume GDP (in 2010, 67-69% of the level of the United States), surpass them in terms of carbon dioxide emissions (in 1990-2007, the share of the United States in its global production decreased from 21-22% to 19.0%, while China, on the contrary, increased - from 11 to 21-22%). According to available estimates, in the PRC in the 1980s and 2000s, the average annual growth rate of the so-called green GDP was 2-2.5 percentage points lower than the growth of official GDP (compiled and calculated by: [World Development Indicators, 2011, p. 154-156; Wang, 2006, p. 88; Melyantsev,2006, p. 88). 2007, p. 22; Pilling, 2010; Hook, 2011; World Factbook, 2011]).

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to destabilize the socio-political situation in them (as happened, for example,in a number of Arab countries) [Melyantsev, 2009(2), pp. 147-170; Melyantsev, 2011] 24.

According to the available forecast estimates, in terms of total GDP (purchasing power parity, PPP) in the next ten years, China, all other things being equal, may catch up with the United States, and India - Japan. However, the above-mentioned shortcomings in the development models of the two largest Asian PCs complicate this task. The fact that, in particular, in China, economic and social imbalances have reached a huge scale is indicated by the intention of its leadership to sharply (up to 7% per year) reduce the estimated average annual GDP growth rate in the next five years [Wolf, 2010; China Growth..., 2011; Giles, 2011].

4. Due to the limited space available in this paper, we will focus only on the most important aspects of the Russian Federation's macroeconomic performance. Russia, which accounts for 1/8 of the world's territory, more than 1/5 of global natural resources, but only 2-3% of the population, world GDP and exports, and less than 2% of global KB and R & D expenditures [Global Economic Prospects, 2011, p. 4; World Economic Outlook, October 2010, p. 177-178, 181-182; World Factbook, 2011], plays, alas, not the most important role in the world economy.

As you know, the crisis hit the Russian Federation harder than many other G20 countries: in 2009, Russian GDP shrank by 7.9%. Despite some growth in 2010. (by 3.8%), the volume of GDP as a result remained at the level of 2007. In general, if over the past twenty years (1990-2010) GDP in Japan increased by about 1/4, in the USA-by 70-71%, in India-by 3.6, and in China - by 4.9 times, then in the Russian Federation as a result of the transformation crisis (in the 1990s) and the subsequent economic recovery (in the 2000s, under favorable conditions of hydrocarbon prices), the initial (1990) level of GDP was only practically restored [Global Economic Prospects, 2011, p. 4; World Economic Outlook, October 2010, p. 177-178, 181-182; World Factbook, 2011] 25. The Russian economy by GDP and national wealth, their structural characteristics (see graph. 1-3) is significantly inferior to the leading countries of the world.

The current crisis in the Russian Federation has highlighted the acute problems of economic insecurity and inefficiency of a raw material rent-oriented country suffering from underaccumulation of capital, poor quality of governance and institutions. Despite the relatively high level of gross savings, which reached 1/3 of GDP in the second half of the 2000s, the financial system of the Russian Federation remained underdeveloped: in particular, the level of domestic lending to the real sector of the economy did not exceed an average of 30-40% 26, which was almost 2 times less than in India, 3-4 It is 3 times less than in the PRC and the Republic of Korea, and 5 times less than in the Russian Federation. As a result, Russia's economic growth in the 2000s was largely based on an increase in private external debt, the total amount of which reached about 2/5 of Russia's GDP on the eve of the global crisis (calculated from: [World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 34, 214, 256, 292 - 294, 308 - 310]) (this factor, along with a sharp drop in prices for raw hydrocarbons and government mistakes related to ignoring the crisis at the initial stages of its development, led to a sharp drop in GDP in 2009).

In the Russian Federation, the real rate of capital investment (in PPP terms, 12-13% of GDP) 2/5 less than in the Russian Federation (17-18%), almost 2 times less than in India (23%), and 3 times less than in China (38%) (calculated from: [World Development Indicators, 2008, p. 8-10; 2010, p .254-256;

24 The number of officially registered public demonstrations in China grew in 1994-2008 / 2009 at an average annual rate that was 2-3 times higher than the official GDP growth rate [Lai, 2010, p. 831; Why China..., 2011; Anderlini, 2011 (2)].

25 We emphasize that the accuracy of data on growth in the Russian Federation is low. The share of the unaccounted sector is from 1/4 to 1/2, and the calculation of deflators leaves much to be desired [Bashkatova, 2011(1)].

26 At the same time, according to the rating agency Fitch, the share of non-performing loans in Russian banks as of mid-2010 was approximately 1/4 [Voronova and Biyanova, 2010].

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World Factbook, 2011]). In 1987-2009, the average service life of fixed assets in Russia increased by almost 3/5, and their depreciation rate increased by more than 1/3, reaching almost half [Inozemtsev, 2010]. This resulted in numerous man-made disasters. Due to poor roads, the country is estimated to suffer losses equivalent to 3 to 5% of its GDP every year27.

In the Russian Federation, total expenditures on higher education, science and IT in GDP (in 2007, 6%) are 1/5 less than in India (7.6%), 2/5 less than in China (10%), and twice as much as in Asian NIS and WG (11-13%) [Melyantsev, 2007, pp. 115-116]. In contrast to many other countries, modern Russia is characterized by a relatively high average number of years of education of the adult population (according to our calculations and estimates, in 2007 - 13.6 years; in India-6.7 years; in China-8.4 years; in Russia-17 years) and a fairly high indicator of enrollment in higher education (75% compared to 13% in India, 22% in China, and 82% in the United States) [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p. 213; World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 106-108]. At the same time, however, the quality of education at school and in many universities, unfortunately, leaves much to be desired. Only 1/6 of university teachers are engaged in scientific work (this is almost 2 times less than at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s) [Sheregi and Strikhanov, 2006, p. 227; Shishkunova, 2010] 28. And the average life expectancy from birth, despite the increase in the standard of living in the Russian Federation over the past 10 years, generally does not change much: she (in 2009 68-69 years old) lower than in many Asian countries (71-73 years) [World Development Indicators, 2011, p. 120; Bashkatova, 2011(2)] with much lower per capita incomes.

The low efficiency and instability of growth in the Russian Federation29 are largely determined by the relatively low levels of technological and institutional development of the country [Melyantsev, 2009(2), p. 213]30, the lack of legitimacy of power and property, monopolism, and a high "degree of distrust" in society [Gudkov, 2011]. The Russian elite is the most corrupt and incompetent among countries with a similar level of development. According to the Corruption Perception Index, the Russian Federation ranked 154th out of 178 countries in 2010. With a relatively high per capita income, Russia is second only to other BRICS countries in terms of international competitiveness (in 2011, Brazil ranked 53rd, India ranked 56th, South Africa ranked 50th, China ranked 26th, and Russia ranked 66th out of 142 countries surveyed).. The Russian Federation lags far behind them not only in the innovation index, which in itself is very unfortunate (China ranks 29th, India 38th, South Africa 41st, Brazil 44th, and Russia 71st), but even more so in the quality of institutions (in Russia-128th place, Brazil-77th, India-69th, China-48th, South Africa-46th), according to the level of independence

27 According to a World Bank report, 70% of federal roads in the Russian Federation do not meet the minimum requirements for defects [Bashkatova, 2010; Kolesnichenko, 2008].

28 This is one of the most important factors in the fact that Russian universities occupy very low places in the world university ranking [Malykhin, 2010]. According to one estimate, Russia ranks 4th in the world in terms of the number of scientists, 8th in terms of spending on science, and 15th in terms of innovative products (Leskov, 2010).

29 According to our calculations, the contribution of efficiency (EFI) to GDP growth in 1999-2008 did not exceed 20-25%, i.e. it was 1/3 less than in China, 1.5 times less than in India, and half as much as in the Russian Federation (adjusted for changes in the degree of capacity utilization and the balance of migrant inflows according to: [Russian Economy, p. 9-10, 233; Russian Economic Report, June 2008, p. 2, 4; N 22, June 2010, p. 4-6]).

30 In 2008, the Russian Federation accounted for only 0.2 - 0.3% of global exports of high - tech goods, compared with 12.4% in the United States, 8.7% in Germany, 6.7% in Japan, 6.0% in South Korea, and 20.5% in China (the latter figure may be somewhat inflated, since it is generally considered to be the largest export market in the world). It is also considered to include goods of medium complexity) [World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 340-342].

31 corresponding places in the rating under consideration were -1 in New Zealand and Singapore (the lowest level of corruption), 8 in Australia, 30 in South Korea, 33 in Taiwan, 78 in China, 87 in India, 110 in Indonesia, 116 in Vietnam, 134 in the Philippines [Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010].

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courts and management efficiency (123rd place), property rights protection (130th place out of 142 in the Russian Federation) [The Global Competitiveness, 2011-2012, p. 15 - 22, 390, 395, 400]32.

Modernization of Russia, which is increasingly losing its position in the world and has shown its weakness within the BRICS [Farzad, 2010], is extremely necessary. But its possibilities are limited due to the fact that in a divided society, the top 5-10% of the population, having received the lion's share of the country's wealth 33 during the redistribution of property, are not very interested in risky (and unnecessary to them in fact) metamorphoses.

5. Returning to the main points of the text proposed for discussion, I emphasize, paraphrasing the well-known dictum of former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (on the French Revolution), that now, despite certain signs of the (new) rise of Asia [34] and the weakening of the West (slowing growth, worsening debt crisis) [35], it is too early to draw any conclusions.or the final results (in the spirit of the early F. Fukuyama), especially since, let's admit, we generally do not understand well enough the laws of evolution of the economic world around us. A number of important postulates of modern macroeconomics (the theory of equilibrium, market efficiency, etc.), which is still read with minimal changes in most universities of the world, are based on weak foundations [Market Idol, 2009; Kay, 2011; Skidelski, 2011]36.

Victorious "reports" about the rapid onset of the "Asian century" and the superiority of Asian growth models are premature for a number of reasons. A number of scenarios for the future development of the global economy take into account that in the near future growth in China and a number of other Asian countries may slow down due to the aggravation of their structural imbalances, the emergence of the so-called middle income trap.31

Let us also recall how much there was talk in the 1980s that Japan would soon be able to surpass the United States in terms of development. But despite all the hard work of the Japanese and their rather high creativity in innovation, Japan, which reached 78% of the US GDP per capita in 1990, fell to 75% in 2000 and 72% in 2010 (despite the fact that, according to the World Bank, the average annual growth rate is GDP per capita in the United States declined by 1/4-from 2.3-2.4% in the 1980s to 1.7-1.9% in 1990-2010) [World Development Indicators, 2003, p. 40, 188; 2011, p. 38, 193, 196; The World Factbook, 2011; Maddison, 2003, p. 89, 184].

Although China's GDP per capita has been growing at a rate about 3 times faster than that of the United States over the past three-plus decades, its absolute value is still very high.

32 The Russian Federation also dropped seven places in 2010 to 123rd among 183 countries in the ease of doing business ranking, while Uruguay and Uganda became its "neighbors" (see [Doing Business, 2011, p. 4]). The volume of net capital outflow from the private sector has grown very rapidly in recent years [Capital outflow..., 2011].

33 Privatization in the 1990s in the Russian Federation brought in 10 times less budget revenues than in Brazil [Shmelev, 2010].

34 Asia concentrated more than half of the world's GDP during the 18th of the 20th centuries A.D. Its share of global GDP has doubled in the last 30 years, now reaching 35-36% [Maddison Counting, 2010; The World Factbook, 2011].

35 According to D. Jorgson, a leading American expert on efficiency issues, the average annual productivity growth rate in the United States in the 2010s will be 1/4 less (1.5% per year) than in the previous two decades [Still Full of Ideas..., 2011]. It is obvious that purely liberal methods, which were actively promoted in Western countries, cannot save it (the West) [Roubini, 2011; Sachs, 2011; Pidd, 2011; Magnus, 2011; Feldstein, 2011].

36" We have created an ersatz capitalism with unclear rules " [Stiglitz, 2011, p. 350].

37 We are talking about a reduction in the demographic dividend and the effect of intersectoral movement of labor in the PRC, an increase in the cost of labor and the yuan, and the inability to continue the record-breaking growth of labor capital-to-labor ratio [Asia 2050..., 2011; Spengler, 2011; Eichengreen, 2011]. Moreover, if we know a little of the world's economic and political history, we can hardly imagine a situation where the RGS will allow the PC's to continue to strengthen, which continue to take away jobs and incomes from the former [Rodrik, 2011].

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the gap with the latter has at least doubled - from about $ 18,000 in 1980 to $ 40,000 in 2010 in PPP terms (although, of course, its relative level in comparison with the United States has increased more than 4 times over this time - from 3.5-4 to 16%).

The share of PCs in the global economic aiperarax, primarily due to Asian countries, is growing and, in particular, in global GDP reached 52-53% in 2010-2011 [Power Shift, 2011]. But since GDP, as you know, includes everything and everything, it is possible to exclude from the calculations everything that is associated with a very low level of development (and serves to meet the most basic basic needs) to clarify the relative economic power. Take, for example, an indicator that is 2 times higher than the World Bank's poverty threshold ($4 per day in PPP). Then the ratio between PC and RG will be mirrored and will be 47 - 48% : 52 - 53%. If we also raise the bar, say to $ 8 a day, to compare the consumption of higher-quality goods, services, and capital goods, then the ratio of potentials will be 2/5:3/5. So the superiority of developing countries, including Asian ones, is far from obvious.

By GDP (in PPP) China in 2010 accounted for more than 2/3 of the US figure, and India - 9/10 of Japan. However, in terms of national wealth, Japan and the United States were 2.6 and 3.2 times higher than India and China, respectively (graph. 2), while having its qualitatively different, post-industrial structure (Graph 3). It is noteworthy that the total volume of human (intellectual) capital of the United States, which is being increased both due to the efforts of Americans and due to the influx of European, Asian, Russian and other emigrants, exceeds the total national wealth of four countries - Japan, China, India, and Russia. In the latter, unfortunately, the share of intellectual capital turned out to be, firstly, less than in other countries of the "five", and, secondly, it is declining in the trend, which sharply limits the possibilities of its effective integration into the advanced echelons of the world economy of the XXI century.

Schedule 1

USA, China, Russia: potential ratio of the most important sectors, billion dollars, PPP 2010

Note: The secondary sector includes industry and construction. OP manufacturing industry.

Рассчитано по: The World Factbook, 2011. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/thc-world-factbook/gcos/xx.html Accessed 09.12.2011; The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2011, p. 198 - 200.

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Schedule 2

Total national wealth (human and physical capital, natural resources), PPP, $ 1 trillion, 2010

Schedule 3

National wealth structure,%, 2010

Note: N, K, and H are the shares of natural resources, physical capital, and human capital in the total national wealth structure, respectively.

Graph. 2 and 3 are calculated based on the data and methods contained in: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 212 - 214, 226 - 228, 254 - 256, 258 - 260; The World Bank. Global Economic Prospects, 2011, p. 4; The World Bank. Where Is the Wealth of Nations, 2006, p. 171 - 174; Мельянцев, 1996, с. 120, 187, 269 - 272; World Facthook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/thc-world-factbook/rankordcr/2001rank.html. Accessed 03.06.2011).

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