UNIVERSAL HISTORY BY LEONID SERGEEVICH*

The concept of L. S. Vasiliev has been known to specialists in the East for many years. At one time, when it was impossible to take a step without Karl Marx or, in extreme cases, F. Engels, it was called the concept of the "Asian mode of production"; when ideological freedom came, but it was still difficult to abandon the usual use of words, it became known as the concept of the "state mode of production". Now, according to the latest book, it has received the name "Eastern structure".

L. S. Vasiliev has written many monographs, but perhaps the most famous of them is "History of the East" in two volumes, published in the fourth edition, which is still the main textbook for all students taking this subject.

The novelty of this work lies not only in the fact that "West" was added to "East", but also in the fact that even the "eastern" chapters were written anew. According to the author, much of what was presented in the two-volume "History of the East", "including a considerable number of analytical arguments of a theoretical nature, the reader will be able to find in this work", but "verbatim repetition of the text is almost nowhere to be found" (I, p. 10). And it really is. You can only bow before a master who polished his conclusions many years ago, but does not consider any of his words cast in bronze. At the same time, speaking about himself (in the third person), L. S. Vasiliev writes: "He did not seek to create new theories for his new work" (ibid.). Indeed, the main positions of the researcher remained the same, but now the venerable scientist decided to write the history of the East into the history of all mankind. Or rather, to write the history of mankind in the history of the East. This intention is quite legitimate, because the history of the East is the history of the majority of humanity and the largest part of this history is 6 thousand years against 2.5 thousand years of the history of Europe. The long-cherished dream of overcoming Eurocentrism in the presentation of history will be realized. In any case, two volumes out of the planned six clearly demonstrate this intention. After reading them, you are convinced that only an orientalist should write world history.

One could say a lot about the author's broad and deep erudition, about successful passages dedicated to individual countries and societies. But the authority of L. S. Vasiliev as a historian is so high that such confessions will be superfluous. For such a generalizing work, the main thing is the concept. There are both loyal adherents of the constructions of L. S. Vasiliev, and those for whom they are completely unacceptable. But, oddly enough, no one has yet taken the trouble to analyze it in detail. I will say at once that, although I am an opponent of it, on many issues we have no disagreements with L. S. Vasiliev, and I fully accept some of his theses. Perhaps someone thinks that you can analyze the concept only when the work is completed, i.e. you need to wait for the release of the sixth volume. But when that will happen, it's hard to say right now. There is no point in postponing the conversation. The main thing is that it is based on the material of the early stages of history that this concept is grown up and it is based on them. So I think we can at least start discussing it.

The concept is based largely on the rejection of Marxism, especially historical materialism, which, according to L. S. Vasiliev, is a vulgarization of Marxism. It seems that its bitterness is somewhat overdue, especially when you consider that the textbook is intended for students who have not passed the "Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism" or "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy". No one preaches the theory of formations and does not promote the formation scheme ("five-member"), the "basis" and "superstructure"have long been forgotten. It's time to move from destroying to building. Vasiliev continues to fight enthusiastically with the defeated enemy, sometimes with an overlap.

* L. S. Vasiliev. Universal history. In 6 vols. Vol. 1: Ancient East and Antiquity. Vol. 2: East and West in the Middle Ages. Ucheb. posobie, Moscow: Vysshaya shkola Publ., 2007, 447 p.; 478 p.

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Thus, he denies not only the class struggle as the main driving force of history, but also the very existence of a sociological category of class. And this is no longer reasonable, because classes clearly manifest themselves in public life. In overthrowing the thesis of the decisive role of the class struggle, he proceeds from the fact that Marxism sees in it only and exclusively a mechanism for the replacement of one system by another (II, p.442). Nothing like that. Marxists have always recognized (and supported) the efforts of workers or other classes to improve their position within the former socio-economic system. Several quite neutral terms have indeed been "discredited" by Marxism. For example, "formation" or "production method". But this does not apply to the concept of "class". It is used by sociologists of various political views (those who in Soviet times were called "bourgeois scientists") along with such concepts as "ethnos", "confessions", "community", "community", "caste", "social stratum", "stratum" and others, without giving it a defining meaning. meaning neither in society, nor in politics. Using the concept of "class" does not mean recognizing the antagonistic nature of class relations, or believing in revolution as the engine of history, or in the ultimate victory of communism (I, p.54).

In some cases, L. S. Vasiliev vulgarizes Marxism, obviously to make it easier to overthrow it. For example, he presents the well-known position on the priority of the economic factor as a statement that a person must eat to the brim and satisfy all his other needs, and only then can he engage in science, art or politics. The author asks a rhetorical question: "Did the ability to get food with the help of tanned tools create and constantly evolve modern man in terms of not biological, but spiritual and intellectual perfection?" (II, p. 404). And successfully responds negatively to it. And below is another anecdotal account of Marxism: "At the heart of everything is the production of material goods. And after having eaten, dressed, warmed up in good homes, received full material support and much more, humanity could safely engage in other non-material affairs "(II, p. 432). But no one ever claimed that. In its most primitive form, this Marxist thesis reads as follows: before a person can think and draw the Monna Lisa, he must have something to eat. Further primitivization of this thesis is already unthinkable. And for the state to emerge, it is necessary that food production reaches such a level that a part of society is freed "from everyday worries about daily bread" (II, p. 410).

At the end of the second volume, the author even asserts that the essence of what is proposed in the book "is reduced to questioning the scheme of basis and superstructure created by Marxism" (II, p.403). This is the author slandering himself. The content of the book is much richer, and it is not rational to spend effort on solving such a problem.

I am not calling for preserving the concepts of basis and superstructure. They are meaningless, if only because, on mature reflection, the superstructure turns out to be part of the basis. But in place of one theory, it would be necessary to propose another, and this is not possible for the author. L. S. Vasiliev quite rightly points out that the source of movement is not mysterious "productive forces", but inquisitive individuals, inventors (II, pp. 407, 409, 433). However, the main problem is not at all in this, but in the question of why something is being invented, "what motivated people to exchange some tools of production for others" (II, p. 433). The author asks this question, but does not answer it. Nor does it raise another question: why do some inventions remain fun toys (like gunpowder in China) or are not noticed at all by society (like Yablochkov's light bulb or Polzunov's steam engine), while others are picked up and really become factors of progress? This means that the issue rests on the level of development of society or on the natural conditions in which society is placed. Of course, the author understands all this perfectly and in the section "Man and Nature in history" is forced to return to the objective conditions of the existence of societies - to the nature of soils and irrigation opportunities, to the need for "purposeful efforts for survival and at least some well - being" (II, pp. 428-429, 440). But it does not develop the problem of driving forces further.

The eulogy of the "creative personalities" who "were the most important driving force of the historical process" is very sympathetic, but the main mystery of progress lies not in them, but in those ordinary, gray people who perceived new ideas "mainly only to the extent necessary for their socialization" (II, p. 438). Australian Aborigines themselves learned how to create polished (Neolithic) stone tools 20 thousand years ago, but rejected this innovation and remained Paleolithic tribes. The Indians did not accept the ideas of the Buddha, nor did the Jews accept the ideas of Christ. It's not about thinking about ro at all-

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lew personalities and masses. The state of societies, their responsiveness to innovations, the degree of their dynamism - all these things may not be measurable, not verifiable, but, of course, the main ones for the fate of these societies.

The question of the driving forces of development is one of the examples of the fact that many of the author's thoughts are under-formulated and presented inconsistently. Other examples are given below.

I support Vasiliev's opinion that fundamental inventions were made, as a rule, in one place, and then the ideas of these inventions traveled around the world. Of course, we have previously paid absolutely insufficient attention to the process of diffusion of discoveries and ideas. But each society reacted to the new idea in its own way. Some accepted it and developed it, others accepted it with great caution and with delay (Ancient Egypt, for example, did not perceive iron until the VI - V centuries BC, although it was more socially and politically developed than the surrounding tribes that used iron tools), and still others did not perceive it at all. Simplifications of Marxist views are annoying not only in themselves, but also because they can really mislead modern students who are not familiar with Karl Marx's theory and with all the works on its development.

The author continues to persistently attract support for the idea of K. Marx's idea of an " Asiatic mode of production," as all the "Asiatics" did forty years ago, when without such support it was impossible to say a word at all. Marx served as a fairly strong shield for all those who put forward new ideas. But why put a shield on yourself now when no one is attacking? Why, contrary to the obvious, claim that the "Asian mode" did not fit into his own, Marx's, scheme of formations (I, p. 53, 60; II, p. 30, 411, 414) and attribute to Marx that by "Asian mode of production" he meant "a way of managing society" (II, p. 412). Marx could not confuse the mode of production with the mode of management. It is quite blasphemous to say: "Marx actually recognized the primacy of the state, of the political structure of society "(II, p. 415).

I did not think that I would have to return to such a burning question in the 1950s and 1960s.: what exactly did Marx mean by the "Asiatic mode of production"? Really, it doesn't matter in the least now. But what if the book, which by all indications is destined to become the desktop book of Russian students, reanimates this problem again, and in a completely erroneous interpretation of it?

I have already stated all this [Alaev, 2000, p. 437, 439-440], but I have to repeat myself. There is no evidence that the "Asian way" somehow "did not fit" into the scheme of formations. Wherever this "method" or "Asian order" is mentioned, it comes first in the list, i.e. it is synonymous with primitiveness. And Vasiliev explicitly admits this (I, pp. 53, 55). His repeated references to the fact that Marx did not see classes in the East (I, p.55,251) cannot carry any meaning, because, according to Marx, in a primitive society there really should not be classes. Marx introduced the "Asian" stage into his scheme not to emphasize the peculiarities of the East, but with the opposite goal-to fit it into the general scheme, highlighting the first stage for it. When the "communal theory" of G. L. Maurer appeared, Marx considered that his concept of the Asian (i.e., communal) mode of production as the first stage of human development was confirmed, and four times made it clear that the "Asian system" is the first stage of European history [Marx, Engels, vol. 13, p. 20; vol. 19, p. 346; vol. 23, p. 88; vol. 32, p. 36]. Now this hypothesis is outdated, and these statements cause confusion. It is difficult to understand how an educated and intelligent person of the nineteenth century could think that the modern East is at a primitive stage. L. S. Vasiliev seems to understand what Marx is trying to say and exclaims: "It would seem that this is nonsense" (I, p.55). Yes, nonsense. Yes, he "left his active followers perplexed" because they could not accept that Marx was making a clear incongruity. But Karl Marx has earned the right to his own opinion, and it is not necessary to distort it.

The conclusion that inevitably follows from the above is that Vasiliev's concept in this part cannot be based on Marx. Leonid Sergeyevich rejected Marx's theory. Okay. But then why did he need one of this thinker's apparently unsuccessful hypotheses? Here's why: it's hard to get rid of the Marxist legacy. Below I will draw attention to cases when Marx's views and formulations permeate the work of Leonid Sergeevich, apparently against his will.

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The positive part of L. S. Vasiliev's views is presented in the book weaker than the negative part. He pre-dates the presentation of the actual historical outline with chapters of the most general content: "History as a science "and"Philosophy of History". Naturally, such chapters are very useful in the tutorial. There are many indisputable arguments in them. But it remains unclear what concept the author adheres to. Moreover, in his opinion, "true history should not, cannot be written from the point of view of any concept developed on modern material" (I, p.66). The expression "based on modern material" sounds strange. It seems quite clear that any historiosophical concept must be based (or at least claim to be based) on the material of the whole of history. It turns out that the concept for writing a story is not needed at all? But then how to write it? Let's see how this is done in practice.

Several chapters are devoted to "prehistory": "History and Homo Sapiens", "The Emergence of Society" and "The Emergence of the State". You can't do without them either, because the story needs to start somewhere. But first we must raise the question of how to relate to the so-called history of primitive society or to the "anthropological" construction of the scheme of socio - and politogenesis. The fact is that all theories of the formation of human society, and then the emergence of the state, are based on ethnographic material, i.e. on the material of societies that have not overcome one or another milestone in the formation of a stratified society. Social and cultural anthropologists try to construct a process, a movement based on the material of immobile societies. They are trying to understand how people went to civilization on the material of peoples who are not going anywhere! The data of different peoples are glued together into a single picture using logic, i.e. the anthropologist's own ideas of how development should go.

L. S. Vasiliev quite definitely states that "one can speak about history only from the moment when writing and the first written texts appeared" (I, p. 20, 21), but then presents a scheme that is not historical, without reservations that it is only a logical scheme. All theories of the origin of the State are particularly vulnerable. They are constructed based on the presumption of priority of internal factors of evolution. We are told that social and economic inequality gradually arises, that the power of the headman or leader gradually increases, that a managerial apparatus and a layer of noble people are formed around him, etc.However, the independent emergence of the state occurred only in six points of the Old World, and this scheme may have been carried out in these points. This is exactly what we don't know, because we don't have such early documents (they can't possibly exist). And we draw up the scheme purely logically, attracting disparate material from various tribes. Most states have emerged under the influence of primary state societies, i.e., with the participation of a strong external factor, which is not taken into account in the theories of politogenesis.

Specifically, this logical approach to the early stages of history leads to several errors. One of them is the postulated "free community", in which the elder "distributes" arable land and lands (I, p. 138, 140-141). Land "was traditionally considered primarily a collective possession of the community" (I, p. 149). It also mentions the termination of the supposedly existing regular redistribution of family plots. This could be written in the middle of the 19th century, when a logical one-line approach to primitive history prevailed, the process of the emergence of agriculture was not known, there was no concept of the "Neolithic revolution" yet. Now it is clear that with the advent of settlement and agriculture, plots of arable land immediately became family properties, and the community was not involved in regulating land use. I wrote about this [Alaev, 1977; Alaev, 2000, pp. 168-182], relying on the works of Russian and German scientists, whose authority is high. No matter how one treats the concepts of Yu. I. Semenov, no one will deny his encyclopedic education in terms of information about primitive and early class societies. And it claims not tothere is not a single example of collective farming or land redistribution at the stage of an early agricultural community [Semenov, 1979, p. 75-81; Semenov, 1993, p.411-412].

Not finding a community in Ancient Egypt, L. S. Vasiliev is forced to think that "the agricultural community with all its traditions of collective land use ""disappeared without a trace from the first steps of civilization" (I, p. 175). How does the author know that it existed and that there were traditions of collective land use in it?! Many people wrote about the community in this spirit in the centuries before and last, but one day this thoughtless schematism must end. I am sure that the idea of a once-common communal economy and of subsequent changes in the economy of the country is not entirely clear.-

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the redefinition of the earth penetrated the work of L. S. Vasiliev directly from the sketches of K. Marx's letter to V. Zasulich [Marx, Engels, vol. 19, p. 418].

In principle, Vasiliev has the same source when considering the community of the ancient Germans - namely, "Mark" and" On the History of the Ancient Germans " by F. Engels. According to the views of a century and a half ago, the allod turns into private property, stratification of small owners occurs, large landholdings arise, the owners of which make the peasantry "feudal-dependent". There is a community in the form of a "village assembly", which has the right to " make verdicts necessary and binding for the population of the community "(II, p. 231). A. Ya. Gurevich has long shown that this scheme is far - fetched and has nothing to do with reality [Istoriya..., 1985, p. 90-136]. And no one objected to him. The allod did not become private property, and buying up allods was unthinkable. The community did not exist at that time. The owners lived in separate farms. In this story, it is again noticeable that it is very difficult to get rid of old-Marxist ideas.

Another mistake resulting from the anthropological approach to history is the construction of a scheme for the emergence of power-property, i.e., the formation of exploitation of community members by levying a tax on them**. The tax system-according to the logical scheme-arises by strengthening the power of the head of the collective, the leader, who becomes the sovereign. Meanwhile, early civilizations were based not on small farms that were subject to "rent-tax", but on large farms (economic complexes) that belonged to temples or the treasury, in which dependent people worked, deprived not only of land ownership, but often of any property at all. This is demonstrated by ancient Egypt, and the early states of Mesopotamia (the most striking example is the III dynasty of Ur), and Ancient China (warehouses of stone sickles have been preserved from these farms). L. S. Vasiliev calls the ancient Egyptian economic system "barrack-command" (I, p. 176). Good expression. But this is not a "centralized redistribution", but a completely different system. And the emergence of such a system, namely, a wide stratum of workers deprived of property and in a situation close to slavery, the concept of the gradual strengthening of the power of the leader and the appearance of rent - tax does not explain. In other words, all this carefully constructed, I would even say, well-established scheme of the emergence of the state turns out to be useless for understanding the specific process that took place in the Middle East, in the Nile Valley, and, presumably, in other places in the 5th - 3rd millennium BC.

The transition from the system of large state-owned farms to small-scale peasant farming, which enjoys a certain economic independence and is exploited by means of taxes, was a significant step forward, which took place at the end of the ancient era and marked the transition to the medieval order. But Vasiliev does not want to notice this. For him, "... Egypt with its high degree of centralization or India with its exceptionally strong almost autonomous community "demonstrate" fundamental similarities". In both cases, he sees power-ownership and centralized redistribution. "It doesn't matter,

** In an article about the phenomenon of feudalism, L. S. Vasiliev, reproaching me for questioning its priority in introducing the concept of "power-property" into scientific circulation, and also distorting the content of this concept, writes that in his works, " where the term "power-property" is often used, never nothing was said about the "eastern system of exploitation". In general, the concept of "power-property" has no direct connection with the Marxist concept of "exploitation of workers": it is much deeper and more serious than it seems to Alaev, who uses it rather frivolously and often inappropriately" (Vasiliev, 2007, p.152) (for a similar footnote, see II, p. 39). The reproach is probably just. I really have no idea what depth is hidden under this concept. "Power" means the right to tax, "property" means the right to rent. Combining these concepts means a special form of exploitation. Whom? Working or not working - it's like when, and that's another question. At the end of the first volume, it turns out that L. S. Vasiliev really does not see exploitation in the East. There was an "exchange of activities". "The lower classes worked, the upper classes ruled... Each of the numerous social strata, each of the categories of subjects did their job and were necessary for the normal functioning of the socio-political organism as a whole" (I, p.248). Well, all right, there is no Soviet power now, we don't have to repeat "unrestrained exploitation of the masses" all the time, but Leonid Sergeevich and I are well aware of the situation of the lower strata of the city and countryside in China and India. They were reduced to the level of animal existence. And this is called "doing your own thing"? Let's talk about the priority of putting forward the concept of "power-property" separately.

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what exactly it looked like and what shape it took" (I, p. 246). It's important to me. I am a historian, and if I see that in one case the state controls each producer and dictates to him all agricultural operations and crops grown, and in the other case it is completely uninterested in all this, but is concerned only with collecting taxes from economically independent producers, then I declare that these are different systems (structures, methods of production) and different companies.

No, says Vasiliev, " in the East there was only one form of farming - communal-state." This form of economy, on the one hand, refers to the period "before the beginning of the privatization process", on the other hand, it "catches the eye" "in any epoch" (I, pp. 247, 248). I cannot understand this thesis and this word formation.

In connection with this story, I will allow myself to make only one comment about the coverage of the history of China. I have noticed that Sinologists generally do not attach much importance to the abolition of the allotment system. Vasiliev also writes epically: "The reforms of Yang Yang in 780 eliminated the allotment system, assigning land plots to those who currently owned them, and allowing the practice of selling plots" (II, p. 142), and does not return to this question again. Meanwhile, this reform (which was not subsequently revised) means that the great Chinese state, so powerful and so traditional, has abandoned its centuries-old attempts to regulate the land ownership of taxpayers and the land use of them and their tenants throughout the Middle Kingdom. Has it radically changed the "eastern structure" or "power-property"? I do not know in what units the degree of power can be measured, but the rejection of the allotment system was a fundamental step towards the recognition of private land ownership. There is still no private land ownership in China. Well, the mole of history digs slowly.

The second password after "power-property" to enter the Vasilievsky " operating system "is"centralized redistribution". "Depending on the title, rank, position, kinship to the ruler, and some other circumstances, each of them (those in power - L. A.) received from the state treasury what he was entitled to, and this was precisely what was centralized redistribution" (I, p. 247). But we know very well that such situations were extremely rare in the East. Even in China, where officials were supposedly paid from the treasury, they were actually fed on bribes that they collected at the place of their service and which were not considered bribes at that time. As for India and the countries of the Near and Middle East, the main form of remuneration for "title, rank, and proximity to the ruler" was the distribution of land possessions - ikta, Tiuli, soyurgals, Timars, zeamets, and Jagirs.

One can, of course, argue that land and income from it are the property of the state, i.e. also "treasury", so that "military fiefs", as they are often (perhaps incorrectly) called, are also "centralized redistribution". But only a modern analyst can think that way. The Iktadars, Tiuldars, and Jagirdars of that time understood the difference perfectly well and resisted fiercely when they were asked to transfer them from the remuneration of land ownership to a salary from the treasury. So "centralized redistribution" is a term that embraces several variants of the structure of the ruling stratum.

From" power-property "logically follows" rent-tax". This category is another tangible "fragment" of the Marxist view of the East. L. S. Vasiliev insists that in the East the tax was rent for land (I, p.140). However, it is well known that there were wealthy taxpayers (in China- "large" and "medium" households, in India - zamindars) who exploited tenants and various kinds of dependents and slaves. They bought up land and could sell it - hence they received rent, otherwise the land could not be a commodity. It is clear that, as a rule, the tax did not coincide with rent, and the community member acted as the owner of the land (subordinate, dependent, oppressed, but still the owner).

Summing up the results of the study of ancient society in the East, L. S. Vasiliev insists that there were only three "groups" (below he calls them "social strata"; it is important for him not to call them "classes"): stewards, producers (workers) and servants (I, p.251). "Among them," he points out, "there is no place for private owners and rich commoners" (I, p.252). How so? There are rich commoners, but there is no place for them! "All of them, as a rule, were included in the groups from which they originated." Let me ask you, what do you mean by "turned on"? Who was included? Vasiliev here is not talking about social strata, but about the gradation adopted in imperial China

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on officials, "good people" and "vile people". But this gradation did not reflect reality. Just because someone was "listed" as a peasant in Imperial China does not mean that they were actually a peasant. The same can be said about other countries. If a brahmana rented land to a tenant, he was still a brahmana, of course, but socially he was a landowner.

So, I do not agree with the fact that in the ancient and medieval East there were no private owners as a special social stratum. I divide eastern society (of course, using the example of India) into the dominant stratum (who lived on the collection and redistribution of taxes), the layer of communal owners (the main contingent of rent recipients) and the lower strata, among which were tenants, artisans, employees who were in varying degrees of dependence, and slaves. The social group of merchants did not belong to any of these layers, occupying a position between them (first and second, second and third). The subjects (except for the upper stratum) were by no means defenseless in the face of despotic power. Communities, corporations, family and clan groups, fraternities and what are called "guilds "in cities, religious sects and secret societies - they did not just" mitigate arbitrariness", they ensured the functioning of the entire system in the absence of legal guarantees of life and property. This is clearly stated in Vasiliev (I, pp. 252-253).

The main nerve of L. S. Vasiliev's concept and the main idea of the book under review is the irreversible bifurcation of humanity in the middle of the 1st millennium BC, the emergence of the" West", which eventually became a modern Western society. The author believes that modern capitalism developed directly from ancient society, that it is, in fact, one and the same society ("ancient-capitalist"). The author repeatedly convinces the reader that ancient society was characterized by complete unlimited private property (I, p. 16, 422, 429, 436, 440). It is not clear how all this can be stated, knowing that the land was considered the property of the city (community). Both in Greece and especially in Rome, a significant part of the land remained in the common ownership of the city (ager publicus). How can we speak of free private property if in Athens a" land maximum " was established, which limited the purchase of land (in Rome, too: I, p. 360, 378), and before Solon, the property of the deceased became the property of his philae (I, p.307). The Spartiates generally denied their private property (I, p. 305). The Gracchi brothers drew on the deep sense of community that permeated Roman society, which was clearly contrary to the idea of private property, to carry out their reforms. The author reports that the tyrants Kimpsel and Periander expelled from Corinth "all the aristocrats, confiscating their lands and distributing them to the poor" (I, p. 300). Land was also taken later (I, p. 308). What was the status of respect for private property rights in these cases?

L. S. Vasiliev is also surprised when he speaks about the freedom of the ancient Greeks and the rights of their individual (II, p. 419). It is interesting that the Spartiates "were free and full citizens of their state formation", but "the authorities actively interfered in all the details of the life of members of the" community of equals" " (I, p.304, 305). How do individual rights relate to ostracism in Greece and proscriptions in Rome? The author agrees that the limits of freedom in the ancient world "were not unlimited" (I, p. 433). But this is clearly not enough to characterize the " rights of the individual in the ancient way." The author is inclined to present the Athenian democracy and the democracy that existed in several other poleis as an early version of the modern European one. "In antiquity, a democratic society of free citizens emerged" (II, p. 415). He often speaks of "elections" and even "electorates" (I, pp. 441, 442). But it is known that the Greeks did not invent representative democracy, there were no elections in the modern sense, everything was decided by lot.

Macedonia, after the conquest of all of Greece by Alexander, "borrowed from Hellas the foundations of the ancient structure "(is it really freedom and democracy? - L. A.), but " enriched them... a different system of power at the top of the state" (I, p. 443). Very interesting: "enriched" the republic with a monarchy! In other words, the author doesn't want to see Athenian democracy die. Many times it is repeated that the Roman Empire (in fact, the entire ancient world) experienced an internal crisis (I, p. 446, 447), but this thesis is not revealed.

It seems to me that L. S. Vasiliev's consideration of the role of slavery is also connected with the struggle against Marxism mentioned above - more specifically, with historical materialism in the Soviet version. It would be possible to approach this issue more calmly, since it is generally resolved. Quite justifiably, as it seems to me, rejecting the existence of a "slave-owning mode of production" at any time and anywhere, Leonid Sergeevich, as is characteristic of him,

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going too far. Having established the" foundation "of ancient society, namely" respect for law, property, and civil liberties, " he begins to obscure the fact that its free and democratic Greeks and Romans were slaveholders. "And whether there were slaves or not at all, whether slavery played a small or significant role - this is only something secondary, which did not affect the essence of the structure" (I, p.436). Moreover, it turns out that democracy was established precisely for the purpose of gradually eliminating slavery: "a considerable number of slaves eventually found freedom," and "this, if you will, is the meaning of ancient democracy" (I, p.441). It's hard to imagine someone who "likes" it.

The importance of slave labor in the economy is one problem. Most likely, it did not determine the nature of social production. But the preservation and development of slavery as an institution, as well as the slave-owning mentality (a firm belief that "barbarians" are meant to be slaves) among the "democratic" citizens of the polis, is a completely different matter. This is an indicator of the moral level of society, its infancy from the point of view of modernity. And from this point of view, slavery cannot play a "minor" role in the evaluation of ancient society.

The meaning of the obvious modernization of the ancient order undertaken by Leonid Sergeevich is to build a single European path of development-from Athens to London and then to Washington (I, p. 9,447; II, p. 230). "The Western world... the heir of ancient democracy " (I, p. 9).The Middle Ages were "a very significant interval between two epochs of the triumph of the West" (I, p. 447). Moreover, the world is still dominated by the "ancient structure" (II, pp. 42-43, 416).

To convince them of this, it is necessary not only to "purge" ancient Greece and Rome of everything ancient (i.e., "ancient"), but also to throw out the Middle Ages from the history of Europe. It should be argued that, on the one hand, even after the fall of Rome, certain "traditions of personal freedom of citizens" were preserved in the cities of the early Middle Ages (II, p. 34; I wonder which ones), and on the other hand, that Western Europe was invaded by hordes of "nomadic barbarians" who came from the East (II, p. 24 however, below, p. 34, they are called "semi-nomads"), which is completely wrong. The Germanic tribes were sedentary and by that time had" experience " of staying in Europe for at least 1.5 thousand years. When it comes to the Barbarian conquest of Rome, the Huns are persistently mentioned among the tribes (I, p.444), although it is known that the Huns were defeated and driven back on the Catalaunian fields and had nothing to do with the creation of barbarian kingdoms. But they are needed to argue that these kingdoms were " Eastern in structure "(I, p. 445) and even "genetically related primarily to the East" (II, p.33).

Feudalism is proposed to be understood as a political structure (the author writes "socio-political", but there is nothing social in his understanding), which arises if the state" for some reason " does not have an administrative apparatus. Moreover, it is, on the one hand, a "world-historical phenomenon", and on the other - it occurs "in a few cases" (II, p.31, 230), "extremely rarely, in a few cases" (II, p. 32, 108). The question of whether the concept of "feudalism" includes a certain degree of dependence of the peasantry or serfdom remains unclear. Speaking about Russia, the author first asserts that " the existence of serf slavery has no direct relation to the system of feudal characteristics "(II, p. 41), and a few pages later asserts that "only with the fall of serfdom did the process of de-feudalization in Russia come to an end" (II, p.46). But "de-feudalization", in his own words, is the strengthening of the power of the center, the emergence of a strong ruler and an effective administration, the elimination of feudalism as a "system of liberties of hereditary nobility" (II, p.45). With this understanding of defeodalization, it began in Russia almost with Ivan the Terrible.

According to L. S. Vasiliev, on the one hand, "feudalism in Western Europe... was the flesh of the flesh of the classical Eastern structure " (II, p. 37), "was a product of the traditional Eastern structure "(II, p. 44), which is characterized by the presence of a strong state and "centralized redistribution", on the other - "feudalism, thus - decentralized redistribution in politically weakened states" (II, p. 44). p. 33). Other original ideas naturally follow from this position. For example, the characterization of the homage rite as an oriental institution, and chivalric courtesy as an element of "revived antiquity" sounds curious (II, p. 34). The author is forced to reconsider the accepted views regarding Byzantium. It is generally believed that Byzantium underwent a process of gradual orientalization. But L. S. Vasiliev believes that by maintaining a centralized administration, it has avoided the "typical

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Eastern early feudalism", preserved the ancient traditions and, consequently, became more "Western" than the West (II, p. 37).

The emergence of ancient society was indeed the greatest event in the life of mankind (along with the emergence of morality in the "axial time" and the rise of Western Europe in the XV - XVII centuries). The legacy of ancient science, art and political ideas undoubtedly played a huge role in the further development of the whole world. Without this legacy, even Arab-Muslim civilization would not have taken place as we know it. It is clear that this legacy has played an even more significant role for Western Europe. But Europe did not just "develop" ancient ideas. It has multiplied its legacy: it has created a new science (experimental, what we now call science), a new art, and a new political system. City self-government of the Middle Ages arose independently, not on the basis of ancient traditions. The same can be said of the Parliament, the States-General, or the Cortes. These were estate meetings, i.e., meetings of various classes.e. an institution fundamentally different from the ancient self-government bodies. Medieval science (scholasticism, alchemy) was of European and Arab-Muslim origin, which was by no means a" development of the views " of Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. The idea of the priority of individual rights over the rights of the collective (society), which underlies the modern European social order, simply could not have originated in the bowels of ancient society and required significant efforts in the fight against the church and the state in the Middle Ages. Vasiliev admits that "the Renaissance was based on humanism, i.e., the idea of protecting the freedom and dignity of the individual, freeing people from oppression by those in power, including the church, and from slavish submission to their masters" (II, p.336).

"In the Middle Ages, Athenian democracy was practically unknown," and when it was first introduced during the Renaissance, European thinkers decried it for a long time [Marinovich, 2007, p.13]. We must not forget that antiquity has fallen into disrepair. Now we will not determine for what reason. Even if it really was an attempt to conform to modern bourgeois norms, it must be admitted that it ended in failure. In short, the Western European Middle Ages were not just a "break" in the" European " development of Europe, but an important period of its maturation.

Consideration of the history of the medieval East as a whole remained the same as in the previous works of Vasiliev. He continues to argue that nothing fundamentally new happened in the Middle Ages, and considers antiquity and the Middle Ages separately only for the convenience of presentation (II, pp. 72-73). However, here, as in the provisions discussed above, his position is somewhat complicated and therefore becomes contradictory. Between antiquity and the Middle Ages in the East, a "barrier" of several centuries is being built. The Medieval East had "little in common with ancient Eastern civilizations" (I, p.17); the Middle Ages differed from antiquity "in many respects" not only in the West, but also in the East. Once he mentions the spiritual changes that took place in the Middle Ages (I, p.438), referring to the world religions and the strengthening of Confucianism in China. The author notes "the discovery and widespread use of new technologies", "cultural achievements" and the fact that " The East has also changed in terms of the prevailing type of state "(II, p. 19). This refers to large empires. It is recognized that in the Middle Ages there was an "expansion of the zone developed by urban civilization" (II, p. 22), as well as a significant development of trade, including caravan (II, p. 25). But all this, in the author's opinion, should not be given serious importance: "we are not talking about any fundamental structural differences" (I, p. 427, highlighted by the author; II, p. 18).

What does the author mean by "structural differences"? We don't have to look for a "method of production" anymore. The change in the nature of statehood and the spread of new, namely world, religions - are these minor changes? We can also see changes in the economy. An economically independent peasant economy is established as the main type of economy. The state refuses (as in China) from interference in the land ownership and land use of community members.

In this regard, let's return to the concept of "power-property". Leonid Sergeyevich insists on his priority in developing it. So be it. But we are not interested in the role of L. S. Vasiliev in science, but in the essence of the problem of feudal land ownership. A. Ya. Gurevich wrote in his 1970 book: "The feudal lord's land ownership was mediated by his power over the peasant, property on his person", " The King granted, in fact, power over people, and not land ownership, immunity, not an estate." "The concepts of "power", "management" and "property"

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(odal) are constantly mixed up in the sources of that time: they were indistinguishable to medieval Scandinavians." "Feudal property did not represent the right to freely dispose of any territory, but power over the people living and working on this land." "The question of property was at the same time a question of power" [Gurevich, 1970, pp. 44-46, 59]. I leave it to the reader to judge who said " a " first. For me, it is not the priority of individuals that matters, but the priority of Western Europe. It is there, within the framework of feudal orders, that power and property merge.

N. P. Pavlov-Silvansky proved the existence of feudalism in Russia back in 1910, referring, in particular, to the same phenomenon - the unification of land ownership and power over the population in one hand [Pavlov-Silvansky, 1988, pp. 288-290]. So, power-property is a sign of feudal social (including economic) relations.

Of course, it is possible on this basis to consider the Western European states in the Middle Ages as "Eastern despotisms". But this innovation of Leonid Sergeevich is unlikely to be taken seriously.

It is impossible not to respond to passages related to the understanding of "civilization", since this topic is extremely fashionable now in Russian social studies (in the West, the fashion for it has already passed). L. S. Vasiliev touches on it, although it is not directly related to the point of view he puts forward on the history of mankind. And it solves the problem of criteria for distinguishing civilizations in a sweeping way. This criterion is " simple and reducible... to a particular religious system" (II, p. 418). Indeed, it is not simple, but very simple. This is stated in the section on bifurcation and the differences between West and East. But, for example, the religious views of the ancient Aryans (Vedism), the ancient Greeks and the ancient Slavs (paganism) were essentially identical, and not just similar, but came from the same root. Does this mean that they were part of a single civilization, or that they were identical civilizations? The relationship between the concepts of "civilization" and "religion" will remain a subject of debate for some time to come.

* * *

In a work of this scale, there are necessarily some errors in the presentation of the material of those countries for which the author is not an expert. Such minor inaccuracies do not change the overall impression of the book and therefore, strictly speaking, are inappropriate in an article that examines its general concept. But still, as an indologist, it is my duty to note the inaccuracies and errors in the relevant chapters to help the author avoid repeating them when republishing. I would like other colleagues, experts on individual countries, to read this book carefully and express their comments to the author.

There are several comments about the coverage of the Indian civilization, in particular the idea that it was a "not too large" "enclave". In fact, it is the longest of the oldest civilizations. It covered the entire Indus Valley with its numerous tributaries and extended far beyond its borders to the east (the Delhi region, the Saraswati River valley, the whole of modern Gujarat). Therefore, it could not possibly "maintain itself on foreign trade" (I, p. 198). The author clearly exaggerates the trade relations of Harappa with Middle Eastern civilizations and at the same time claims that it is connected with the Middle Eastern civilization "only by its origin" (ibid.). Just its origin is established quite accurately -it is autochthonous. Connections with Mesopotamia have indeed been established, but not on the same scale as Vasiliev thinks. There was no "abundance of shipyards", but only one shipyard in Lothal. The ethnic connections of the Hindus with the Sumerians (I, p. 199) is also an unsubstantiated claim. At the level of a brilliant guess, there are also claims that the decline of the Indian civilization was caused by the decline of Sumer (I, p. 199, 261).

The religious views of the Aryans of the Vedic times are inaccurately stated. They are credited with many things that appeared later, such as the doctrine of the reincarnation of souls, the concept of the supreme reality (Brahman). By the way, the Vedas are not" texts of legends " (I, p.200), but hymns, mantras and incantations.

The author has a trusting attitude to the Brahmanic literature, which exalted the Brahmins in every possible way. So he says, for example, that only brahmans could break out of the circle of sansara, that kshatriyas could not rise above the varna of the brahmans (I, p. 201). Fantastic phrase: "The rulers did not feel absolutely legal top of power, state and society"

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(I, p. 214). Even more exotic is Vasiliev's opinion that if a brahmin was enslaved, then his master had to ask him to do something (I, p.215). The kshatriyas cannot be called the "Varna of officials" (I, p.201, 211).

Apparently, Vasiliev repeats the conclusions of the penultimate century that "the main attention is paid to the population of the country... he focused on the problem of relationships with the non-phenomenal world. Everyone first of all cared about their place in the karmic circle of the wheel of samsara... and so I didn't think much about today's profane problems of the earthly world" (I, p.63). Do I need comments here? After all, India was the largest producer of fabrics, spices, iron and steel, and many other goods in Asia (perhaps after China), which is why gold and silver settled in it. This would hardly be possible if India were not an economic power.

L. S. Vasiliev shows a lack of understanding of the specifics of Indian communities when he writes that full-fledged community members could belong to different castes (I, p. 203), or when he believes that Rajputs and Brahmins, "settling on the land, became members of communities" (II, p.109). No, the landowning collective of the Indian community is always of the same cast. Rajputs, as well as Brahmins, received land and became a community themselves, pushing the previous owners down to the position of tenants. Contrary to the known data, the author claims that the community was headed by an elected body, that full-fledged community members themselves cultivated their own land, which they only "used", and that land ownership belonged to the community. However, he admits that the community leaders could rent out their land, but for some reason believes that the tenants could be "only from their own community" (I, p. 203). I do not give materials about how "it will be right", because all this is covered in the indological literature and there is not enough space to describe all this here.

In one passage (I, p.205) it is said that kshatriyas have "increased in number"; in another (I, p. 206) it is said that "the number of kshatriyas... it gradually decreased." This "observation" plays an important role in the author's understanding of the subsequent story: since kshatriyas died in battle, and even "at a young age", the states lost their army and became weak. Therefore, they began to be ruled by "foreigners, i.e. representatives of the lower Shudra varna" (I, p. 210). The author's imagination does not fail him when he worries about a sudra who has become a rajah: "He must have suffered internally from being surrounded by representatives of the Kshatriya varna" (ibid.). "A sudra foreigner, even if he was a powerful ruler of India, could not be ranked higher than the three varnas of the twice-born Aryans" (I, p.215). I will have to reassure the humane author: the Indian philosophical mind long ago invented psychological mechanisms that made it possible to turn a sudra into a non-sudra and raise him, if necessary, above all others.

Separately, I will say about the constant refrain " shudras are strangers." Indeed, the most common view is that the Varna Shudras were descendants of the local pre-Aryan population. But by the time the chapter deals with them, they were completely assimilated and were not perceived as foreigners in any way.

The free handling of the material can be illustrated by the statement that the first Nanda dynasty "probably" belonged to "an ethnic community that came from the west (? - A. L.) and was alien to the Indo-Aryans" (I, p.206). Chandragupta Maurya, who received an audience at the court of Alexander the Great, is called the latter's " confidant "(ibid.).

It is said of Siddhartha Gautama, i.e., the Buddha, that he spent "a turbulent and careless youth in search of pleasure and enjoyment" (I, p. 211). In fact, it wasn't much fun - they didn't let him out of the palace and made sure he didn't learn anything about life.

The" short-lived " Kushan state (II, p. 105) still lasted for about 300 years.

Another statement, apparently based on "own" sources:" There was no hierarchy, no strictly established vassalage in the usual sense of the word, much less chivalrous norms of military valor or anything else like that " (II, p.107). What is "strictly established", what is "in the usual sense of the word"? You can read about vassalage and hierarchy here [Alaev, 2003, p. 66-68], and the "knightly norms of military valor" are best described in the latest book by E. Yu.Vanina [Vanina, 2007, p. 169-174]. This is a new work, and the author could not take it into account, although just in this issue Vanina does not report something fundamentally new. The orders of Rajput India are described many times, including in the literature in Russian [Uspenskaya, 2000].

L. S. Vasiliev repeats the rather common misconception that " most brahmins are priests engaged in temple maintenance "(II, p. 120). The Brahmans have long been zani-

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they are very diverse (of course, as a rule, "clean") the temple priests are the lowest ranked among them.

A minor but annoying mistake that cannot be ignored: sati is not a "rite of burial" (II, p. 121), but a rite of self-immolation. Guru Nanak's teachings contained elements borrowed from Hinduism and Islam, and he taught that God is one for all, but it would still be too bold to claim that his goal was to unite Muslims and Hindus (II, p.121).

The additional name "Singh" does not "distinguish a Sikh from any other Indian" (II, p. 124), because the same "surname" is used by Rajputs.

One gets the impression that L. S. Vasiliev used not very good-quality literature when working on the Indian chapters. Perhaps even this cannot explain the idea of medieval India as a "strong power", the regions of which were "firmly fused by Hinduism and the caste system into a single and strong socio-political entity" (II, p.20). This is just some random blunder, because L. S. Vasiliev is well aware of the weakness of Indian states and the confessional and caste disunity of Indian society.

* * *

In the introduction, the author formulates "the main tasks of the publication": "Their meaning is to understand the essence of complex processes that have taken place in history, analyze them and create on this basis a more or less complete picture of the general historical process" (I, p. 9). I must say that there are no" complex processes " in the book. It is based on a simple scheme that resolutely subordinates the real story to itself. The technique of "straightening" history is constantly used. This is also building a single line for the emergence of a stratified society and state - based on ethnographic, anthropological, and not historical data. This is also a logical, rather than historical, understanding of the process of emergence of centralized exploitation ("power-property", "rent-tax"). This is also the schematization of medieval Eastern societies (every possible diminution of non-state economic and social relations). This is also the schematization (and therefore primitivization) of the Western European path of development - its straightening up to the identification of ancient and capitalist societies. But history does not follow such simplified schemes. The concept of the historical process has yet to be developed.

list of literature

Alaev L. B. Problema sel'skoi obshchestva v klassovykh obshchestvakh [The problem of rural communities in class societies]. 1977. N 2.

Alaev L. B. Community in his life. The history of several scientific ideas in documents and materials / Author and comp. L. B. Alaev. Moscow: Vostochny lit., 2000.

Alaev L. B. Srednevekovaya Indiya [Medieval India], St. Petersburg: Aleteya Publ., 2003.
Srednevekovoe myshlenie: indyskiy opekt [Medieval Thinking: the Indian version]. Moscow: Vostochnaya litra, 2007.

Vasiliev L. S. Fenomen feodalizma (Novyi vzglyad na staruyu problemu) [The phenomenon of feudalism (A new Look at the Old Problem)]. 2007. N 6.

Gurevich A. Ya. Problemy genezisa feodalizma v Zapadnoy Evrope [Problems of the genesis of feudalism in Western Europe]. Moscow: Vysshaya shkola, 1970.

History of the peasantry in Europe. Epoch of Feudalism, vol. 1. Formirovanie feudal'no-zavisimogo krestjanstva [Formation of feudal-dependent peasantry], Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1985.

Marinovich L. P. Ancient and modern Democracy: new approaches to comparison. Textbook, Moscow: KDU Publ., 2007.

Marx K., Engels F. Essays. Vol. 13, 19, 23, 32. M, 1959, 1960, 1961. 1964.

Pavlov-Silvansky N. P. Feudalism in Russia, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1988.

Semenov Yu. I. O stadial'noi tipologii obshchestva [On the stadium typology of the community]. Problemy tipologii v etnografii, Moscow, 1979.
Semenov Yu. I. Ekonomicheskaya etnologiya [Economic ethnology]. Primeval and Early Class Society, Part II, Moscow, 1993.
Uspenskaya E. N. Rajputs. Knights of medieval India. St. Petersburg: Evraziya Publ., 2000.

L. B. ALAEV, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor

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