Attempt with invalid funds

"Canadian Slavonic Papers". Ottawa. 1975, N 2 - 3.

Professor Richard Pearce (Queen's University, Ontario, Canada) is no stranger to Sovietology. In 1960, he made his debut with the book "Russian Central Asia 1867-1917. The experience of studying colonial rule " 1 . Chronologically, it is joined by his article "The Road to Soviet Power in Tashkent", published in a Canadian magazine devoted entirely to the problems of Soviet Central Asia.

Peirce declares his desire to refute what Soviet authors write about the establishment of Soviet power in Tashkent (pp. 261, 269). However, such an intention turns out to be an attempt with unsuitable means. The source base of the article is extremely sparse: it is 2-3 Soviet and the same number of White Guard publications. The author ignored a lot of published documents, press materials, and a wide range of research. Peirce tries to compensate for the narrowness of its sources with an abundance of biased estimates.

What exactly does he oppose? First, against "exaggerating the role of the Bolsheviks" (p. 269). Meanwhile, there is an extensive literature that shows how their influence increased in March-October 19172 . After the February Revolution, during the period of dual power in Tashkent, during political crises and class conflicts, the masses of working people rallied around the Soviets. There was a polarization of forces. The July events led to a decrease in the influence of the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the Soviets and the strengthening of the Bolshevik wing in the united Social-Democratic organization. The Bolsheviks gained even greater prestige (which, by the way, Pierce is forced to admit) after the Kornilov uprising, which coincided with a sharp deterioration in the food situation in the city. In contrast to the proletarian centers, the Bolshevization of the Soviets in Turkestan was somewhat delayed, but even here, even before October, the struggle had placed the question of power on the agenda in the most acute forms. Workers and soldiers clashed with punitive detachments of General Korovichenko sent from the center to suppress spontaneous demonstrations on the basis of the food crisis. As a result, as elsewhere in Russia, the forces of the revolution in Tashkent prevailed over the counter-revolution. The Soviet government won here on November 1. Without the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, this victory would have been impossible.

Secondly, Peirce asserts that Soviet literature "exaggerates the role of the natives" (p.269) in the revolutionary struggle.

1 See also R. A. Pirce. Soviet Central Asia. A. Bibliography. 3 vols. Berkely. 1966.

2 See, for example, N. Akhunov. The victory of Soviet power in Tashkent. Tashkent, 1957; M. G. Vakhabov. Tashkent during the three revolutions. Tashkent, 1957; G. Rashidov. Tashkent Soviet in the Struggle: for the Consolidation of Soviet Power (November 1917-1918). Tashkent. 1960; "History of Communist organizations in Central Asia". Tashkent, 1967; G. Pulatov, G. Rashidov. Tashkent in the first years of Soviet power (November 1917-1920). Tashkent. 1972; "History of the Uzbek SSR". Vol. Tashkent, 1967, and others.

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And this question was already considered in Soviet historiography, which showed how strong and strong was the authority of the Soviet government and the Bolshevik Party among the broadest masses of the working people of Central Asia. The fact that a year after the victory of the revolution, 45-50% of the Turkestan Bolsheviks were representatives of local nationalities indicates the attraction of local working people to the Bolsheviks .3 In the October battles, indigenous workers actively fought alongside workers and soldiers from Central Russia. This is indicated in numerous documents4 .

Pier techniques are also typical. Speaking about the" exaggeration of the role of natives " by Soviet historians, he refers to the book by D. I. Manzhara "The Revolutionary Movement in Central Asia 1905-1920. (Memoirs) " (Tashkent, 1934). "Manjara states," says Peirce, "that the main influence on the native masses was exerted by the' bourgeois-nationalist 'Shuro-Islamia and the conservative Ulema" (p.269). In fact, D. I. Manzhara's work speaks about the influence of the Ulema and Shuro-Islamiya organizations on the working masses of the indigenous population in March 1917.5 D. I. Manzhara convincingly proves that in the following months there was an increase in the number and influence of local Bolsheviks. He writes about the events of September: "As for the Uzbek workers,.. then there was an even sharper turning point than it was with the intelligentsia, in the direction of moving away from the"Ulema". The same book provides data on the number of armed Uzbeks who participated in the battles for Soviet power, strongly criticizes the attempts of "Trotskyist authors to deny the fact of active participation of working people of local nationalities in the revolution and civil war", etc. 6 All this suggests that we are dealing with a blatant falsification of the history of our country by Piers.

I. V. Romanovsky

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3 See H. Inoyatov. Against falsification: The history of the victory of Soviet power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Tashkent, 1976, p. 234.

4 See "Victory of the October Revolution in Uzbekistan". Collection of documents, vol. I Tashkent, 1963, Sec. II, III, etc.

5 D. I. Manzhara. Op. ed., p. 41

6 Ibid., pp. 13, 56.

The real culprits of the Reichstag arson attack

"Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterrichi". Stuttgart. 1976, N 2.

Historians of the Federal Republic of Germany systematically return to the question of the Reichstag arson. At the height of the Cold War, many West German bourgeois historians, in particular Fr. Tobias, G. Mommsen, A. Berndt, tried to prove that the Reichstag was set on fire by van der Lubbe alone. However, their arguments were so unconvincing that even ardent anti-communists did not believe this version. The International Committee for the Study of the Causes and Consequences of World War II, which was formed in Luxembourg in 1968, under the chairmanship of P. Gregoire, became interested in this issue. The Committee selected a special research group led by the Swiss historian W. Hofer, which included some West German historians, in particular K. Graf. In 1972, the first volume of documents was published under the title "Arson of the Reichstag" 1 . A second volume is being prepared.

W. Hofer and K. Graf in their article "New sources on the Reichstag arson" report on previously unknown materials found during the survey of a number of state archives of Germany, as well as private collections of documents located mainly abroad.Among these materials, the most interesting is the information of G. von Kessel, published in 1969 in Stockholm. The author was once associated with circles of conservative opposition to the fascist regime, being a correspondent for Die Kreuzzeitung. His brother, police Colonel O. von Kessel, had connections with the Nazi opposition, knew secrets related to the Reichstag arson, for which he was killed on June 30, 1934. G. von Kessel, who received information from his brother, survived, as he fled to Sweden. In his publication, he spoke about both the political and technical preparations for setting the Reichstag on fire, and named the true arsonists, who, like many witnesses, were destroyed by the Fascist leadership.

The research team obtained a lot of important information from the archive of the former editor of the conservative newspaper " Leipziger

1 W. Hofer, E. Calic (K. Stephan), Fr. Zipfel. Der Reichstagsbrand. Eine wissenschaftliche Dokumentation. Bd. I. (West) Berlin. 1972.

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Neuesten Nachrichten " by R. Breiting, where his letters to the Gestapo are preserved, which can be used to judge the events of those days. This is also evidenced by the records of the former leader of the national Party A. Hugenberg, which are kept in the same archive. Interesting facts are reported in the memoirs of the former editor of "Munchner Neuesten Nachrichten" O. von Heidebrek. His brother Peter, a former SA Gruppenfuhrer in Stettin who was killed on June 30, 1934, provided Heidebrek with detailed information about what happened in February 1933. Scientists also had at their disposal information collected by the last president of the Reichstag of the Weimar period, P. Loeb, based on a survey of Reichstag service personnel, firefighters,stormtroopers who carried out arson, and later also killed.

Many documents are found in the archives of the Reich and Prussian Ministries of the Interior and Justice, the Berlin Police Presidium, the Reich Chancellery, and the Reich Security Office. Materials from the National Socialist Party and assault units were also used, and surviving witnesses were interviewed. A careful analysis of the minutes of the notorious Leipzig trial of 1933 revealed many manipulations designed to hide the true perpetrators of the arson.

Both archival materials and witness statements confirmed that the Reichstag arson was committed not by one person, but by a group of specially selected individuals. It turned out that Goering's confidants - the head of the police department in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, L. Grauert, the head of the Berlin police, R. Dilho, the chief of the security Service, R. Heydrich, and the police general from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, O. Daluge-played a significant role in preparing the arson. The latter was responsible for the technical preparation of the fire. The direct arsonists were selected stormtroopers subordinate to Gruppenfuhrers K. Ernst, K. Eggert and ambulance Fuhrer 15 of the Kepenik standard of stormtroopers E. Willen. The day before the Reichstag was set on fire, they took up residence in the palace of Reichstag President Goering, and on February 27, 1933, they passed through an underground passage to the Reichstag building.

The research team proved that the material contained in the" Brown Book about the Reichstag Arson and Hitler's Terror "was not a" communist fake", as the fascists claimed, but was based on authentic information collected by German emigrants in Paris led by W. Munzenberg.

An investigation of the sources once again showed that the Reichstag arson was a staged act prepared by the highest fascist circles and police authorities in order to legalize terror and establish a Fascist dictatorship.

N. I. Kudryavtseva

An apology for British politics in Ireland

"The Historical Journal". Cambridge. 1976, N 2.

One of the features of the domestic political situation in modern England is the aggravation of ethnic hatred. The country's ruling circles are increasingly grappling with the rise of Scottish and, to a lesser extent, Welsh nationalism. The problem of Ulster is far from being solved, where an acute socio - political crisis has been going on for nine years, accompanied by an increase in internecine hostility and terror. This was also reflected in bourgeois historiography. Special research groups have been set up to deal with the historical aspects of the UK's national problems. One of them (under the direction of A. J. Taylor), which works in Cambridge at the Beaverbrook Library, is engaged in the preparation of an extensive study " The Irish question in Liberal politics 1910-1914."

The article "Liberal Secretary for Ireland and the Irish Question: Augustine Birrell (1907-1914)" was written by one of the group's collaborators, Patricia Jelland of Lucius Cavendish College, Cambridge. The author examines the national policy of the liberal government in 1907-1914 through the prism of the activities of its Secretary of State for Ireland. The main task

1 A. Birrell served as Secretary of State for Ireland from 1907-1916. The author notes that due to the frequent aggravation of the political situation in Ireland, this post was considered to be the most important one.

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Birrell, according to the author, was a "pacification" of the national independence movement in Ireland.

The author gives examples of Birrell's reformist activities, the essence of which was to modernize the colonial regime in order to make it more effective and attract a certain part of the Irish bourgeoisie to the side of England. Birrell extended his links to the top of the Irish Parliamentary Party, led by D. Redmopd and D. Dillop. On his initiative, a Catholic university was opened in Dublin in 1908. Due to the incessant unrest among the tenant farmers, the British government bought out the depreciating landlords ' land at the expense of the state and leased it to the peasants on the terms of payment of bonded lease payments for many decades (p.431). In 1909, a law was passed that helped accelerate the" redemption " of Irish peasants of land that once belonged to their ancestors. It was precisely this law that V. I. Lenin had in mind when he wrote in 1914:: "It was only in the twentieth century that the Irish peasant began to transform from a tenant into a free owner of land, but the Liberals imposed a ransom on him at a "fair" valuation! Millions upon millions of tributes he pays, and will continue to pay for many years to come, to the English landlords as a reward for plundering him for several centuries and driving him to constant hunger strikes. The English liberal bourgeoisie forced the Irish peasants to thank the landlords for this with pure money. " 2
In the context of the brewing national anti - imperialist revolution, Birrell was a supporter of the introduction of internal self-government in Ireland-home rule. He saw it as a limited form of autonomy that extended to issues of local self-government and the development of national culture. Birrell opposed the" federal principle " of solving the Irish question, which was proposed by D. Lloyd George and W. Churchill. Under this proposal, each part of the British Isles - England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland - would have the right of local self-government, a so-called "universal home rule" under the supreme jurisdiction of the British Parliament, which would be responsible for such key issues as foreign policy, defense, finance, etc. (p. 437). If the "federal principle" were adopted, the Irish Parliament would have, according to the author, little more rights than the "county council" in England, and no form of Irish independence would be out of the question (p.437).

As you know, after a long struggle, the British Parliament in 1912 approved the law on home rule. While embellishing Birrell's role as the "creator" of home rule, the author admits that the Secretary of State for Ireland did nothing to ensure that the law was implemented. When the Ulster Orangemen, led by Karsop, prepared a military revolt against home rule, Birrell was extremely soft on the conspirators. At the same time, on his instructions, the police ruthlessly cracked down on Dublin workers who had defended their rights during the 1913 strike.

Irish home rule, as you know, has remained a law that was never put into effect. British imperialism tried at all costs to preserve the rotten colonial regime in Ireland. In the author's opinion, the failure to introduce home rule was due to such purely subjective factors as Birrell's poor health, his wife's illness, and so on.Jelland's article is an attempt to justify the policy of British imperialism in the Irish question on the eve of the First World War.

L. S. Krylov

Idealization of the role of England in the Middle East crisis of the 90s of the XIX century

"The Historical Journal". Cambridge. 1976, N 1.

The article by Roy Douglas, an English bourgeois historian from the University of Surrey, is entitled "England and the Armenian question in 1894-1897". The author uses diplomatic documents from the London archive "Public Record Office", as well as materials from the personal funds of A. Roseburn, R. Salisbury, W. Gladstone.

in the English government, "not particularly desirable." Birrell's predecessors held it for an average of no more than two years (see pages 421-422).

2 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 24, p. 367.

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The Middle East crisis of the 90s of the XIX century arose due to the fact that in response to the attempted national uprising, the Sultan's government resorted to the most severe repression, organizing the massacre of Armenians by Muslim fanatics in a number of places in Asia Minor, and then in Constantinople. The explosion of the liberation movement of the oppressed non-Turkish population, the appearance of the great powers under the slogan of protecting Christians or the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, then forgetting the interests of both the rebels and Turkey and shifting the main emphasis to defending the "vital and natural rights" of the great powers themselves in the Middle East region - this is the scheme of development of the Middle East crisis of 1894-1897.

Douglas, on the other hand, does not seem to be familiar with this well-known scheme, which follows from the very essence of "big politics" in the era of colonial conquests and unjust wars. He hypocritically regrets that the powers did not provide real assistance to the Armenians (p. 133), although, as is well known, this was not their main goal at all. Especially idealized in the article is the politics of England. The author tries to prove that the British governments (the liberals led by Rosebery, and then the conservative cabinet of Salisbury) initiated the pressure of the "European concert" on the Turkish government in order to force the latter to fulfill its obligations contained in the decisions of the Berlin Congress of 1878, and to carry out reforms in favor of Armenian subjects. However, England, the author claims, failed to create such a united front of the powers, because its initiatives ran into the opposition of Russia, then the stubbornness of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, who deftly used the contradictions between the great powers.

Douglas is silent on what the real motives of the London cabinet were. Its course during the Middle East crisis of the 90s of the XIX century was formed under the influence of a certain weakening of England's position in the Ottoman Empire, both economically and politically. The Sultan's government is moving away from the traditional English orientation. In this regard, the British cabinet is changing the course that has been pursued for decades to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-90s of the 19th century, Great Britain opened up two paths in the Middle East, which it alternately took. It tried to force the Sultan to come to terms with the occupation of Egypt and return to the pro-British orientation (an example of such pressure was the intervention in the Armenian question), then put forward plans for the partition of Turkey, during which London expected to pay various pieces of the Ottoman Empire to other great powers for recognizing Egypt by the British 1 .

During negotiations with Nicholas II in September 1896, Salisbury stated:: "The theory that Turkish rule in Constantinople is the bulwark of our Indian Empire can no longer be supported." 2 In an attempt to gain the tsar's support, the British prime minister even hinted at the possibility of making concessions to Russia on the issue of the Straits, an eternal point of Russian - English contradictions .3 The campaign in England itself, launched by representatives of the Armenian revolutionary Committees, also had a certain impact on Salisbury's policy. British political circles of various shades and trends criticized the cabinet for "inactivity" in the Armenian issue. Douglas, however, does not give a political assessment of this campaign, does not want to see its connection with government policy. Meanwhile, this connection was not lost on contemporaries of events 4 .

The British leaders were not motivated by a desire to protect the Sultan's Christian subjects from violence. By the way, Douglas himself writes that not every method of intervention in favor of the Armenians was suitable for Salisbury. The British Prime Minister, for example, ordered in August 1895 the Ambassador in Constantinople, Fr. Under no circumstances would the P. R. P. agree to the convening of an international conference, since it would undoubtedly raise the Egyptian question, which was quite undesirable for England (p.119). R. Douglas ' attempt to idealize England's policy on the Eastern question at the end of the nineteenth century proved untenable.

V. N. Ponomarev

1 "History of Diplomacy", vol. 2, Moscow, 1963, pp. 334-336.

2 "Lord Salisbury's Conversations with Tsar at Balmoral, 27 and 19 September 1896", "The Slavonic and East European Review", 1960, N 92, p. 220.

3 Ibid., pp. 220 - 221.

4 See, for example, Novoe Vremya, 7 (19). IX. 1896.

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Old costs of the "new" approach

"The Journal of British Studies". Hartford. 1976, N 2.

Bourgeois historiography has long maintained a reserved attitude towards the English bourgeois Revolution of the seventeenth century, determined by the desire to obscure its progressive aspects and, on the contrary, to highlight its conservative tendencies. It is no accident that English historians avoid the word "revolution", preferring to use the expression "The Great Rebellion". In recent years, there has been a growing talk of a "new approach" to the study of this problem. Paul Christianson, a Canadian historian and associate professor at Kingston University, in his article" The Causes of the English Revolution: a Reassessment", tried to give an overview of the latest bourgeois research on this topic, and at the same time express his point of view. The author's goal was to "explain the new approach to interpreting Tudor and Stuart history, as well as critique the old approach" (p. 74). The essence of the "new" approach, according to the author, is best expressed by the English historian L. Stone , 1 who, along with other scientists, raised the question of the need to reconsider the question of the causes that caused the revolution. Stone and other contemporary bourgeois authors assume that" the dissolution of parliament was the cause of the civil war", and" it was not war that caused the dissolution " of Parliament (p. 46). Thus, objectively, the theorists of the" new approach " to some extent have to admit that long before the outbreak of the civil war in England, social, political and economic contradictions became acute, which led to the revolution. Christianson approves of this kind of reassessment, although he does not clearly state either the motivations behind it or its specific content. His comments about the " old " approach are rather abstract and do not differ much from what G. Butterfield wrote 2, who more than 40 years ago "exposed some of the mistakes of what he called the "Whig" interpretation of history, emphasizing that its adherents look at the past and evaluate historical development and historical personalities from a different perspective." positions of the present" (p. 41). Christianson takes up arms against Marxist historians, following K. Russell , 3 who reproached them for having a belief in "constant historical progress"at the heart of their method. According to the author, the division of events and their participants into "progressive" and "reactionary" shifts all the emphasis of the study.

Christianson does not want to recognize the regularities of the development of the historical process. He argues "that natural social inequality is a better starting point for the analysis of Tudor and Stuart society than the assumption that history is moving in the direction of greater equality between people" (p.55). The author tries to " prove "that the essence of the main social changes in the period of the English bourgeois Revolution lies more in the restoration of the aristocracy than in the" rise of the middle class", which is written about by" misguided " Marxists.

Christianson and the "reassessment" proponents believe that the foundations of the hierarchical structure of society remained intact during the entire period from 1640 to 1660, and that the English Civil War was the cause of both the revolutionary social, political, and religious ideas expressed by 1645, and the true political revolution that eliminated by 1649-1650. the ancient Constitutions of England, Scotland and Ireland (p. 68). The stability of the social structure was, as they claim, one of the reasons for the predominance of aristocrats in the leadership of the revolution at its first stage. Later, when the king was defeated and executed, the split among the aristocracy, which was previously, according to Christianson, not quite defined, deepened.

In an effort to denigrate the democratic tendencies of the revolution and negate them, Christianson writes that during the struggle of the king and Parliament, no one believed in equality. He refers to Cromwell, who could not imagine a system based on universal equality and devoid of hierarchy, and sincerely believed that even levellers do not believe in equality. Christianson believes that only a few of them supported the idea of social equality, and not all were in favor of political equality. However, he is you-

1 L. Stone. The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529 - 1642. L. 1972.

2 H. Butterfield. The Whig Interpretation of History. L. 1931; ejusd. The Englishman and His History. Cambridge. 1944.

3 "The Origins of the English Civil War". Ed. by C. Russell. L. 1973.

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it is necessary to recognize that "diggers and individual religious sectarians sought to establish true social equality" (pp. 73-74).

Thus, starting with the promise of an impartial re-evaluation of the available research on the problem, Christianson ended up in the traditional position of his bourgeois colleagues in the pen, who praised the aristocracy and gentry, while belittling the role of the masses of the people, and above all the peasants (Yeomanry), in the revolution. "And yet," F. emphasized. It was only through the intervention of this yeomanry and the Plebeian element of the cities that the struggle was brought to its last decisive conclusion, and Charles I was put on the scaffold, which the bourgeoisie alone could never have done. " 4

Attempts at a "new" approach to the study of the English bourgeois Revolution - and not only it - have been made quite frequently in bourgeois historiography recently. Christianson's article, characterized by its pretentiousness, is a typical example of this.

S. N. Burin

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4 K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 22, p. 308.

Project of creating an international organization in the XV century

"Czasopismo prawno - historyczne". Poznan. 1975, N 2.

An article by Czechoslovak scholar Vaclav Vanechek, published in the Polish historical and legal journal, is dedicated to the oldest project of an international peace organization. We are talking about the proposal of the Czech King Jiri Podebrad, dating back to 1462-1464 .1 It is described in the diary of an ambassador sent by this ruler to the French King Louis IX. This source was first introduced into scientific circulation in 1827, and since 1869 it has become the subject of attention of scientists from different countries. The researchers were divided into two groups: one-skeptical-reduced the role of the projected organization to the fight against the Turks and emphasized the fantastic and unrealistic plans of the Czech king. The second one focused on the main idea of the project. Experts in international law and historians of international relations 2 saw Podebrad's draft as a precursor to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the League of Nations Pact, and even the decision to create the UN. In 1964, at the suggestion of UNESCO, the 500th anniversary of the peace initiative of the Czech sovereign was celebrated.

The idea of ensuring a lasting peace through an agreement between the parties concerned, writes in. Vanechek, was reflected in many international acts of antiquity and the Middle Ages, but no attempt was made to exclude war as a form of resolving international conflicts on a universal scale. The author shows that the Czech project was quite original in comparison with previous organizations (for example, the Hellenic unions of polis - amphictyonias) or the political ideas of its time. It went beyond the framework of medieval law, which was based, for example, the Landfrieds of the XIV-XV centuries, aimed at ending feudal feuds. The organization proposed by Jiri Podebrad had no predecessors, and from the point of view of the Catholic Church, it even seemed heretical.

According to the draft, a voluntary organization of States created on the basis of a multilateral agreement was supposed to ensure universal and lasting peace. At the same time, the emperor was not supposed to play any role in it, and the pope had only auxiliary functions. This organization would be secular in nature. It was open to all Christian states and was built on the basis of their mutual equality. V. Vanechek joins those scholars who saw the draft of the Czech King as the first attempt in international law to apply the principle of collective security.

The Czech royal court, rightly emphasized in the article, was aware of the complexity of the situation that existed in Europe in the mid-15th century and sought to find a comprehensive solution to existing problems. A new international authority was needed to replace the one that was losing its credibility.

1 For more information about the project's history, see: D. A. Polukarova. To the 500th anniversary of Jiri Podebrad's peace proposals. Voprosy Istorii, 1965, No. 3.

2 For the full text of the draft, consisting of 28 articles, based on an authentic copy from 1463, see :" The Universal Peace Organization of King George of Bohemia". Praha. 1964. There is also a Russian translation of this document.

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create a universal medieval Christian monarchy headed by an emperor and a pope. The proposed organization was intended to create a permanent international court of Justice. The draft suggested that in the future this court could contribute to the establishment of a universal order that is binding worldwide.

The draft provided for a permanent general meeting of delegates of the organization's member States, each of which had one vote. Joint decisions had to be made by a majority vote. This assembly would represent the principal organ of an international organization. The foundation of its staff was to be the council of its employees. The organization was supposed to be headed by a syndic, who was intended to play a key role in the organization. The organization's headquarters were to be relocated to another country every five years, and the personal composition of its employees would change. The organization's budget was supposed to be made up of annual contributions from member States, as well as from emergency revenues (primarily from church estates).

The project proposed more than 500 years ago to the then diplomatic world, writes V. Vanechek in conclusion, did not have a model in previous history. It was the first time that the idea of creating a voluntary organization of independent European states was formulated.

I. V. Sozin

Another falsification of the relationship between history and politics

"Historische Zeitschrift", Munchen. 1975, N 1.

One of the fundamental issues of historical science is the problem of the role of historical knowledge in public practice, in other words, the relationship between history and politics . In bourgeois historiography, there are directly opposite points of view on this issue. Some try to justify the idea of independence of history and politics, while others recognize their close interaction. The West German bourgeois historian T. Schieder also declares his commitment to the second point of view in his article "Political Actions based on historical Consciousness". "There is a close connection between historical consciousness and political practice" (p.21). The article provides a number of examples of understanding the meaning of history by some statesmen. The author highlights their understanding of history "as fate" (O. Bismarck), as an incentive to national liberation (T. Masaryk, S. de Gaulle), as a useful experience for modern politics (G. Kissinger). According to Schieder, they all proceeded from the belief in the existence of the social function of history and the need to use it.

However, the author needs these arguments only to convince the reader that V. I. Lenin" radically " simplified the role of historical consciousness, reducing its functions exclusively to the justification of the world revolution (p. 16). It is, therefore, a deliberate distortion of the Marxist-Leninist solution of the question of the relationship between history and politics.

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the fact that the results of its analysis of history should serve the social and practical activities of people. Based on the knowledge of the objective process of events, history offers specific assistance to politics, helping to clarify the essence of modern phenomena. However, Marxist-Leninist historical science does not consider history only from the point of view of its applied significance, as Schieder claims. Marxism-Leninism recognizes the independent role of historical science. In reality, the role of applied science is assigned to it by bourgeois ideologists, supporters of the concept of presentism. It was V. I. Lenin who categorically opposed fitting the facts of history to the desired conjunctural scheme and pointed out that "the truth, no matter how bitter it may be, must be looked directly in the face. A policy that does not satisfy this condition is a disastrous policy. " 2 Marxist-Leninist historical science reflects the interests of the historically progressive class and is armed with knowledge of objective laws of social development: it is inseparable from the public knowledge of modernity and the determination of trends in its development.

1 For more information about this issue, see "History and Society". Voprosy Istorii, 1977, No. 1.

2 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 32, p. 12.

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Shider reduces foresight of the future to its prediction, which, as he writes, is usually carried out on the basis of two prerequisites: "the absolute determinism of a historical phenomenon depending on the purpose of history" and the idea of "the unchangeable essence of man as his own motor of history" (p.22). But since the meaning of history remains mysterious to Schieder, he argues that the consistent principle of determinism, which he believes is characteristic of positivism and Marxism, reduces "to zero the role of chance and the personalistic nature of history" (p. 23). Without recognizing the dialectic of the accidental and necessary in the historical process, Schieder opposes the concept of historical determinism, which, in his words, "cannot be proved and is only a hypothesis."

The obvious contradiction of Schieder's reasoning is that, while recognizing the possibility of taking into account the experience of the past in modern political actions, he fundamentally denies the existence of the only criterion on the basis of which politics can be successful, namely, knowledge of the laws of the historical process. The best he can offer is for politicians to act by analogy with the past. Shider's methodological concept condemns the historian to simply fix and describe the facts of the past without penetrating their essence, without determining their place in history. In fact, Shider stands on the position of the "individualizing method", refusing to analyze qualitative changes and irreversible results.

A. I, Patrushev

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