Diplomatic relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 18th century are a significant part of the foreign policy of both powers and represent one of the most important and interesting subjects of European political history.
This paper examines the specifics of Russian-Ottoman diplomatic relations in the context of the evolution of international relations from the end of the Seven Years ' War (1756-1763) to the signing of the Peace Treaty of Iasi (1792).
Keywords: Ottoman Empire, Russian-Ottoman diplomatic relations, Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi Peace Treaty, Iasi Peace Treaty.
The Ottoman Empire entered the second half of the 18th century unencumbered by wars and armed conflicts. This longest period of peace in the history of the Ottoman Empire (1740-1768) crowned the "era of Sultan's calm". For more than two and a half decades, the empire was engaged in solving its internal problems, observing from the outside the European competition for influence on the Austrian throne (1747-1748), the course of the Seven Years ' War (1756-1763), and the formation of the military-political alliance of Prussia and Russia against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
In April 1764, the Russo-Prussian treaty was concluded, according to which Russia received the right to invade Polish territory, and in September of the same year, despite the resistance of France, Austria, Prussia and Great Britain, Stanislav Poniatowski was elected to the Polish royal throne, which in Western Europe and in Istanbul was clearly perceived as a protege and "protégé" of the Russian Empress Catherine II [Aksan, 1995, p. 115].
The strengthening of Russian influence in Poland and the intervention of St. Petersburg in the affairs of the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities vassal to the Ottoman Padishah seriously worried not only Sultan Mustafa III, but also King Frederick II of Prussia and the Austrian Empress Maria Theresa, who postponed for a while the dispute over the border between Austria and Prussia. However, no European state wanted to be drawn into a war with Russia, which was gaining strength in Europe, preferring to see the Ottoman Empire as the warring party. France, which was at war with Great Britain, lost its influence on European affairs at that time, so Paris was not able to actively interfere with St. Petersburg. France was an ally of Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and then Austria, while Great Britain took a "friendly-cool" rather than neutral position towards Russia. Paris and London in the 60-80s of the XVIII century implemented a policy of protectionism of their trade in the Levant and in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. But the main and most pressing issue for the whole of Europe was the question of the future fate of Poland. It is one of the most acute aspects of the "Eastern European Issue" [Aksan, 2007, p. 139].
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Austria and Prussia sought to mediate between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and also participated in the first partition of Poland in 1772 [Aksan, 1995, p.116].
Ottoman subjects gave their government poetic names: "Majestic Ottoman Threshold" (Asitane - i aliye-i osmaniye), "Threshold of Bliss" (Asitane-i saadet), "Threshold of the Sultan's abode" (Asitane - i saltanat Asiyan), "Noble Threshold" (Atebe - i seniye), " Majestic threshold" (Atebe-i beehive), "Majestic Courtyard" (Dergah - i Ali), "The Court of Justice" (Dergah-i adalet penah), "The Highest Court" (Dergah-i mualla), " The Support of the majestic throne "(Pae-i sherir-i ala), "The Threshold of Happiness" (Sudde-i saadet), "The brilliant threshold of the center of bliss" (Sudde-i senia-i saadet medar), etc. [Bayerle, 1995, p. 11, 12, 13, 36, 124, 138]. No less colorful Sultan's subjects called their state: The" Majestic state "(Devlet-i aliye)," Possessions protected by the Almighty "(Memalik-i mahruse), etc. [Bayerle, 1995, p. 37, 107, 123], as well as its capital: "The Refuge of Bliss "(Der - i Saadet), "The Refuge of the Sultanate" of Der-i Saadet).and Saltanat), "The Refuge of the Caliphate" (Der-i Khilafah) [Bayerle, 1995, p. 33, 34, 36].
It should be noted that until the second half of the XVIII century, the Ottoman rulers considered themselves the most powerful monarchs on earth and bore the titles "sultan who crowns kings" (taj bahci-i husrevan), "sultan to whom everyone in the world is submissive" (padishah-i alem-penah), " sultan who is asked for help" (padishah-i jihan-muta'). They were also called " the successors of the Prophet Muhammad on Earth "(khalifa-i ru'i zemin) or "the shadow of Allah on Earth" (zillu-l-llahi fi-l-arz) [Yurdusev, 2004, p.19].
The gradual penetration of Russia into the Cossack territories, the encouragement of settlement of these lands and the strengthening of Zaporozhye cordons in the second half of the XVIII century seriously worried the Ottoman Empire. This happened after by 1764 the northern border (along which the Zaporozhye Cossacks lived until the abolition of the Zaporozhye Sich by Catherine and the resettlement of part of the Cossacks to the North Caucasus, where they formed the Black Sea line of the Kuban army) was transformed into a Russian province - Little Russia, the first governor-General of which was P. A. Rumyantsev.
The intentions of Catherine II's imperial policy were obvious to the Ottoman government: they easily revealed the desire to annex the Crimea to Russia and access the Black Sea. Western European ambassadors increasingly began to recommend the Port to prepare for a new Russo-Turkish war, convincing the Sultan that by occupying Polish lands, Russia was making its way to the Ottoman Empire [Bukharov, 1878, p. 7].
After the death of the Polish king Augustus III, the Russian Empress sent her troops to Poland, where, as already noted, Stanislav Poniatowski, a protege of the Russian court, ascended to the Polish throne as a result of Russian-controlled elections. His attempts to grant the non-Catholic population equal rights with Catholics led to the creation in 1768 in Bar (Podillia) of a confederation of Polish national resistance led by Jan Potocki, which began to enjoy the support of the Porte. The instigation of the Crimean Khan Kerim-Giray and the French government, as well as the strengthening of the "war party" within the Ottoman elite, deprived Sultan Mustafa III of any maneuver. After the Padishah's ultimatum to the Empress demanding the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland was ignored, the Porte declared war on Russia.
At the beginning of the war, few doubted the impending victory over the "infidels", who alone had to fight the Porte. All the more crushing was the defeat, until the formal recognition of which the Ottoman Padishah Mustafa III, who died in January 1774, did not live to see. It is noteworthy that sadrazam (the great, or supreme vizier. - M. Ya.) Mohsen-zade Mehmed Pasha (1765-1768) strongly discouraged Sultan Mustafa III from going to war with Russia, arguing that his position was not ready for the empire.-
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prepare for a large-scale military campaign. This point of view cost the Grand vizier the post to which the padishah appointed a new sadraz-silahdar ("chief squire").- M. Ya. Maher Hamzu Pasha (7.08.1768-20.10.1768), an incompetent man who listened more to the opinion of the Sultan's court than was guided by his own mind (Aksan, 2007, p.142). Then the sultan appointed another court dignitary to the post of Grand Vizier - Yagliki-zade Nisani Mehmed Emin Pasha (20.10.1768-12.08.1769). After him, Hashi Moldavanchi Ali-iasha (12.08.1769-12.12.1769) became sadrazam, who was replaced by the new Grand Vizier Ivaz-zade Khalil Pasha (13.12.1769-25.12.1770), who was successfully replaced by the new Grand vizier Ivaz-zade Khalil Pasha (13.12.1769-25.12.1770). crossing the Danube in July 1770. Nevertheless, by the end of 1770, the padishah, dissatisfied with the course of military operations with Russia, again replaced Sadraz with Silahdar Mehmed Pasha (25.12.1770-11.12.1771). However, by November 1771, the sultan abandoned the "Sadrazam leapfrog" at his court, returning Mohsen-zade Mehmed Pasha (1771-1774), who had been deposed before the war, to the post of grand vizier. Ironically, it was he who had to experience all the bitterness of defeat in the war with the Russians [Aksan, 2007, p. 150-155]. In his death throes, the Padishah still raved about it, intending to personally go on a campaign and restore the honor of the Ottoman weapons, shamed by the victories of the Russian troops [Smirnov, 2005, p. 132].
During the negotiations on the peace treaty, a humiliating contribution clause appeared for Turkey, under which Istanbul agreed to pay a huge amount of 7.5 million akce (4.5 million rubles) over three years [Shaw, 1976, p. 250; Aksan, 2006, p.103].
Mustafa's successor, Sultan Abdul-Hamid I (1774-1789), as well as Sadrazam Mohsen-zade Mehmed Pasha and his deputy nishanji ("keeper of the Sultan's seal" - M. Ya.) Ahmed Resmi-efendi, too, was convinced of the futility of further struggle with Russia. The new Sultan was so distressed by the disgraceful articles of the treaty with Russia that he kept its contents secret from the population and from foreign diplomats accredited to his government. On July 10/21, 1774, in the Ottoman village of Kuchuk-Kainarji (Bulgaria), Sadrazam Mohsen-zade Mehmed Pasha and Field Marshal General Count P. A. Rumyantsev signed a peace treaty. Sadraz'am could not bear the shame and died from his experiences in Adrianople, never reaching Constantinople [Bukharov, 1878, p. 22]. Sheikh-ul-Islam (the Supreme Mufti of Istanbul), who approved the peace treaty signed with Russia with his fatwa, was forced to give up his post [Perminov, 1992, p. 280]. The signatory of the document (together with the authorized Prince N. V. Repnin), the authorized representative of the Port of Nishanji Ahmed Resmi-efendi, fearing the wrath of the Sultan, delayed returning to Istanbul.
According to the provisions of the Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi Treaty, Russia was granted permanent possession of part of the coast of the Azov and Black Seas and, with the consent of the Crimean authorities, Greater and Lesser Kabarda (Aksan, 2007, p.158). St. Petersburg gained freedom for Russian trade not only by land, but also by commercial shipping on the Black Sea, the Straits, and the Danube. Russian merchants received the same rights and benefits that the French and British enjoyed in the Ottoman East. St. Petersburg received the right to have a permanent representative in Constantinople-a minister of the second rank, i.e. an envoy or minister plenipotentiary, in relation to whom the Brilliant Porte pledged "to use all the attention and respect that is observed for ministers of the most excellent powers" [Yuzefovich, 2005, p.49]. This meant that at all official ceremonies, the Russian minister had to follow directly behind the "Caesar" minister (an Austrian diplomat - M. Ya.), if he was of equal diplomatic rank with him (Bukharov, 1878, p.21). The Port officially recognized the imperial title for Russian monarchs(Temamen Russielerin padishah), and also granted Russian diplomatic representatives in Constantinople the right to petition the Porte for the vassal Christian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Although according to the agreement, all the southern "Tatar peoples" (Crimean,
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Kuban and others) were recognized by St. Petersburg as independent from the Ottoman Empire, the sultan retained the title of spiritual leader, caliph, but "without the slightest prejudice to the establishment of political and civil liberties" of the Tatar people [Zhigarev, 1896, pp. 195-196]. However, shortly after the annexation of Crimea, the article about the Sultan's caliphate in relation to all Muslims, including Russian subjects, was canceled.
One of the important achievements recorded in the treatise was the recognition of the right of the Russian envoy in Constantinople to intercede with the Porte on the affairs of the Moldavian-Wallachian principalities, both political and spiritual (Article 16). The Porte pledged "not to hinder, in any way whatsoever, the practice of the Christian law completely free", including "the creation of new churches and the correction of old ones, as it was before" [Yuzefovich, 2005, p. 54]. By returning all the islands of the Archipelago to the Ottoman government, Russia secured from the Porte a commitment that "the Christian law will not be subject to the slightest oppression, since the churches of this Archipelago will be prevented from rebuilding or correcting them; people who serve in them will also not be insulted, they will be oppressed below" [Yuzefovich, 2005, p. 55]. It is noteworthy that in the first half of the XIX century. St. Petersburg tried to interpret these provisions broadly in relation to Orthodox and other Christians as well.
According to Article 7, the Ottoman Empire pledged to take under its protection the Christian faith and Christian churches, allowing "the ministers (envoys of the second class. - M. Ya.) of the Russian Imperial Court to make, in all circumstances, in favor of both the church erected in Constantinople mentioned in Article 14, and its employees, different representations, and promises to accept them in respect, as assigned by a trusted special neighboring and friendly power." According to article 14, the" Russian High Court", following the example of other powers, the Sultan allowed, "in addition to the house church in the house of the minister", to erect in the diplomatic quarter of Pera in the Galata district of the capital, on Bey-Oglu Street, "a public Greek-Russian confession church", the protection of which was entrusted to the Russian mission [Yuzefovich, 2005, p. 55].
Even when drafting the articles of this document, the Russian side, at the suggestion of the third-class envoy A. M. Obreskov, proposed to include in the draft treaty a clause on the free and unhindered visit of Russian subjects to holy Christian sites in the Ottoman Empire.
Having received the approval of the Grand Vizier, the Port's authorized representatives-Nishanji Resmi Ahmed-efendi and Reis-efendi Ibrahim Munib-agreed to fix this provision in the 8th article of the Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi treatise, according to which the status of Russian subjects who made pilgrimages and simply traveled through the territory of the Ottoman State was increased. In addition, the Porte undertook to ensure the religious freedom of Russian subjects within the Ottoman Empire, granting the Greek-Russian Church various privileges that other Christian confessions already enjoyed [Yuzefovich, 2005, pp. 50-51].
Statesmen of that time and historians recognized the most important decisions of the Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi Treaty as "the pinnacle of Russian diplomatic art and Turkish stupidity" [Tatishchev, 1887, p. 467], " which soon caused a considerable stir throughout Europe... defeated Turkey lay at the feet of the Russian monarchy "[Giré, 1906, p. 1]. According to other historians and publicists, this treaty was the only and most humiliating document for the Ottomans who signed it [Aksan, 2006, p. 103]. Noteworthy is the assessment of the treaty by one of those who approved it - the Ottoman ambassador and Nishanji Ahmed Resmi-efendi, who in his work" Hulase ve Itibar " calls it "an unprecedented, rare peace, which has not been similar since the beginning of the emergence of a High Power" [Smirnov, 2005, p. 131].
Such a" successful " way out of the then critical situation, according to an Ottoman diplomat, as the conclusion of peace, Ahmed Resmi half-jokingly, noluse-
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He seriously attributes it to the fact that "the august accession of a new powerful padishah to the throne took place in springtime and that, consequently, his august happiness was then in full force" (Smirnov, 2005, p.131-132).
According to the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Treaty, Russia began to claim the right to defend the interests of its subjects who arrived in the Ottoman Empire and Orthodox Christians living on its territory. Under this treaty, the Port promised to " firmly defend the Christian law "(Article 7), making various commitments to improve the situation of the Christian population of Moldavia, Wallachia, Mingrelia, Georgia and the islands of the Archipelago (Articles 16, 17 and 23).
The conclusion of the Kuchuk-Kainarji peace Treaty placed Russia in a completely new and even exceptional position relative to the Port, as a result of which the document marked the beginning of a new era of Russian-Ottoman relations, when Russia began to speak from a stronger position. European states, always hostile to Russia's expansion of rights in the East, did not dare to protest strongly. Moreover, some of them were directly or indirectly interested in Russia's success in the East; others, due to various circumstances, were unable to help the Ottomans at a critical moment. France feared a European war. England was distracted from Russo-Turkish affairs by unrest in the North American colonies. Prussia and Austria, intimidating each other with the power of Russia, did not have a single position in Eastern politics, since the Berlin cabinet was completely occupied with the Polish question, and the Vienna court alone did not dare to fight the Ottomans with the Russians, fearing the alliance of St. Petersburg with Berlin, which Frederick II constantly intimidated Vienna with [Zhigarev, 1896, p. 202].
The signing of this treaty dealt a serious blow to the military and political prestige of the Ottoman Empire and entailed the first loss of its territory with a predominantly Muslim population (Crimea). It should be noted that 1774 was only the first round of endless Russian-Ottoman negotiations on the formulation of contractual relations. This negotiation "saga" did not stop either in the era of Nizam-i Jedid and Tanzimat (the first half of the XIX century), or in the subsequent fateful stages of the history of Russian-Ottoman relations in the second half of the XIX century.
Before the exchange of instruments of ratification, the contracting parties signed a treaty in Constantinople on January 8/19, 1775, which determined the future relations of the sultans to the Crimean khans. Taking power, each new khan was obliged to declare this to the Ottoman and Russian governments. To prove his agreement, the sultan had to send him a sable fur coat, turban, and saber as a gift [Zhigarev, 1878, p. 22].
The signed treaty did not lead to the final elimination of the reasons for the clash and could not guarantee peace. On the contrary, it opened up opportunities for subsequent armed conflicts and persistent violations on both sides. The recognition in the treatise of the full independence of the Crimea from the Ottoman Empire, while preserving the religious status of the Sultan-caliph in relation to the Muslim Tatar population in the Crimea, did not allow the Sultan's court to come to terms with the idea of losing its rights to the Crimean Peninsula. St. Petersburg tried in every possible way to strengthen its influence among the Tatar population, for which it took all measures to ensure that the Crimean khan's throne was occupied by a protege of Russia, and not by the Ports. Relying on the loyal Muslim clergy, the Sultan tried in every possible way to preserve his rights to the Crimea and arouse hostility towards Russia among the Muslim population of the peninsula. The desire of St. Petersburg and Istanbul to have an adherent in the Crimea and strengthen their influence there led to the formation of two parties on the peninsula - the pro-Russian and pro-Ottoman, who fought with varying success for the election of the "khan of the Genghis generation" by "all Tatar society". After the election of the Khan, his
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the ambassadors were sent to Istanbul, where they received "caliphal" firmans for the khanate. At the same time, the ambassadors of the protégé of Istanbul received an audience with the Sultan-Caliph, and the envoys of the Khan Shahin-Giray loyal to Russia, for example, reis-efendi or reis-ul-kuttab ("chief secretary" of the Port-M. Ya.), Abdurezzak - efendi refused such an honor [Smirnov, 2005, pp. 195-196].
In 1772, the "Russian party" elected Sahib-Giray as the Crimean khan, but a year later the "Turkish party" prevailed and after the overthrow of the pro - Russian khan, they elected the pro-Ottoman one-Devlet-Giray. Soon the "Russian party" won again and in 1777 elected Shakhin-Giray as the ruler of the Crimea, who became its last khan (Zhigarev, 1878, p. 204). In 1788, under pressure from the "war party", the Sultan sent his troops and fleet to support the pretender to the khan's throne, Devlet Giray. The Russian army repulsed the Ottoman attacks, retaining Shahin Giray on the khan's throne.
The aggravation of Russian-Ottoman relations almost led to a new war. On March 10/21, 1779, in Constantinople, through the mediation of the French Ambassador Francois-Emmanuel Guignard, Count of Saint-Prix (1768-1784) and the British Ambassador Sir Robert Ainslie (1775-1793), it was possible to conclude the Ainali-Kavak explanatory convention to determine the borders and supplement the terms of the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji concerning the religious relations of the Crimea with the Port, navigation, etc. private property in Moldavia, Wallachia and Morea (Greece). When elected to the Crimean throne, the khan was obliged to seek the consent of the Sultan, but the caliph had no right to interfere in the secular and political affairs of the Crimean Khanate. Istanbul and St. Petersburg agreed to conclude a commercial agreement based on the French and British capitulations, modified in relation to Russian trade.
However, this peace treaty could not establish strong relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The Porte began to look for allies in London, and the Russian government in Vienna, since an agreement with the Austrian court would not only eliminate the constant opposition to Russian policy in the East on the part of Austria, but would also turn this main rival of Russia in Turkish affairs into a military and political ally. The rapprochement between St. Petersburg and Vienna was reinforced by the conclusion of a secret Austro-Russian treaty in 1781, which provided for the reorganization of the entire Balkan Peninsula, as well as correspondence established between the Russian Empress Catherine II and the Austrian Emperor Joseph II regarding the conquests of the Ottoman regions. This rapprochement was called the Entente of 1781 in Western Europe (Bagis, 1984, p. 10).
Crimea, formally recognized as independent of Istanbul, soon became engulfed in unrest, thus giving the Ottomans an excuse to occupy Taman. Suppression of the endless Crimean troubles cost Russia 12 million rubles. This served as an excuse for the Russian government to stop any possibility of Ottoman intervention and in the summer of 1782 to order Russian troops under the command of Prince G. A. Potemkin to occupy the Crimean regions.
On November 1/12, 1782, dragomans (translators - M. Ya.) of the Russian and Austrian diplomatic missions in Constantinople presented the Port with a joint memorandum, in which they presented three requirements: unhindered navigation in the Black Sea, refusal of" secret and explicit interference " of the Port in the affairs of the Crimean Tatars, strict compliance with the articles of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhii Treaty in relation to the Moldavian and the Principalities of Wallachia [Bagis, 1984, p. 11].
The Crimea occupied by Russian troops was annexed to Russia by the manifesto of April 8/19, 1783, which declared that "The Crimean Peninsula, the island of Taman and the entire Kuban side were taken under the Russian power" [Zhigarev, 1896, p. 217]. Moreover, this was done by Prince Potemkin in accordance with his promise to the Empress practically without bloodshed [Bukharov, 1878, p.31].
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On September 5/16, 1782, the Ottoman Empire and Russia signed a customs tariff "on the collection of duties on goods imported and exported from Constantinople by Russian merchants" [AVPRI, p. 90-120], and in June 1783, Russian and Ottoman representatives signed a trade treatise in Istanbul [Bukharov, 1878, p. 26-27], which provided Russian merchants with the following rights: The Ottoman Empire had even greater privileges than those enjoyed by the French and British there at that time, which gave Paris and London a reason to demand the same privileges from the Sultan for their merchants [Martenet, 1888, p.85]. A similar Russian-Ottoman customs tariff was signed seventeen years later on August 11/22, 1799 [AVPRI, pp. 121-156]. It should be noted that these trade agreements significantly revived Russian commerce on the Black Sea.
In 1783, another significant event occurred that affected Russian-Ottoman relations: the Georgian Tsar Heraclius, recognizing the rule of Russia at his own request, signed a treatise in the St. George Fortress, according to which his successors were obliged to ask for the consent of St. Petersburg, and not Istanbul, when they ascended the throne. Kakheti and Imereti, recognizing the power of Russia over them, created a buffer between the Ottomans and the Russians.
The Sultan and his government could not come to terms with the loss of the vassal Crimean Khanate and in every possible way evaded the exact implementation of the agreements concluded with St. Petersburg. A similar line was drawn by the Russian side. The trade agreement of 1783 did not lead to the normalization of Russian-Ottoman relations. At a meeting of the Imperial Council on July 30, 1783, the Porte refused to recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia. In the current international situation, Istanbul could only count on the mediation efforts of London and Paris, whose ambassadors, in close coordination with the Russian envoy Ya.I. Bulgakov, persistently tried to convince the Ottoman government of the inexpediency of a new war with Russia. This was clearly stated by the British Ambassador Lord Robert Ainslie (after consultations with Bulgakov) at a meeting in Scutari (a suburb of Istanbul) with reis-effendi Haji Mustafa (1783-1784), defterdar ("chief treasurer" - M. Ya.) Feizi-effendi (1782-1784) and dragoman Mikhail Sutso (1782-1783). [Bagis, 1984, p. 13].
At a meeting with the Porte Ministers on November 10/21, 1783, Bulgakov made it clear that his British and French counterparts were not acting as intermediaries between Istanbul and St. Petersburg, but only as parties offering their good offices to put an end to the Russo-Ottoman dispute.
On December 3/14, 1783, Bulgakov was again invited to a meeting with the Ottoman "aristocracy". The government was represented by: kapudan pasha (Commander of the Ottoman Navy-M. Ya.) Ghazi Hassan, Haji Mustafa, and Ahmed Azmi-efendi, an authoritative representative of the corps of scholars. Kapudan Pasha expressed the government's readiness to adopt a peace-loving policy towards Russia, which, according to him, should take into account the dignity and security of the Ottoman Empire. Hassan Pasha tried to insist on the need for Russia to accept the mediation of France and England. In response, Bulgakov told the Ottoman ministers that, while paying tribute to the good and friendly services of the French and British courts, he could not accept official mediation by Great Britain and France, since the Russian court strongly opposes any foreign mediation [Bagis, 1984, p.16].
Grand Vizier Khalil Hamid Pasha and Ghazi Hassan, despite the opposition of the Islamic clergy, adopted the European point of view. The meeting of the advisory council in Porto on December 7/18, 1783, with the participation of the Ottoman nobility, was devoted to discussing the demands of the Russian side and the friendly advice of the French and British ambassadors to recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea. Sadraz Khalil Pasha opened the meeting, assuring those present that no one would be blamed for the opinion expressed at the council. However, this did not help, because the nobility continued to remain silent-
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a research project. Sadrazam and Sheikh-ul-Islam Mehmed Atallah-effendi have again requested to speak out. The Ottoman nobility began to evasively hint at the expediency of mediation by France and Great Britain, to which Sadrazam said that the Russian envoy did not show much enthusiasm for the good offices of London and Paris, let alone their formal mediation.
At first, the clergy opposed concessions to the Russians. In response, Ghazi Hassan frankly stated that the military and financial situation in the empire does not allow for serious resistance to Russia. Despite the protracted debate, the meeting ended without a clear response for formal transmission to the Russian envoy. The next day, Ghazi Hassan, on behalf of the Sultan, invited British Ambassador Ainsley to the Sultan's summer palace to ask him if the Sultan could believe the Russians about the provisions of the Crimea agreement. At the same time, Kapudan Pasha added that the padishah, Sadrazam and the majority of the Ottoman nobility, including the commanders of military corps and even the top clergy, spoke in favor of a peaceful resolution of the issue. Ainslie replied to Ghazi Hassan that he saw no threat in accepting Russia's demands, assuring the Pasha that they were in the interests of the Porte [Bagis, 1984, p. 17-18]. After some hesitation, the Porte agreed to the annexation of Crimea by Russia under the Treaty of Constantinople of December 28, 1783/January 8, 1784, signed by the Grand Vizier and Russian envoy Bulgakov.
Having taken possession of the Crimean Peninsula, Catherine II began to strengthen Russian rule on the Black Sea, ordering the construction of the military port of Sevastopol with an arsenal and a fortress near the village of Akhtiar (Chersonesos). In 1786, Potemkin founded the new city of Yekaterinoslav on the right bank of the Dniester River. In order to encourage trade, he announced an invitation to foreign merchants to settle in the Crimea on favorable terms for them.
In 1787, Catherine II made a famous trip to the Crimea, where a huge number of Russian troops were stationed, to get acquainted with new acquisitions on the southern borders of her empire, which came into contact with the Ottoman Empire. She was accompanied by a retinue of St. Petersburg dignitaries and foreign ambassadors. During the trip, Catherine met with the Austrian Emperor Joseph II, who, along with the Polish King Stanislaw Poniatowski, joined the royal retinue. The trip was carried out in the manner of a theatrical production: the Empress ordered the inscription "Road to Constantinople"to be inscribed on the gates of the new naval fortress. After the trip, few people in Europe saw in the" Greek project " the arrogant arrogance of the Russian Empress, since from Sevastopol the Russian army (faster than any European one) could be delivered in 24 hours across the Black Sea to the Bosphorus, from where it had to make only one march overland to Tsargrad. This demarche alarmed the Sultan's court and was regarded by the Ottoman government as a continuation of the offensive policy of St. Petersburg against Istanbul.
The Porte did not accept the loss of Crimea and only waited for an opportunity when the political balance of power in Europe would change in order to enlist more active support from Western European courts. The Ottoman government engaged in re-equipping the army and navy, as well as retraining their personnel. The reforms were carried out under the control of Sadraz Khalil Hamid Pasha, who did not receive the support of Sultan Abdul Hamid, and the influx of French military specialists did not arouse popular approval [Bagis, 1984, p.25-26].
The Sultan and his government began to rely more on diplomacy. The Port began sending diplomatic agents to European courts to probe the ground for possible alliances against Russia. After collecting detailed information "on the ground", Istanbul came to the conclusion that the Ottomans could
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Count on the political support of Great Britain, Sweden, France and Prussia.
In 1787, British and Prussian diplomatic agents began actively pushing the Sultan to launch military operations against Russia on land and at sea, even convincing him that Sweden intended to support the Ottomans. Grand Vizier Koja Yusuf Pasha (1786-1789), who believed in their promises, handed a note in the form of an ultimatum to the Russian envoy Bulgakov on July 15/26, 1787, with a set of demands unacceptable to Russia, limited to a two-week period [Zhigarev, 1878, p.227]. The Sultan was convinced that Catherine II would reject all these points, since only delivering them to St. Petersburg took two weeks.
Under these circumstances, Bulgakov decided on a bold demarche: on behalf of the Empress, he declared that Russia would never fulfill demands that were offensive to her dignity. This was exactly the answer the Ottomans had been waiting for when they imprisoned him in a Seven-tower Castle. In August 1787, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia for violating its treaties by seizing land belonging to the Port.
Russia entered the war with the Ottoman Empire in a coalition with Austria. The victories of A.V. Suvorov at Fokshany, Rymnik, the storming of Izmail, the Battle of Machin convinced Porto of the futility of revenge. The French Revolution changed the configuration and balance of power of European states, bringing together all the monarchical governments in Europe. Catherine the Great sought to take advantage of the revolution to successfully end the war with the Porte and resolve the Polish question. It deftly encouraged the European powers to take concerted and consolidated action against revolutionary France in order to refocus their attention from East to West and thus free their hands in securing Russian interests in the south. The anti-French coalition put together by Great Britain could not do without the participation of Russia. For this reason, the London and Berlin cabinets began to actively advocate an early end to the Russo-Turkish war.
In the current unfavorable circumstances for both powers, Istanbul offered St. Petersburg peace. The implementation of the preliminary terms of peace between the Porte and Russia, signed on August 11/22, 1791 in Galac, was suspended due to the illness of Prince G. A. Potemkin. After his sudden death, the Director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Count A. A. Bezborodko, concluded on December 29, 1791/January 9, 1792 in Iasi "a treatise of eternal peace and friendship", consisting of 13 articles. Under the treaty, Russia acquired Ochakov, expanding its borders to the Dniester.
According to the Treaty of Iasi, Russia claimed possession of the entire Black Sea coast from the Dniester to the Kuban, and thus resolved in its favor the vital "Crimean issue", as well as the problem of the freedom of Russian merchant shipping in the Black Sea. The Treaty of Yass confirmed Russia's right to intercede for its co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire.
Founded by the decree of Empress Catherine in 1794 by Vice Admiral Joseph (Jose) de Ribas on the site of the Ottoman fortress of Hadjibey, the port harbor soon turned into the modern European city of Odessa and the center of Russian trade in the south, finally establishing the predominance of the Russian fleet there [Orlov, 1885, p.XI-XVI].
Russia's military successes, supported by victories on the diplomatic front, made it possible to finally change the nature of Russian-Ottoman relations, in which Russia began to play a dominant role.
Thus, in the second half of the 18th century, diplomatic contacts between St. Petersburg and Istanbul developed against the background of the constantly changing international situation in Europe.
page 55
list of literature
[Customs tariff concluded on September 5/16, 1782 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia], [Customs tariff concluded on August 11/22, 1799 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia] // AVPRI (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire). F. Relations between Russia and Turkey. Op. 89/8, 1782. D. 604.
Bukharov D. Russia and Turkey from the emergence of political relations between them to the London treatise 13/25 March 1871 Historical Essay, St. Petersburg, 1878.
Gire A. A. Russia and the Middle East. Materials on the history of our Relations with Turkey, St. Petersburg, 1906.
Zhigarsv S. Russian policy in the Eastern Question (its history in the XVI-XIX centuries, critical assessment and future tasks). Historical and Legal Essays, Vol. I, Moscow, 1896.
Martene F. F. Sovremennoe mezhdunarodnoe pravo [Modern International Law]. Vol. II. SPb., 1888.
A. Orlov Historical sketch of Odessa from 1794 to 1803. Odessa, 1885.
Psrminov P. Ambassador of the III class. Moscow, 1992.
Smirnov V. D. Crimean Khanate under the rule of the Ottoman Porte. Vol. 2. Moscow, 2005.
Tatishchev S. S. Foreign policy of Emperor Nicholas I. Introduction to the History of Russia's Foreign Relations in the era of the Sevastopol War. St. Petersburg, 1887.
Yuzelovich T. Podgody Rossii s Vostokom [Russia's Contracts with the East]. Politicheskie i torgovye [Political and Trade Relations], Moscow, 2005.
Aksan V. An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783. Leiden-New York-Koln, 1995.
Aksan V. War and Peace // The Cambridge History of Turkey. V. 3. (The Later Ottoman Empire 1603-1839). Faroqhi S. (cd.). Cambridge, 2006.
Aksan V. Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged. L., 2007.
Bagis Ali Ihsan. Britain and the Struggle for the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul, 1984.
Baycrle G. Pashai, Begs and Effendis: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul, 1997.
Shaw S. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. V. 1. Cambridgc-London-New York-Mclburn, 1976.
Yurduscv A.N. (cd.). Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional? Basingstoke, 2004.
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