A. V. GROZIN
Candidate of Historical Sciences
The question of power always begins with a close examination of its bearers. Asian newly independent states provided a number of instructive examples of the transformation and evolution of ex-Soviet elites in the changed historical and economic situation.
The modern Turkmen elite is a symbiosis of separate strata, the formation of which is determined by the development of a specific historical situation. Strata that are largely genetically related. From the beginning of their formation, the Turkmen elite clans were replaced in the following sequence: traditional nomadic (tribal), colonial, Soviet nomenclature, and modern elite.
The same situation was observed in other Central Asian States. At the same time, there has never been a revolutionary or radical (all of a sudden) replacement, which makes it possible to assume with a high degree of confidence that: a) the boundaries of the change of elites are very blurred in time; b) elements of various types of elites have existed together and have been intricately intertwined (intertwined) to the present time.
These conclusions are also confirmed by the materials presented in the book " Elite Clans. Strokes to portraits" (Moscow, MMIX. 2010. 272 p., Fig., schemes, table.).
The work of the scientist devoted to the nature, demography, genesis and specific genealogy of elite clans in the post-Soviet space (in Turkmenistan - mainly and primarily) is certainly an extremely valuable source, rich, without exaggeration, with unique material. It should be noted that the famous ethnographer explored this topic in other, earlier works.1
Before Soviet rule, each Turkmen tribe had its own area of residence, its own territory, and the violation of the borders of others took place only during raids. With the establishment of Soviet power, geographical and other borders between tribes gradually began to disappear, and people began to move freely, to move from one area to another. There were opportunities to unite and transform the Turkmens into a single nation, and this opportunity was more or less realized.
However, the Turkmens did not particularly enjoy the freedom to live wherever they want: the people are committed to traditions and conservatism. They prefer to live and die where they were born. Therefore, they are smaller than the present value.-
In addition to the Soviet Union, they also migrated within the borders of their own republic. Each tribe remained mostly settled in its own historical settlement zones.
The appointment of top officials in the republic on rotation, when a representative of one tribe replaced a representative of another tribe, did not give the effect that Moscow expected from this personnel policy. Turkmens, as Kadyrov convincingly proves, are still, according to the scientist's apt definition, a "nation of tribes" 2, and their level of civic consciousness remains low.
Genetically, each Turkmen tribe - and there are about 30 of them and more than 5 thousand generic groups unite - is a rather hermetic, special subpopulation. The" nation of tribes " consists of sub-ethnic groups that are so divided that each of them, in principle, can be described as an independent small nation. In this regard, special attention to clans in Turkmenistan is not only justified, but also absolutely necessary for any serious study.
The leaders of the republic both in Soviet times (under the Turkmen leaders, however, in the pre-war and post-war period of the XX century, there were always non-Turkmens in the positions of deputies and various "third secretaries"), and in the post-Soviet period, they pursued one personnel policy-relying on representatives of their tribe. Every time the head of state changed, so did his entourage, almost the entire administrative apparatus.
Tribalism in the republic is most clearly expressed in the rivalry between the clans of the Akhal oasis, where Ashgabat is located, and the clans of other regions.
Before the collapse of the USSR, representatives of the" aborigines " of the capital region-the Akhal (Ashgabat) Turkmens-teke (or Akhalteke Turkmens)-did not manage to break through to the post of the first head of the TSSR from 1951 to 1985.
And under Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) (in 1985-1991-First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, in 1990-2006-President of Turkmenistan) the situation in the elite of the republic has not fundamentally changed at all - it's just that Tekin residents from the" capital " Ahal have finally become absolutely dominant in both power and business. Many in Turkmenistan (A. Kuliyev, N. Soyunov, etc.) said that Niyazov was trying to "ahalize" the country, turn it into a "state of Akhal-Teke people".
The new president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (born in 1957 in the Ahal velayat) belongs to the Teke tribe. And with him, almost three-quarters of all state officials (and the security forces - by 9/10) are Tekintsy (mainly from Baharden, Ahal velayat). It is precisely belonging to the Akhal-Teke tribe that is most often the basis for obtaining an important official chair.
ON THE ROAD TO REMODELING
Some orientalists, paying attention to the transformations of the traditional clan in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, do not consider the statement about the historical "inevitability" of the death of demographic clans, their rebirth into new, as Kadyrov also notes, less blood-oriented elite groups, to be justified. It seems, however, that, along with the orientation towards small children forced by the social realities of Central Asia, there are also many trends that directly contradict the "modernizing" vectors of development of the societies of the republics of the region. These trends can generally be called "remodeling" and they are reduced to a number of points.
1. After the collapse of the USSR, authoritarian political regimes began to take shape in the former Soviet republics of Asia, with a bias towards the state-paternalistic model rooted in local traditions and values. The political leader postulates himself from above and is perceived from below as the "father of the nation". The entire system of government is built under this scheme.
2. As catalysts for the formation of paternalistic autocracies in the region, first of all, clan-tribal regulators of the functioning of Central Asian societies (both among nomads and settled peoples), which were formed even before the entry of these territories into the Russian Empire and were preserved to some extent during their time as Soviet Union republics. Cronyism largely determined both the nature of recruiting local political elites and the meaning of the" main leader", which was transformed over time into the figure of the national"autocrator".
3. Traditional forms of Islam are used as the ideological foundations of the region's paternalistic ethnarchies. The principle of unity enshrined in Islamic theology, the undivided use of power, makes the "supreme" bearer of power a kind of living embodiment of "earthly authority", the "main arbiter" standing over elites, branches of government and peoples. Despite the processes of Russification and Sovietization that lasted for more than 70 years in the republics of Central Asia, Islam has retained its significance at the cultural and everyday level and has become a symbol of building a new sovereign state, returning to cultural and historical traditions. The extent to which the confessional factor is used to strengthen power regimes in the region varies considerably.
4. The mechanisms and procedures of strong presidential republics, where heads of state have actually secured the powers and prerogatives of "lifetime presidents", who are not just considered as guarantors of constitutions, but as "constitutional monarchs" above the branches of power, whose powers and capabilities are close to absolute, serve as supporting political and institutional structures. This was most evident in the phenomenon of "Turkmenbashi".
5. Within the framework of these models, the processes of forming paternalistic autocracies, recruiting and changing political elites, as well as the selection of potential "pre-Soviet" leaders are taking place.-
emnikov" Central Asian leaders.
It is difficult to call this whole system in any way focused on modernization: archaization is observed everywhere-both in ideological and practical state life. Naturally, the clan system of society and the elite, catching all these power impulses, also ultimately focuses on various anti-modernization," traditional"," state-conservative", etc. values.
Soviet power helped to strengthen the clan identity; its authoritarian-hierarchical system merged with the traditional scheme of social relations based on collectivist solidarity and obedience to "elders". And after the collapse of the USSR, a socio-cultural mechanism of re-traditionalization was launched, the flip side of which is the dominance of collective values over individual ones and unconditional submission to the authority of various elders. Central Asian "bashism" became a special form of organization of political systems, within the framework of which the archaization of the main political institutions, characteristic not so much for the parameters of modern national states, but for tribal organisms, took place.
In the case of Turkmenistan, this process has led to the most impressive results - a political regime that has come as close as possible to the implementation of the classical parameters of both autocracy as a whole and its paternalistic modification that developed in Turkmenistan under S. Niyazov. Demodernization and rearchaization contributed to the consolidation of the power of the Turkmen Bashi as a national super-autocrator, but they also largely determined the country's isolation in the international arena. Such a regime could have existed only during the lifetime of Turkmenbashi, as was shown by the events after his death and the process defined by Sh. Kadyrov, as the "velvet clan revolution", during which the old Soviet clans finally disappeared from the political arena of the country, and Niyazov elite groups lost a significant part of their influence. The coming to power of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov made adjustments to the mechanisms of interaction of Turkmen clans in their struggle for power and resources, but did not lead to significant changes in the regime itself.
OLD DRESSES OF THE NEW KHANS
Despite the similarity in the division of elites in the five Asian republics of the former USSR, there are naturally significant differences.
For example, no matter what is said about the two-thousand-year history of "Kyrgyz statehood", the true carriers of Kyrgyz identity, language and culture have always been the tribe and clan. Moreover, the Kyrgyz tribe also had the attributes of a political community. Tribes and clans had generic external signs: uraan (battle cry), tuu (banner), tamga (brand of cattle), namys (honor of the clan), zhardam (help to members of the clan), aksakal (elder of the clan), baatyr (hero of the clan).
It is worth noting that patriotism in the traditional Kyrgyz sense is largely associated with the concept of "one's own" tribe and its territory. Even the word " el "(related in meaning to the one discussed in detail by Sh. Kadyrov's concept of "Turkmen or" 3) has two meanings in the Kyrgyz language. When a Kyrgyz says "Kyrgyz eli", it means the Kyrgyz people as a nation. But when a person is asked " elin kaisi?", it means - " what kind of tribe are you?" And the answer to such a question sounds accordingly: "solto elinen bolom" (from the Solto tribe), or "elim-adygine" (from Adygine), etc.
Every Kyrgyz with his mother's milk imbibes the consciousness of the primacy of the interests of his clan and tribe. The same thing is observed among Kazakhs: despite all the authorities 'desire to create a "society-nation", "Kazakhstanis", intertribal differences of Kazakhs, the priority of self - identification along the line-Zhuz 4-tribe - tribe (and only then-all-Kazakh or all-Kazakh) remain a priority. It is interesting that it is among nomadic peoples (Kazakhs, Kirghizs, and Turkmens), as recent history demonstrates, that the "clan consciousness" is often more flexible (including other ethnic elements through marriages, business, community, etc.), but at the same time it is much stronger than among peoples with centuries of settlement. Uzbeks and Tajiks have long since moved to sedentarism, so knowledge about who is from what clan and tribe has lost such importance and relevance as among nomadic peoples, and has become, to a large extent, a function of intra-elite relations and a purely functional institution that makes life easier.
The clans of Uzbekistan are different from the clans of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, they are formed primarily on the basis of tribal ties; the entire Kazakh population is divided into three zhuzs, each of which consists of several unequal clans, divided into tribes and tribes. Clans in Uzbekistan are formed according to the territorial principle, in this republic this phenomenon coincides with the concept of community, a representative of another nationality, as a rule, cannot be a member of the clan.
Uzbek political and financial groups are more flexible than a strictly territorial clan, since, in addition to regional community, there are also other important factors: access to financial resources, family ties, friendly relations, etc. In practice, representatives of different regions and nationalities can enter the Tashkent or Samarkand political and financial groups, which enhances the capabilities of each individual the ability to influence the situation and defend their interests*.
* In this article, we deliberately do not elaborate on the rather complex issue of clan division of Central Asian societies. Sufi brotherhoods (tariqats) and awlods, not to mention the non - clan steppe aristocracy - the Genghisids and the descendants of saints-certainly have their influence on the dynamics of intra-elite processes in post-Soviet Asia, but this is a topic for a separate conversation.
Key ministers in the government of Uzbekistan are united in rival blocs that arise both on the basis of clans or regional affiliation, and on the basis of personal financial interests.
And in Kyrgyzstan, tribal division has always been a serious factor, and after the collapse of the USSR, as mentioned earlier, there was actually a revival of the semi-feudal system of social relations, which raised the role of this factor to a new height. The division into genera, usually numbering at least several thousand people, has acquired a new, special importance for people, becoming a factor of informal social guarantees. The presence of a high chief in a clan or clan automatically strengthens the position of the entire clan, and its defeat reduces the status of the clan. Since the late 1990s, it has been the" southern clans " that have consistently consolidated their efforts and strengthened their cooperation to achieve the common goal of removing the power of the "presidential tribe" Sary Bagysh, who did not want to" fairly share " power and property with the southern clans.
It seems that the Kyrgyz tribal associations are not ethno-political, but rather ethno-cultural entities, and a sharp increase in their political activity a few years ago indicated the weakness of the actual political institutions of the state (Sh. Kadyrov is certainly right when he says that clans "replace" formal institutions of power in the country). if they are incapacitated). Only when specific organizations that are supposed to manage society do not cope with their functions, what happened in Kyrgyzstan on the eve of the so - called "tulip revolution" of March 2005 happens-the politicization of clans. During 2005-2006, much was said about the breakup of the Kyrgyz elite into "northern" and "southern" clans, 6 but in practice, the general trend for the countries of the region to build a rigid "power vertical" under the leadership of the president-an arbitrator who settles disputes between the country's leading elite clans and regulates their political and business ambitions-prevailed. In April 2010, instead of K. Bakiyev, who failed to become a full-fledged arbiter in the disputes of the "north" and "south", a provisional government appeared, consisting of a number of ambitious political leaders from both the North (A. Atambayev, T. Sariev, etc.) and the South (R. Otunbayeva, O. Tekebayev, I. Isakov, A. Beknazarov and others) applying for key posts (Speaker of Parliament, Prime Minister, president) in the country.
Parliamentary elections will be held in October 2010, and a nationwide referendum will be held on June 27. According to the new Basic Law of the country adopted at the referendum, Kyrgyzstan becomes a republic with a parliamentary form of government. According to the members of the provisional government, this will not allow all power in the country to be concentrated in one hand.
The very idea of a parliamentary republic arose precisely because the winners of the" new revolution " are chronically unable to agree among themselves. These differences became especially noticeable during the Kyrgyz-Uzbek interethnic clashes and pogroms in the South - in Osh and Jalal-Abad.
Instead of an elite that can formulate a national agenda in the interests of the entire society, the country still has fiercely competing groups of influence, and instead of one president, Kyrgyzstan risks 120 "small presidents-deputies" who permanently fight with each other for their clans ' access to the resources of the poor republic.
"APOLOGY" OF CLANS IN CENTRAL ASIA
Clans in the Central Asian republics have deep historical and cultural roots. Continuity is inherent in any national culture, and the power of custom and tradition in Asian societies is exceptionally great. Tribal divisions are not political parties or non-governmental organizations, and they cannot be banned by a presidential decree. They themselves are the law that generations of Kyrgyz, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Karakalpaks have lived by. For thousands of years of history, tribal ideas have managed to enter into their flesh and blood. They live in the customs and traditions of the people and are stored in the depths of the mental space of the peoples of the region.
Clans work with people and use propaganda. In Kyrgyzstan, after the" first revolution "of 2005, there were more than 40 parties, and after the" second " of 2010, according to various estimates, from 50 to more than 100 (!). However, none of them had any noticeable influence on the population, because they simply did not contact the population. And now the capital offices of Kyrgyz political parties are almost always empty. These organizations remember about citizens a month and a half before the election and forget about them the day after the vote. The same pattern is observed in all Central Asian republics without exception (where political life includes the dimension of inter-party rivalry and the permissibility of political discussions). Now, when the transition to a "parliamentary republic" has been announced in Kyrgyzstan after the former president fled abroad, and elections are due to be held in October, the absolute majority of Kyrgyz parties do not declare themselves in any way.
Tribal associations and associations are another matter. They work with people regularly, not just on the eve of parliamentary or local government elections. Both in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, regional clans arrange holidays (Nooruz/Nauryz), Orozoayt/Eid), etc.) festive events, competitions and games, help poor fellow villagers (with flour, coal, money, etc.), build mosques, organize public works (cleaning ditches, restoring gravel roads, repairing schools, etc.). Financial expenses are covered by small fees from all members and large contributions from the rich and poor. powerful families that exist in any community. They sponsor folk festivals, pay for construction and repair work. Moreover, the heads of "families" emphatically respect their elders, honor the customs and traditions of the community.
Before participating in the elections, they always ask the elders to give them their blessing. This ritual emphasizes that in a political struggle, the leader acts as a representative of the community, clan, and the opinion of his tribesmen is sacred to him.
Clan propaganda instills the main rule - "friends support their own". For Kyrgyzstan, this simple thesis means the priority of the principles of uruuchuluk (tribalism) and zherdeshtik (community) for any member of the community. In extreme simplification, the meaning is as follows: the more "ours" in power - the better for us 7. This idea resonates better with the majority of the population of all Central Asian republics than official propaganda slogans ("Kazakhstan is our common home", "Kyrgyzstan is a country of human rights", etc.).
The strength of clans also lies in the fact that they solve the real problems of their members. What to do when the state abandons its citizens to their fate? This is exactly what the government's strategy of "curtailing" the state's social obligations to citizens, which is being implemented (at different speeds, but in the same direction) in the Central Asian republics, looks like in the mass consciousness. Where and to whom to contact a person in trouble? To those who help without unnecessary red tape and are not blocked off by instructions and regulations that are incomprehensible to most citizens: to relatives and fellow countrymen, from whom you are more likely to receive help than from the bureaucratic apparatus.
In Kyrgyzstan, for example, tribal associations and fraternities were revived in the early 90s of the last century not as political groups. These spontaneous formations began with the revival of traditions of solidarity and mutual assistance. It was they who brought back the concepts of ashar (gratuitous joint construction of a house for a community member), yntymak (support), koshumcha (monetary or property contribution), and zhardam (assistance) to everyday life in Kyrgyzstan. And now informal associations support their members not only in their small homeland - in the region, but also in the capital - Bishkek. Fellow countrymen and relatives help each other get a job, find housing, and enroll in a university. For the average Kyrgyz, these communities have not a virtual, but a very specific value. From their side, he feels understanding and real participation in his life. It is here that he finds what has been taken away from him: attention, cooperation, and basic respect. When considering the mechanisms of functioning of sub-ethnic groups in Turkmenistan, Kadyrov points out the same features that clans "at the grassroots level" almost always use to be more effective than the state apparatus.
Another element that contributes to the growth of the influence and social significance of clans in Central Asian countries is that it is often through blood-related groups (which, as the Turkmen scientist rightly notes, are the basis of any fraternal or corporate associations) that control and restore order in the territory of a particular clan are implemented. The weakening or loss of control over social processes was a real disaster for Kyrgyzstan (the "post-revolutionary" period and the current "powerlessness" after the coup of April 7-8, 2010) and Tajikistan (the civil war).
In Kyrgyzstan, for example, until the fall of 2005, state control simply did not exist (and even now, in the south of the country, the power of the interim government is purely symbolic, which was once again confirmed by the bloody inter-ethnic clashes of June in Osh and Jalal-Abad in April-June 2010). The markets sold goods and products whose quality did not stand up to any criticism. Cattle rustling flourished in the countryside, and the capital was at the mercy of criminal authorities. Drug addiction and alcoholism even permeated schools. The courts, police, akimiats and other state agencies did not control anything else and were not responsible for anything. Even today, after the fall of Kurmanbek Bakiyev's regime, the interim government has little control over the situation not only in the south of the country, but also in Bishkek itself.
After the" tulip revolution " of 2005, at some point the situation became absolutely unbearable. People realized that the state would not help, and informal associations took up the task. The clans easily organized the citizens to restore order. Infamous was the case in Talas, where a mob stoned racketeers who terrorized the entire village. Although it was a lynching and illegal reprisal, the public opinion of the republic turned out to be on the side of the rural community - the medieval version of justice arose because law enforcement agencies did not cope with their duties.
The inaction of the authorities led to the expansion and deepening of the influence of informal associations in Kyrgyz society. Archaic institutions, such as aksakal courts and kurultai, have begun to revive in the country. Especially in rural areas, traditional, community-based forms of governance have greatly displaced the state. They set the queue for irrigation, resolve small land and economic disputes, determine the size of bitir (mandatory poll tax in favor of the mosque), etc. As the new government strengthened, these "shoots of clan revival" were not abolished, but integrated into the socio-political system (kurultai, for example, has long been used by all participants in the Kyrgyz political process as a regular demonstration of "popular support"). Currently, against the background of another weakening of the central government in Kyrgyzstan, it is precisely the "grassroots" systems of self-organization of the population, using clan solidarity, that will undoubtedly only strengthen.
It is interesting that, for example, in Uzbekistan, in a completely different socio-political landscape than in Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, similar trends can be observed at the level of the neighboring and related community-mahallas. And just as in Kyrgyzstan, the authorities initially considered the "grassroots" structures of local self-government, directly intertwined with traditional clans, as objects that should not be associated with them.-
rummage, but control and use. It is in Uzbekistan that the elders of mahalla committees and" responsible for order " - posbons - receive state salaries: nothing like this has yet been observed in other republics of the region.
The "advantages" of Central Asian clans include the fact that the leaders of informal groups, unlike state officials, communicate with people "in their own language". A speech addressed to the masses should not only reflect ordinary, unscientific and non-political ideas of people. Persuading the masses is an art that requires daily improvement and constant practice.
However, in any case, the "strength" of the Kyrgyz (and all other Central Asian) clans is not in their merits. It lies in the numerous shortcomings of the political systems, administrative management practices, and overall political systems established in the countries of the region. Increasingly, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, or Kazakh societies are choosing tribalism because they have no other choice.
Clans are sometimes more organized and effective than not only political parties and NGOs, but also the state apparatus; in the end, the power of clans does not strengthen the state, but breaks it. This was clearly demonstrated during the" first "and" second "Kyrgyz" clan revolutions" of March 2005 and April 2010, or the Tajik "inter-clan war" of 1992-1998, when the stability of the economies and societies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was dealt a severe blow, from which these countries still cannot recover.
FURTHER RESEARCH IS NEEDED
The situation in Turkmenistan looks different. In terms of its resource potential, Turkmenistan can be compared with such key states in the region as Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. In addition, the country occupies a special place in Central Asia and the Caspian region. Geopolitics and raw material resources make the republic a very important, without exaggeration, key segment of the entire post-Soviet Asia. Therefore, it is particularly important for all world power centers to find opportunities for effective influence on the elite and further develop an effective model for maintaining and further strengthening their positions in interstate relations with" post-Niyazov " Turkmenistan. Knowledge of hidden but very significant for traditional society decision-making mechanisms, prospects for strengthening or weakening the control of various clans over the country's politics and economy, allows us to build more effective methods of promoting interests in Turkmenistan and in the entire region.
All the more interesting is an objective analysis of the current domestic political situation and the situation in the sphere of elites in Central Asian countries, since, for example, in Russia, there is a clear shortage of this kind of information. Such data are of interest, among other things, in connection with the unfolding global economic crisis phenomena and global geopolitical transformations. 8
Understanding the ways in which intra-elite interactions are developing in the countries of the region, changes in the highest elites on the eve of transformations awaiting the highest authorities of some republics, and the influence of world power centers on them is interesting not only in a purely academic sense.
Clan studies opens up prospects for building effective models for promoting interests. That is why works about elites, their interaction and struggle, the inner circle of leaders, and the foreign policy orientations of the most significant financial, industrial, and informal political groups of influence in the Central Asian republics enjoy the closest attention in world capitals.
According to Sh. Kadyrov, " the clans are constantly on the move." This movement, mutual struggle and frequent changes in the intra-elite situation make it difficult to study the problem. His work outlines only the outlines of a future large-scale interdisciplinary study of the fate of clans in the region and especially of post-Soviet elites.
Kadyrov Sh . 1 Chto takoe "bashizatsiya" [What is "bashizationization"]. Information and Analytical Bulletin, 2000, No. 2, January, pp. 33-36; Kadyrov Sh. Some remarks on the question of the social well-being of Russians in Turkmenistan / / Russia and the East: problems of interaction. Moscow, 1993. Part 2. pp. 346-351; Kadyrov Sh. Some Questions on the Study of the Turkmen Family / / Central Asian Survey, 1993. Vol. 12, N 3. P. 393 - 400, etc.
Kadyrov Sh . 2 "Nation" of tribes. IV RAS Moscow, 2003.
3 The concept of "Turkmen or" in the 1920s-1930s and later was translated as "Turkmen people", "country of Turkmens". Sh. Kadyrov points out that such a translation is acceptable, but the original meaning of this concept is still somewhat different: Turkmen or is a confederation of tribal federations of Turkmens.
4 In Kazakh historiography, it is customary to call muses unions of tribes that recognize themselves as part of a single Kazakh nation and inhabit a part of the Kazakh territory fixed by tradition. There are three zhuzovs in total: Uly zhuz ("Senior"), Orta ("Middle") and Kishi ("Junior"). Geographically, they were located from the south-east (Semirechye as the settlement area of the Senior zhuz) to the north-west (the habitat of the Junior Zhuz). Sredny zhuz occupied the most extensive central territory. The Zhuz are divided into 20 tribes of unequal importance, and those-into clans and tribes.
5 See: Khlyupin V. Kyrgyzstan is agonizing. The country can only be saved by a dictatorship / / CentrAsia, 07.11.2006.
6 Including: Kadyrov Sh. Ethnology of Governance in Central Asia: yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Turkmenistan. Historical dictionary. 29.06.2005 - http://turkmeny.hl.ru/analyt/a12.html
7 See: M. Urumbayev. Kyrgyzstan held hostage by refugees? // Evening Bishkek, 04.07.2005.
Knyazev A. 8 Russia returns to Central Asia / / Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2007. N 5(53).
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