Libmonster ID: UZ-1495

This article describes the results of quantitative value research of the Muslims of Dagestan and outlines the difference between religious groups present in this republic of Russia. It also presents information on the determinants of the justification of violence (in its different forms). According to this analysis, religious groups have certain value profiles. Sufis, for example, value obedience, disapprove of violence, and tend to trust people. Salafis are more conservative in terms of gender, more prone toward justification of violence, and trust people less, while secular Muslims support liberal values and universalism. The analysis of violence justification determinants showed that along with gender, age, and strength of religiosity, the factors that influence this phenomenon are participation in Salafi social circles and level of happiness, security, and trust. Each of these factors relates to the explanation of various forms of violence justification differently.

Keywords: Islam, values, violence, Dagestan, internet survey.


Varshaver E., Starodubrovskaya I. Who and why in Dagestan justifies violence? Comparative analysis of value profiles of Dagestani Islamic religious groups / / State, religion, Church in Russia and abroad. 2017. N 3. pp. 202-233.

Varshaver, Evgeni, Starodubrovskaya, Irina (2017) "Who Justifies Violence in Dagestan and Why? A Comparative Analysis of Value Profiles of Muslim Religious Groups in Dagestan", Gosudarstuo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 35(3): 202-233.

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Introduction

To WHAT extent are religious affiliations and attitudes related to a person's values and life orientations? Why do some people tend to justify violence while others don't? Within the framework of this article, the search for answers to these questions is based on the material of a quantitative study of the values of Dagestanis conducted by a team of researchers in 2016.1. The article focuses on two questions: what is the difference between the values and attitudes of Dagestanis belonging to different intra-Islamic Sunni religious groups that have developed in Dagestan, as well as how belonging to these groups is related to the attitude to justify violence and how different factors relate to each other in explaining this attitude. The analytical part of the article is thus divided into two parts: the first examines the general value profile of religious groups and identifies the main differences, while the second focuses on the attitude to justify violence and demonstrates what factors this attitude is associated with. The analytical part is preceded by a detailed description of the survey design and methodology for identifying religious groups.

Large comparative studies of values emerged in the last third of the twentieth century2 and focused primarily on differences between cultural areas. 3 At the same time, the tradition of generational and cohort analysis4 developed on the empirical basis of international surveys, which focused on differences between generations.-


1. The study was conducted by I. Starodubrovskaya, E. Varshaver and E. Lazarev.

2. Rokeach, M. (1973) The Nature of Human Values. Free press; Schwartz, S.H. (1992) "Universale in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries", Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 25: 1-65; Hofstede, G.H. (1984) Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values. Sage; Inglehart, R. (2015) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton University Press.

3. Inglehart, R., Baker, W.E. (2000) "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values", American Sociological Review 65(1): 19-51; Inglehart, R., Welzel, С (2010) The WVS Cultural Map of the World, World Values Survey [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54, accessed on 30.08.2017].

4. Glenn, N.D. (2005) Cohort analysis. Vol. 5. Sage.

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social groups within and between societies 5. The analysis of differences between other groups was much less developed, and religious differences were the subject of research either in the case of poly-confessional societies, 6 or in large comparisons, where cultures were distinguished according to the principle of religion that underlies them. 7 Rare attempts have been made to study intra-confessional differentiation, but for Islam it is limited to stating and studying the value differences between Sunnis and Shiites in countries where they are present at the same time, 8 or between countries 9. As far as we know, no attempt has been made to trace the value difference between groups within the main branches of Islam.

Violence in various forms is one of the key topics of social sciences10. The range of research topics ranges from 11 wars to 12 domestic violence. Violence has also become a topic for work in value researchs13 - questions about justifying violence in various forms were included in questionnaires of large studies, 14 and texts about its determinants appeared both in relation to the phenomenon as a whole, 15 and in relation to


5. Inglehart, R.F. (2008) "Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006", West European Politics 31(1-2): 130-146.

6. Allinsmith, B. (1948) "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude: A Study of Eight Major US Religious Groups", Public Opinion Quarterly 12(3): 377-389.

7. Parboteeah, K.P., Paik, Y., Cullen, J.B. (2009) "Religious Groups and Work Values: A Focus on Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam", International Journal of Cross Cultural Management 9(1): 51-67.

8. Verkuyten, M., Yildiz, A.A. (2009) "Muslim Immigrants and Religious Group Feelings: Self-Identification and Attitudes among Sunni and Alevi Turkish-Dutch", Ethnic and Racial Studies 32(7): 1121-1142.

9. Robertson, C.J., et al. (2001) "Beliefs about Work in the Middle East and the Convergence versus Divergence of Values", Journal of World Business 36(3): 223-244.

10. Walby, S. (2013) "Violence and Society: Introduction to an Emerging Field of Sociology", Current Sociology 61(2): 95-111.

11. Malesevic, S. (2010) The Sociology of War and Violence. Cambridge University Press.

12. Kishor, S., Johnson, K. (2004) Profiling Domestic Violence: A Multi-Country Study. ORC Macro.

13. Karstedt, S. (2006) "Democracy, Values, and Violence: Paradoxes, Tensions, and Comparative Advantages of Liberal Inclusion", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 605(1): 50-81.

14. "WVS Wave 6 (2010-2014)", World Values Survey [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Documentation, accessed from 01.09.2017]

15. Asal, V, Brown, M. (2010) "A Cross-National Exploration of the Conditions that Produce Interpersonal Violence", Politics & Policy 38(2): 175-192.

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16. However, since quantitative studies of intra-religious value differences are rare, little is known about the impact of belonging to certain movements within a religion on attitudes related to violence based on such studies. The article thus contributes to the research of intra-religious value differences in Islam and to the research of determinants of attitudes to violence.

Religious situation in Dagestan

Dagestan is one of the most Islamized republics in the North Caucasus, with the deepest Islamic roots. Since the late 1980s, the republic has experienced a rapid process of Islamic revival: the growing number of practicing Muslims, the opening of mosques and Islamic educational institutions, the emergence of popular preachers, and the mass departure of young people to study at foreign Islamic universities. All this was accompanied by a serious differentiation of Islamic religious views, the emergence of new trends and groups for the republic, including radical ones. The radicalization of Muslims was seriously affected by the war in Chechnya, which the militants tried to transfer to the territory of Dagestan in 1999. This attempt failed. But until recently, the scale of religiously motivated violence in the republic was great, and there was a fairly massive armed underground.

If we consider the situation in the Islamic sphere at the time of the survey, we can state that it was characterized by significant differentiation and fragmentation. Let's try to characterize the main "fault lines".

At the time of the collapse of the USSR, Sufism could be considered traditional Islam in Dagestan. 17 Sufism in Dagestan was not always conservative - in the past, it was Sufis who often acted as carriers of the desire for change, for a more complete implementation of Sharia in everyday life, and were at the forefront of national development.-


16. Koenig, M.A., et al. (2006) "Individual and Contextual Determinants of Domestic Violence in North India", American Journal of Public Health 96(1): 132-138.

17. Sufism is a mystical trend in Islam, in which believers unite in Sufi orders (tariqats) around sheikhs, whose followers (murids) must obey their mentors without question. In Dagestan, Sufism is mainly represented by the Naqshbandi and Shaziliya tariqas.

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the liberation struggle against the Russian Empire. However, during the Soviet era, when many Islamic scholars were repressed and Dagestan was cut off from the main centers of Islamic thought, the underground Sufi Islam actually turned into traditional, popular Islam, intertwining with traditions and customs that had nothing to do with Islamic doctrine.

In the post-Soviet period, quite quickly, one of the branches of Sufism - followers of Sheikh Said Chirkeyi, an Avar-began to almost completely control the Spiritual Administration( muftiate), which is actually the official representation of Muslims of Dagestan, built into the power structure. It was she who began to represent the so-called "official Islam" in the republic. At the same time, there are quite a lot of other sheikhs in Dagestan. Thus, well-known representatives of Sufism, whose views differed significantly from the position of the muftiate, were among the kumyks until recently. Some sheikhs do not recognize each other and accuse their opponents of being false sheikhs. There are also communities that honor deceased sheikhs who had no successors.

If we talk about the views of representatives of this rather diverse field, we can say that they are very heterogeneous. Among the believers belonging to it, there are devoutly observant Muslims who impose serious additional religious obligations on themselves in comparison with the minimum necessary ones, and there are people for whom belonging to the tariqa is largely just a tribute to tradition. In general, it is considered that Sufis are quite peaceful and fit into the existing secular society. However, in Dagestan, it is increasingly clear that a radical wing stands out among Sufis, which is quite aggressive and ready to take violent actions against their opponents.

These opponents themselves have not yet received a generally accepted name. They are called Wahhabis, Salafis, fundamentalists, and in contrast to the more traditional Sufi Islam - non-traditional Muslims. It is generally believed that this ideology came to Dagestan from the Arab East. To a certain extent, this is true. However, it also has internal roots. Before the 1917 revolution, there were representatives of similar views in Dagestan, among them quite well - known scientists. At the same time, the dissemination of knowledge from the centers of Islamic thought on its own

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the periphery is also a fairly natural process that emerged immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

In fact, the main idea that unites this trend is to defend "pure" Islam, liberate it from traditional strata, and return to what is written in the holy books - in the Koran and Sunnah. Unlike the Sufis, this trend does not recognize the authority of the sheikhs as an "intermediate authority" between Allah and believers, and encourages independent reading of primary sources. It also seems that in general, its representatives are more critical of the secular state and are ready to openly express their protest in various forms. Beyond these general characteristics, differences begin that are even more numerous and diverse than those of the more traditional and disciplined Sufis.

If we talk about religious views, the more moderate representatives of this trend recognize four Sunni legal schools-madhhabs, while the more radical (non-madhhabists) generally reject madhhabs and insist on referring directly to the Koran and Sunnah. Moreover, some seek to rely on the opinions of Islamic scholars, while others consider it possible for each believer to interpret the sacred texts independently. At the same time, it is obvious that in the sacred texts they also look for (and find) different things. Someone - the value of knowledge, a healthy lifestyle, respect for people, unconditional fulfillment of contractual obligations. Some are justifying violence, gender inequality, and the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims. And often these two groups of values - relatively speaking, modernist and archaic-are intertwined in the most bizarre way.

If we talk about participation in public life, some seek to distance themselves from it altogether in the "state of infidels"; some are integrated into the peaceful protest field, engaged in human rights and civic activities. The most radical ones advocate armed jihad against the Russian state. Accordingly, serious discussions arise among different groups about participation in elections, as well as in politics in general, and integration into various areas of civic activity (for example, in urban activism). There are also different views on participating in the Islamic call-the active attraction of people to Islam-although it seems that the Negro-

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traditional Muslims are more likely to see this as their responsibility than Sufis. A certain number of Muslims are engaged in various types of Islamic social activities - charity, organization of children's Islamic holidays, etc.

The introduction of Sharia law and the establishment of the caliphate are more relevant for representatives of this trend than for traditional Islam. However, this does not mean that they are all ready to do it today or tomorrow. This is the position of the radicals - those who recognize the possibility of fighting for the caliphate by force. As for the moderates, for them the caliphate is rather a social ideal that will be achieved in the distant, indefinite future, when all Muslims will be ready to follow the laws of God. This aspiration is not directly related to everyday life.

Sufis and Salafis ( non-traditional Muslims) are the groups that are most clearly visible in the Islamic field of the republic. However, a significant number of believers do not adhere to any of these rather rigidly ideologized trends. They position themselves as simply praying, practicing, although in fact they may be closer to either one or the other wing. Finally, there are those who consider themselves to be ethnic Muslims, Muslims "by birth", although they do not perform the rituals and restrictions provided for by religion.

Is there any way to organize and classify this diverse and differentiated religious ideological space? Do religious differences affect people's values in everyday life? An attempt to answer these questions was made in the framework of a quantitative study on the values of Muslims in Dagestan, conducted in 2016.

Research methodology

The survey of Dagestani Muslims was conducted via the Internet, mainly by targeting the social network Facebook. The questionnaire was placed on the portal www.surveymonkey.com. 3,105 respondents took part in the survey, of which 1,675 completed the questionnaire in full, and these respondents were included in the final data set. The targeting method is new

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It is used as a method in social research and is only currently included in scientific circulation 18. In general, the procedures associated with it imply that the link to the survey page is shown to certain groups of social media users as an advertisement. Users see the link and can go to the survey page.

Research in accordance with this method, as well as the characteristics of sample populations (in particular, representativeness) that are formed as a result of its use, both in Russia and abroad, is in the process of implementation, so at the moment this sampling method should be attributed to spontaneous non-random sampling methods. Consequently, the array collected in this study does not claim to represent the population of Dagestan. The main socio-demographic indicators of the sample are as follows:: 70% of men and 30% of women; 73% have higher education, 14% have specialized secondary education, 11% have secondary education, and 2% do not have completed secondary education; the average age of survey participants is 40 years. Comparing these distributions with official statistics-


18. Arcia, A. (2014) "Facebook Advertisements for Inexpensive Participant Recruitment among Women in Early Pregnancy", Health Education & Behavior 41(3): 237-241; Head, B.F., et al. (2016) "Advertising for Cognitive Interviews: a Comparison of Facebook, Craigslist, and Snowball Recruiting", Social Science Computer Review 34(3): 360-377; Potzschke, S., Braun, M. (2016) "Migrant Sampling Using Facebook Advertisements: a Case Study of Polish Migrants in Four European Countries", Social Science Computer Review 1-21.

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Based on the results of a study of 19 and 20 representative studies, it can be concluded that women, young people, and Dagestanis without higher education are underrepresented in the sample. At the same time, the study primarily focuses on the relationship between variables, as a result of which the requirements for the representativeness of the sample relative to the population of Dagestan are somewhat reduced.

At the same time, the question arises as to whether the representativeness of the sample for the population of Dagestan as a whole is in principle adequate to the research objectives. After all, we are talking about Dagestani Muslims, and here the characteristics of the general population may be different. In addition, Dagestanis living in other regions who consider themselves Muslims also participated in the survey. As for the possible shift in results related to the use of social networks, it can be estimated as follows. On the one hand, it can be assumed that Muslims who are more educated and use information technologies both reflect more reflexively and transmit to their followers the value system that was revealed in the survey. On the other hand, it seems that certain groups of Muslims - the most closed, archaic, lumpenized strata-may not have been included in the survey. However, it is not obvious that due to their specific nature, they would also be represented in a survey that is representative of the population of the republic as a whole. High-quality research methods are more appropriate here. It should also be noted that preliminary diagnostics showed that Dagestani Muslims are most fully represented in the social network Facebook, so the main focus on this network seems justified.

The research tool - questionnaire-was dedicated to values and attitudes and was partly based on international value studies - the World Values Survey 21 and the European Values Survey 22. Some


19. Territorial body of the Federal State Statistics Service for the Republic of Dagestan. Federal State Statistics Service [http://dagstat.gks.ru/, accessed from 01.09.2017].

20. Eurobarometer. Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration [http://www.ranepa.ru/uceniyyissledov/strategii-i-doklady-2/evrobarometr, accessed from 01.09.2017].

21. World Values Survey [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp, accessed from 01.09.2017].

22. European Values Study [http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/, accessed from 01.09.2017].

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The questions reproduced questions from these studies verbatim, but most of them were designed specifically for the study presented here-taking into account the specifics of the field. The wording of the questions was discussed directly with Dagestani Muslims. So, at the final stage of preparing the questionnaire, it was sent to 12 representatives of various Islamic movements, from 10 of them comments and comments were received, many of which were taken into account.

A methodological feature of this tool in comparison with the questionnaires of large international studies was the use of so-called vignettes 23. Vignettes are a special type of question in which the respondent describes a certain situation and is asked to determine their attitude to this situation, give advice to its participants, or suggest how they would behave in such circumstances. For example, respondents were asked the following question: "Haji's son was killed in an accident caused by Omar, the son of a high official who was driving under the influence of alcohol. However, despite the presence of evidence, the court acquitted Omar. After that, Haji organized a lynching and shot Omar. How do you feel about Haji's action?" The answer options were as follows: I fully approve, rather approve, rather disapprove, completely disapprove, and find it difficult to answer. If the answers to the questions reflect primarily the declarative position of the respondent, vignettes allow us to better understand what values the respondent focuses on in their practical actions.

Both the usual questions and vignettes were designed to identify the respondents ' values and attitudes related to generational hierarchies and gender issues, informal relations in society and the desired political structure, science and religion, education and violence, as well as other phenomena. Along with value questions, respondents were asked to answer questions from the socio-demographic block, as well as questions designed to describe their attitude to religion in general, their participation in religious practices and rituals, and their attitude to certain intra-religious problems,


23. Alexander, C. S., Becker, H. J. (1978) "The Use of Vignettes in Survey Research", Public Opinion Quarterly 42(1): 93-104; Puzanova Zh.V., Tertyshnikova A. G. Method of vignettes in sociological research: methodological principles and methodological solutions. Series: Sociology. 2015. N. 4.

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on which there is no consensus in Islam. Based on these questions, four groups of respondents were identified. Conventionally, they were called Sufis, non-traditional, secular and traditional. The following criteria were used for their selection::

* Sufis-perform salat and belong to the tariqa (Sufi brotherhood);

* non-traditional - they perform namaz, but do not participate in mawlids and do not belong to the tariqa;

* secular-do not perform namaz (obligatory five-fold prayer for Muslims);

* traditional - they perform namaz, participate in mawlids 24, but do not belong to the tariqa.

Table 1. Identification of groups of respondents by religion

 

Sufis

Non-traditional ones

Secular services

Traditional ones

Namaz

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Belonging to the tariqa

Yes

No

It doesn't teach you anything.

No

Participation in mawlids

It doesn't teach you anything.

No

It doesn't teach you anything.

Yes

N(96)

455 (27%)

365 (22%)

367 (22%)

470 (28%)



Let's briefly explain the non-obvious terms and selection criteria. We call those who do not perform the daily five - fold prayer (namaz) - the main pillar of Islam-secular. Such people cannot be classified as practicing Muslims. The remaining three groups (those who perform salat always or sometimes) are practicing Muslims, but they differ (1) in their formal membership in the Sufi brotherhood (tariqa); and (2) in their participation in practices that are not recorded in the Qur'an and Sunnah (in the mawlids). Using similar criteria for selecting CSB groups-


24. A ritual meeting dedicated to the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad or other important social and family events. Within the framework of non-traditional Islam, it is considered an unacceptable innovation and is not practiced.

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It was expected with Dagestani Muslims who received a good Islamic education. The use of the term "non-traditional Muslims" is due to the fact that out of all possible variants (as already mentioned above, the terminology for this group is not well established) this one is the least ideologized and generates the least negative connotations.

The analysis was carried out in two consecutive stages. At the first stage, a simple difference between groups was investigated for all questions. If the scale describing the distribution of responses to the question under study was nominal, the comparison was carried out using the chi-square criterion 25. If the scale was quantitative, t-test and ANOVA 26 were used. Based on the results of this comparison, a table was created containing the difference in all questions and/or concepts contained in them. For the possibility of generalization taking into account the difference in scales, the magnitude of differences in each case was not analyzed, but rather the extent to which differences are present and which group differs in which direction (if different) from all the others. After this analysis was carried out, several questions were identified, the differences in which were most interesting, and the factors that explain the distribution of responses to these questions were analyzed using correlation and regression analysis. 27 Based on the results of this analysis, conclusions were drawn about the relationship of certain variables with attitudes to justifying violence.

Research results: values of Dagestani Muslims

Before going on to describe the differences between groups and the value profiles of these groups, it is necessary to briefly describe the "starting point" - the results that characterize the entire array. This analysis has been presented in other publications 28 and you-


25. Test used to compare distributions of nominal variables across groups

26. Tests used to compare quantitative variables by group

27. Methods for calculating the relationship between variables-pairwise (simple correlations) and simultaneously (regression).

Starodubrovskaya I., Lazarev E., Varshaver E. 28. Values of Dagestani Muslims: what the survey showed / / Kavkazsky uzel [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/itogi_oprosa_naselenia_Dagestana/, accessed from 01.09.2017]

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There are 29 steps based on the project results, so very little will be said about them here.

Dagestanis who consider themselves Muslims believe that the most important thing in life is the family (more than 96% of respondents noted the corresponding answer). Their second priority is health (80%). Less important are "religion" (71%) and "work" (63%), while free time is not very important (35%). Dagestanis generally feel happy (85%) and protected (60%). Among the qualities that should be raised in children, the most important, from their point of view, are responsibility (85%), hard work (82%) and tolerance (79%), and the least important are imagination (8%), self - expression (26%) and obedience (25%). The intermediate positions are again occupied by religiosity (65%). Dagestanis are intolerant of drug addicts (96%), homosexuals (93%) and alcoholics (92%), but they are tolerant of representatives of other religions (4% are intolerant), nationalities (1% are intolerant) and races (2% are intolerant). When asked about the groups that the survey participants trust the most, the majority notes the answer option "to all people, if their actions do not prove the opposite" (51%), in second place - the answer option "relatives" (32%). At the same time, when faced with the choice "most people can be trusted or, on the contrary, you need to be careful when dealing with people", the majority of Dagestanis note the second option (53%). The Dagestani people we surveyed are largely religious (56% said they always perform the five-fold prayer, while only 30% do not do it). The overwhelming majority of respondents consider it important to get an education - less than 2% of respondents opposed it. Moreover, more than 60% note the importance of both religious and secular education, while only about 7% consider it possible to limit themselves to religious education.

Respondents do not take clear positions on violence. 58% believe that when a husband beats his wife, it is never justified, and 39% believe that it is sometimes justified. Only 28% of respondents cannot justify parents who beat their children. However, 71% of respondents believe that violence in general is "never justified". The vignette described above, in which the father is killed-


Isaev T. 29. The results of the study of Dagestani values caused a discussion at the presentation in Makhachkala. // The Caucasian Knot. 17.11.2016 [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/292779/, доступ от 01.09.2017].

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the image of the culprit of the accident that killed his son, acquitted by the court, causes conflicting assessments - 50% approve of the behavior of the hero of the vignette, and 50% do not approve. In addition, there was disagreement on gender issues. Those who believe that a situation in which the wife earns more than her husband will cause problems, and those who believe that this is not a big deal, shared in half. There is a similar correlation between those who believe that men should have more rights to jobs in case of lack of them than women, and those who do not. These are the main results on the most relevant issues for further analysis.

How do groups identified according to the principles set out in the methodology differ from each other? Below are the value profiles of each group.

Sufis are highly religious, and the value of religion for them, as for non-traditional Muslims, is key. This is how these groups differ from traditionalists and secular ones. Sufis are conservative in terms of values and attitudes related to gender relations (homosexuality, divorce, education for women), but they are less conservative than non-traditional ones.

At the same time, there are a number of positions that characterize only Sufis and distinguish them from other groups. First of all, among the representatives of this group, the attitude to submission and trust in authorities is more pronounced than on average. In children, it is more important for Sufis than for others to cultivate obedience, and less often than for others to cultivate independence. In religious matters, they rely more than others on the imams of mosques and their spiritual guides, and if in a conflict situation the imam made a decision in favor of his relative, Sufis more often than others believe that this decision should be accepted. They value initiative and determination less than others, and also prefer not to take risks in career matters. At the same time, they trust much more - all people, fellow countrymen, representatives of their own nationality - and feel, in general, more protected in comparison with representatives of other groups. And, showing average values of support for domestic violence, Sufis oppose violent conflict resolution in society - they are less likely to support lynching and more likely not to support "violence against other people". This is not to say that Sufis are against participating in politics

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Rather, with the exception of a more private reluctance to participate in petition signing and boycotts, their performance does not differ from that of other groups. We can say, however, that among other groups, Sufis are the happiest.

Non-traditional Muslims also consider religion to be an important life value for more than two remaining groups, but their religiosity is based on different grounds than that of Sufis. In particular, the system of appeal to authorities differs: when a Sufi turns to a spiritual mentor or imam, an unconventional Muslim is more likely to go to a more knowledgeable friend or go to the Internet, where - on various sites-he consults on issues of interest to him. Some attitudes and practices differ - and this difference has a dogmatic origin - non-traditional Muslims believe that it is possible to read the Koran in Russian translation, while Sufis believe that one should only refer to retellings or to the Arabic original.

There are also a number of values that distinguish non-traditional Muslims from all other groups. Non-traditional people are the most conservative group in terms of gender attitudes. In all the questions and vignettes that somehow raise this topic, non-traditional Muslims demonstrate the greatest disagreement among the studied groups with gender equality, as well as the right of women to work or receive professional education. Non-traditional people are the least likely to trust others - relatives, work colleagues, fellow countrymen, people of their own nationality, and basically all people except co-religionists. Co-religionists for them more often than for other groups, appear as the "last bastion". They are more likely to oppose marriages with representatives of other religions and, at the same time, are more likely to support marriages between Muslims of different nationalities. In addition, in the vignette about the need to divide money from charity between refugees from Syria and Ukraine, they often choose the option "give everything to refugees from Syria".

Non-traditional Muslims, who feel less protected than others, are first and foremost more likely to support institutions of parallel-religious-justice (along with Sufis), as well as violence: both family (the husband beats the wife), and in prin-

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violence against other people is a common practice (although even in this group, the proportion of people who never condone violence exceeds 60%). It is they (along with the secular ones) who most often allow lynching in a situation of an unfair court decision. They are against injustice, but non-traditional Muslims see ways to resolve conflicts outside the public sphere; for example, closing the market where the hero of one of the vignettes trades requires countermeasures, but these measures consist in attracting personal connections. Non-traditional Muslims are more likely than others to try to be in "parallel worlds" with the state : they are less likely to share economic growth and strengthening the country's defense capability as goals at the national level; they do not believe that the laws of the state should be implemented if they do not agree with them; they do not want to participate in electoral politics either as a voter or as a way to defend rights, boycotts (passive means) are more often chosen than others, and demonstrations (active means) are less often chosen than others. In addition, non - traditional Muslims are more likely than others to believe that it is normal to receive government benefits to which a person has no rights, and not pay taxes.

At the same time, they are less likely than others to agree that Islam should be outside politics. In addition, they are less likely than others to support the view that people should choose political leaders in free, fair elections, although among them the share of support for this thesis is 83%. Non-traditional Muslims also have another interesting feature - they are more likely than other groups to not consider work and career as important, preferring "not to overdo it" when preparing for interviews in a high-paying workplace, and also more often supporting the point of view that you should work as little as possible. At the same time, they are committed to career growth and promotion, even if it causes significant inconvenience in their lives.

Secular groups - as the name implies-are distinguished from other groups by the lower importance of religiosity and, as a result, the mildness of intra-religious attitudes. Unlike both Sufis and non-traditional Muslims, they choose a mosque based on where it is more convenient for them to get to, and also, if the dispute was resolved by an imam who turned out to be a relative of the hero's opponent, they are more often advised not to obey the decision, or they do not have a point of view on this issue. They walk less often

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they go to the mosque and fast less often on Eid. And they are more likely to believe that Islam should be outside politics.

At the same time, secular groups differ significantly from other groups and at the level of values and attitudes. In particular, they are most often focused on creative self-realization - in their work, it is more important for them to get pleasure in the process (and work as such is more important), and in children they would like to cultivate imagination, self - expression (but also thrift and determination), and in addition-independence. Independence and freedom, in general, characterize their value series. They are less likely than representatives of other groups to speak out against living near homosexuals and unregistered couples; they are more likely to believe that homosexuality, abortion, prostitution, divorce, sexual relations before marriage, as well as suicide (but also taking bribes using their official position) can be justified; they are more likely to advocate for equal rights for women in work and study, and also for their ability to independently search for a husband. They value secular education and science more than anyone else. They are in favor of universalism-they support the equal distribution of money for charity between Muslims and non-Muslims more often than others, and also support interfaith marriages more often than others.

At the same time, they, like non-traditional Muslims (although to a lesser extent), do not trust the people around them (although the "set" of groups they trust less is slightly different - in their case, they are co-religionists, relatives, fellow countrymen, and people of their own nationality), and also justify lynching more often than others. although, in general, they do not support violence - they oppose domestic violence and take intermediate positions on "violence against other people". In terms of relations with the state and the public sphere, their position is ambiguous and contradictory - for example, they are more likely to oppose informal relations with government agencies, but, at the same time, they are less likely to speak out against bribery. They are no more democratic than others - they do not differ from others in the distribution of answers to questions about the need for elections and personal participation in electoral processes. At the same time, they see the point of participating in public protests a little more often than others. And-they are the least happy of all four groups.

The fourth group - traditional ones-take an intermediate position on most issues. In case their posi-

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These groups are extreme, they find themselves on the edge along with one of the groups - either with the secular ones, sharing with them some of the anti-conservative (gender, universalism) attitudes, or with the Sufis, converging with them in terms of trust in certain groups, as well as inclusion in traditional hierarchies. Less often, the positions coincide with non-traditional Muslims. These two groups are more likely than others to use online sources when they want to find an answer to a particular question, and in some situations they are more likely than others to solve problems using personal connections. Values that would distinguish this group from all other groups were not recorded.

The groups are thus very different in many ways. At the same time, there are a number of values and attitudes in relation to which there are no differences between groups. There is no difference in general tolerance to such "outsiders" as people of other races and nationalities, and intolerance to carriers of social vices-drug addicts. There is no difference in the importance of family and health. There is a consensus regarding such violations of the order as traveling without a ticket in transport, as well as theft of other people's property. In addition, groups generally do not differ in their attitude to certain modes of participation in public life (improvement, petitions to the head of the republic, struggle for civil rights).

In addition, there were intersections between the groups in terms of values and attitudes (see table 2). These intersections were partly expected and partly unexpected. Sufis and non-traditional Muslims turned out to be similar in terms of the value of religion as such, but also in terms of religious ideologization - so, unlike other Dagestanis, it is important for them to follow the ideological direction of the imam of the mosque where they go to juma namaz. In addition, representatives of both these groups are more conservative on the gender issue than anyone else - they often believe that work and study are a priority for men. There are no similarities between Sufis and seculars, with the exception of issues where there are no differences between the majority of Dagestanis, moreover, they are in antiphase on a significant part of issues. The similarities between the non-traditional and the secular run along three lines. First of all, it is distrust of various groups in society to which they relate - relatives, fellow countrymen, representatives of their nationality. Secondly, it is support for violence in the event that the state refuses to-

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it is called to perform the function of maintaining justice. Third, it is individualism and risk-taking in career matters.

Table 2: Similarity between groups

Group Pairs

Similarity

Sufis are unconventional

Religiosity, religious ideologization, conservatism in the gender issue,

Sufis are secular

-

Non-traditional - secular

Support for mob justice, distrust of different groups that they belong to, individualism in their career



Thus, we can say that at least three of the four groups identified - Sufis, non-traditional and secular-actually have a value profile that distinguishes them from representatives of other groups. Sufis are conformist, they fit well into existing social relations and feel protected and happy. Non-traditional Muslims are conservative and, not trusting the people around them, prefer to live in a" parallel society", partly on the basis of Sharia law, and partly to maintain justice independently. Including through violence against which they do not have strong prejudices. Secular - tend towards liberal values: they are tolerant of groups to which other Dagestanis are intolerant, they are in favor of gender equality, but - they, like non-traditional people, do not trust people and, probably, institutions, and, being against violence, do not condemn the violent maintenance of justice. They feel insecure and the least happy.

Study results: justifying violence

On the basis of the above, it seems that it is the axis of religiosity - happiness - security - trust - violence that is the most important factor in the development of religion.-

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It is crucial for understanding the differences between groups. The subsequent analysis attempts to identify the relationships between these variables that characterize Dagestan society, and to explain why some support and justify violence, while others do not.

In general, the question for this stage of analysis can be formulated as follows: what factors are associated with attitudes to violence? There are also two general hypotheses. According to the first one, the attitude to violence is a function of being religious and belonging to a particular religious group (in this case, non - traditional Muslims). According to the second one, the attitude to violence is primarily related to the factors of the Muslim's environment and self - perception-how protected he is, how much he can trust others, and, ultimately, how happy he is. Thus, we selected as dependent variables those that describe attitudes to violence - "justification of violence in general" and "justification of revenge". The last variable was created based on a vignette in which, after an unfair trial, the father of the deceased in the accident killed the culprit of the accident. Among others, these variables were chosen because one of them (justification of violence in general) describes the element of a person's worldview to a greater extent, and the other (justification of revenge) describes more practically oriented attitudes.

In the preliminary correlation analysis, variables were introduced that characterize the degree of religiosity of respondents, their religious affiliation, the level of generalized trust, security and happiness, as well as describe their socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, level of education, level of education of parents). Table 3 shows simple correlations between the main variables.


30. The method of correlation analysis is Pearson correlation, including for binary variables due to the fact that continua are assumed for binary variables in the installation dimension.

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Table 3: Correlates of justifying violence31

Correlations

 

 

Justification of violence in general (1 maximum unjustification, 4 maximum justification)

Justification of revenge (1 maximum indefensible, 4 maximum excuse)

Paul

1st, 2nd w

-0,173*** (1580)33

-,097** (1355)

Age

Scale (18-76 years old)

-0,049** (1542)

-0,023 (1322)

What is your level of secular education

1-primary, 2-secondary, 3 - secondary vocational, 4-higher education

0,071** (1583)

0,002 (1356)

Do your parents have a college degree

1 - both have it, 2-one has it, 3-no one has it

-0,080*** (1577)

-0,04 (1351)

Do you do the five-fold prayer

1-always, 2-sometimes, 3-never

0,043 (1656)

0,088** (1421)

Sufis vs non-traditional ones

1 - Sufis, 2-non-traditional

0,181*** (814)

0,154** (685)

Unconventional vs. Everyone Else

1 - non-traditional, 2-all others

-0,113*** (1646)

-0,071** (1408)

Are you happy

1 - completely happy, 4-completely unhappy

0,084** (1649)

0,139** (1415)

Do you feel protected

1-yes 4-no

0,041 (1652)

0,148** (1419)

Most people can be trusted or need to be careful

1 can be trusted, 0-you need to be careful

-0,052* (1531)

-0,099** (1324)

To all people, if their actions do not prove that they are not worthy of trust

1 - yes, 0-no

-0,054* (1646)

-0,089** (1414)




31. Hereafter * - relationship is significant at the level of 0.05, * * relationship is significant at the level of 0.01, * * * relationship is significant at the level of 0.001, the value of N. is given in parentheses.

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According to the results of this analysis, women are less likely than men to justify violence, but the relationship between justifying violence in general and gender is stronger than between the same variable and justifying revenge. There is a link between age and justifying violence: the older a person is, the less often they justify violence in general; however, there is no link between age and justifying revenge. There is no correlation between the justification of revenge and the level of education of respondents and their parents. At the same time, support for violence in general is associated with the level of education, and this connection is unexpected - the higher the corresponding indicator is for the respondent and his parents, the more likely they are to support violence in general.

The level of religiosity is associated with justifying revenge. This variable is not associated with violence in general. As we have already shown, there is a link between belonging to certain religious groups and justifying violence. Non-traditional Muslims justify violence more often than Sufis and more often than all religious groups combined. At the same time, Sufis are closer to non-traditional ones in terms of revenge and further from them in terms of justifying violence in general.

The level of happiness plays a role: the happier a person is and the more protected they are (there is a strong relationship between these variables), the less often they support lynching. As for violence in general, it is only related to the level of happiness, but not to a sense of security. In addition, there is a negative association between justifying both types of violence and indicators of generalized trust.

Based on this analysis, therefore, it can be assumed that if the justification of violence in general is more related to socio-demographic characteristics and belonging to certain religious groups, then attitudes towards restoring justice are a function of the social relations in which the respondent is included and his worldview. To test this hypothesis and the hypotheses formulated above, a regression analysis was performed. Below are two sets of models designed to explain the distribution of responses to questions about justifying violence in general and revenge, respectively.

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Table 4: Regression analysis32 justifications for violence in general

Significance of the model

R2

Belonging to non-traditional Muslims

A sense of security

Happiness level

Generalized trust

Religiosity 5-fold prayer)

Parents ' level of education

Level of education

Age

Paul

 

>0,0001

0,044

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-0,044

-0,177***

Model 1

>0,0001

0,034

 

 

 

 

 

-0,072**

0,063*

-0,031

-0,179***

Model 2

>0,0001

0,052

 

 

 

 

0,090***

-0,065*

0,059*

-0,053*

-0,197***

Model 3

>0,0001

0,056

 

 

 

-0,018

0,078**

-0,059*

0,071***

-0,050.

-0,207***

Model 4

>0,0001

0,059

 

 

0,091***

 

0,077**

-0,072**

0,063*

-0,065*

-0,204***

Model 5

>0,0001

0,054

 

0,045

 

 

0,086***

-0,065*

0,059*

-0,063*

-0,0197***

Model 6

>0,0001

0,060

 

0,012

0,086**

 

0,078**

-0,071**

0,063*

-0,069*

-0,205***

Model 7

>0,0001

0,069

-0,139***

 

 

 

0,140***

-0,060*

0,055*

-0,037

-0,200***

Model 8

>0,0001

0,075

-0,142***

 

0,093***

 

0,117***

0,071**

0,071**

-0,076**

-0,234***

Model 9

>0,0001

0,076

-0,155***

0,013

0,085**

 

0,129***

-0,066*

0,060*

-0,048

-0,208***

Model 10



Dependent variable: justification for revenge


32. All regression models were performed using the OLS regression method, which assumes that the intervals between the values of dependent variables are equal.

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The first set of models describes the factors associated with justifying violence in general. Gender has the greatest explanatory power. Age is important only in some models. Religiosity plays a role - the more often a person performs prayer, the more likely they are to justify violence in general. Environmental and worldview factors play a limited role : if the level of generalized trust and a sense of security are not significant when taking into account the socio-demographic characteristics and characteristics of the respondent's religiosity, the level of happiness within this set of models is significant in combination with any variables.

Inclusion of non-traditional Muslims in the set of models of belonging to a religious group is of great importance for testing hypotheses about factors justifying violence. If the explanatory power of the model increases, and environmental factors and attitudes (trust, happiness, security) cease to be significant, this means that belonging to non-traditional Muslims alone explains the distribution of these variables, and, in addition, this variable contains something else that also explains the justification for everyday violence. For example, certain norms or moods that have developed in this community. If belonging to non-traditional Muslims is not significant, and the significance of socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and environmental factors remains, we can say that the corresponding attitude to the problem is not related to religious affiliation per se. If all sets of factors are significant, we can conclude that they all play a role in determining attitudes to violence to varying degrees.

In this case (models 9 and 10), the explanatory power of belonging to non-traditional Muslims is greater than that of environmental factors, but less than that of socio-demographic variables. In model 10, which includes both belonging to non-traditional Muslims and happiness and security, happiness is significant, but security is not. Thus, we can say that environmental factors and attitudes are somewhat important in shaping attitudes to violence, but more important is belonging to the religious group "non-traditional Muslims". The coefficient of determination of the final model is 7.6%33.


33. For large and small values of R2, see Frost, J. (2013) " Regression Analysis: How Do I Interpret R-squared and Assess the Goodness-of-Fit?", The Minitab Blog.

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Summarizing, we can say that the justification of violence in general, according to this analysis, is associated with two blocks of variables - socio-demographic and related to religious affiliation. A separate significant factor is the level of happiness. Violence is more likely to be justified by men, young people, worshippers, unhappy people, and non-traditional Muslims. Environmental factors (security, trust) are not important in these models.

The second set of models is designed to explain the distribution of responses to a vignette in which the father of a deceased motorist kills the culprit of an accident who is unfairly acquitted by a court. Gender remains relevant in this set of models. The level of education of the respondent and his / her parents loses its explanatory power. In addition, the variable "religiosity" remains relevant. At the same time, and this distinguishes this set of models from the two previous ones, environmental and self-perception factors play the first roles in explaining support for lynching. Happiness, security, and trust in these models turn out to be significant both individually (when controlled for gender and religiosity) and collectively, in the latter case adding about 3% to the explanatory power of the model. Against this background, the importance of belonging to the "non-traditional Muslims" group is lost. This variable is significant, however, firstly, the strength of the connection decreases if it is controlled by environmental factors, and secondly, this variable adds about 0.5% to the explanatory power of the model. On this basis, it can be argued that factors such as trust, security, and happiness come to the fore in the explanation of support for lynching, pushing both religiosity and belonging to a religious group "non-traditional".

Thus, based on these models, we can say that the justification of violence is associated with the following set of factors. First, these are socio-demographic characteristics. Women, in general, are less likely to justify violence than men. In addition, a higher level of human capital (the level of education of the respondent and their parents) is associated with greater support for violence in general. The second block of factors includes the characteristics of the social environment and personal attitude. The most "saving"feature


30.05.2013. [http://blog.minitab.com/blog/adventures-in-statistics-2/regressionanalysis-how-do-i-interpret-r-squ ared-and-assess-the-goodness-of-fit, доступ от 01.09.2017], а также Abelson, R.Р. (1985) "A Variance Explanation Paradox: When a Little Is a Lot", Psychological Bulletin 97(1):129.

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Table 5: Regression analysis of revenge justification

Dependent variable: justification for revenge

Significance of the model

R2

Belonging to non-traditional Muslims

A sense of security

Happiness level

Generalized trust

Religiosity (5-fold prayer

Parents ' level of education

Level of education

Age

Paul

 

 

>0,0001

0,012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-0,021

-0,105***

Model 1

 

>0,0001

0,012

 

 

 

 

 

0-,046

-0,005

 

-0,099***

Model 2

 

>0,0001

0,021

 

 

 

 

0,110***

 

 

 

-0,121***

Model 3

 

>0,0001

0,027

 

 

 

-0,096**

0,101***

 

 

 

0,112***

Model 4

 

>0,0001

0,038

 

 

0,135***

0,087**

 

 

 

-0,124***

Model 5

 

>0,0001

0,040

 

0,139***

 

 

0,089**

 

 

 

-0,115***

Model 6

 

>0,0001

0,047

 

0,103***

0,094**

 

0,078**

 

 

 

-0,118***

Model 7

 

>0,0001

0,048

 

0,086**

0,091**

-0,073**

0,073*

 

 

 

-0,111***

Model 8

 

>0,0001

0,032

-0,113*"

0,155***

 

 

 

-0,124***

Model 9

 

>0,0001

0,053

-0,075*

0,081**

0,083**

-0,071*

0,105**

 

 

 

-0,114***

Model 10



from justifying violence is the level of happiness. The happier a person is, the less likely they are to condone violence. Factors such as feelings also play a greater or lesser role

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security and trust - higher scores for these variables are associated with lower scores for revenge support. In addition, and the strength of this link is relatively high, support for violence is positively associated with both the level of religiosity as such and belonging to the religious group "non - traditional Muslims". The specific weight of each factor varies depending on the variable being explained. However, if the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent, as well as belonging to a "non-traditional" religious group, come to the fore in the explanation of violence in general, and environmental factors (security, trust) go to the background, the contribution of environmental factors and worldview is decisive in justifying revenge, when otherwise justice cannot be achieved.

In general, we can say that, along with socio-demographic characteristics, both his experience and worldview, as well as the religious circles to which he belongs, are involved in shaping the attitude of a Dagestani to violence. One thing overlaps with the other, but not to the full extent, and as a result, although in general non-traditional people feel less protected than on average, the distribution of the variable "sense of security" cannot be explained by belonging to this group (if only because the other least protected group, according to self-perception, will be the group of secular people). this means that the feeling of insecurity in Dagestan society develops differently than just through belonging to the circles of non-traditional Muslims. In turn, there is something in these circles that in itself (apart from a sense of insecurity) is associated with a higher level of support for violence. These factors can be found both in the content of religious dogmas shared by members of the group, and in the interpretations that circulate in these circles of individual and collective experiences of their participants or events that are not directly related to them (for example, the war in Syria). It is obvious, however, that a comprehensive explanation of the justification of violence should be sought at the intersection and interaction of these factors and factors not included in the analysis, in the light of the limited explanatory variables.

Conclusion

Let's summarize the main results of the study.

First, depending on the nature of religious views, four groups of Dagestani Muslims-Sufis-were identified,

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non-traditional, secular and traditional. The value differences between these groups were analyzed. It turned out that groups differ on most issues and that for each group, with the exception of traditional ones (which in their attitudes are partly on the scale between the attitudes of other groups, and partly "repeat" the attitudes of different groups), you can create a value profile.

So, Sufis are religious, are adherents of submission as the basis of behavior, oppose violence and conflicts in society, are conservative in terms of gender issues, trust others and feel protected. Sufis are also, on average, happier than other groups.

Non-traditional Muslims are also religious, they are even more conservative in gender issues than Sufis, their identity is primarily connected with Islam, they distance themselves from other groups, and also try to live in "parallel worlds" with the state. They are more likely than others to support violence: both in general and related to revenge in a situation of injustice. At the same time, they are more likely to support parallel institutions of justice - for example, dispute resolution with the imam. In addition, this group values work the least in life, although it is determined to advance its career.

Secular people are more likely to express attitudes towards independence and self-realization than others. In their work, it is important for them to enjoy it, in gender issues they advocate equality and freedom for women, in addition, they are supporters of universalist values and identities. At the same time, they, like non - traditional Muslims, feel insecure and believe that if public institutions fail to maintain justice, violence is the way to restore it. Secular people are the least happy of all groups.

Second, the main factors that determine attitudes to violence include::

* socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, especially gender-women are significantly less likely to justify violence;

* religious: the more religious the respondent, the more likely they are to justify violence;

* environmental and self-perception factors: the more secure the respondent is, the more they trust others, and, most importantly, the more they trust others.

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the happier they are, the less likely they are to justify violence;

* belonging to the "non-traditional" religious group: non-traditional Muslims are more likely than others to justify violence.

At the same time, if belonging to the religious group "non-traditional" is more "responsible" for justifying violence in general, then environmental factors and self-perception are more responsible for justifying revenge in a situation of atrophy of state institutions of justice.

However, all types of violence in the aggregate are best explained by all these factors in the aggregate. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the low coefficient of determination limits the reliability of these results and requires better models to explain the justification of violence in Dagestan society.

Obviously, the study does not provide a definitive answer to the question of what determines attitudes to justifying violence among Dagestani Muslims, but it provides a rich source of thought on this topic. Moreover, reflections related to the key issues of discussions about the relationship between Islam and violence. It is known that some researchers associate violent potential with the content of Islam as such or its individual trends. Others believe that radical Islam is a form of protest ideology, while the very roots of protest should be sought outside of Islam, in social reality.34 In the North Caucasus, the popular view is that Muslims are "brainwashed" and "programmed"to commit violent acts. Do the results of the survey of Dagestani Muslims provide any additional clarity on these issues?

To begin with, it should be emphasized that questions about violence - " justifying violence in general "on the one hand, and" justifying revenge " on the other-have one essential difference. In the first case, the respondent should declare their general attitudes; in the second case (in the case of a vignette), they should give an assessment of the specific situation of violent actions. Note that in the first block, the factor of religiosity plays a more serious explanatory role than in the second. To some extent, this can be interpreted.-


34. The most famous discussion on this topic is between Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy.

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Based on the fact that some practicing Muslims cannot completely deny violence if the possibility of violent actions is recognized in the Qur'an and Sunnah. This hypothesis is quite consistent with a more significant attitude towards violence among non-traditional Muslims, who tend to understand the holy books in the most literal way, as well as the relationship between the attitude towards violence and the level of education - it can be assumed that more educated respondents are more familiar with the theological aspects of this topic and are ready to focus on them in

It is debatable to what extent declarations on the justification of violence can lead to conclusions about the likelihood of violent acts in practice. When discussing the results of the study, one of the participants explained that he could not clearly recognize the situation when a husband beats his wife as unjustified, since in the Koran this is considered permissible under certain conditions. However, he himself has never raised a hand against his wife and cannot imagine a situation when such a thing would happen. Similar arguments have been repeatedly encountered in the course of qualitative research. So, most likely, although recognizing the permissibility of violence at the declarative level may increase the likelihood of violent actions, it would be wrong to identify these two processes.

At the same time, the greatest importance of environmental factors in justifying actual violence ("justification of revenge") makes us recall the position of those experts who speak about the special importance of non-religious views, namely the situation in society for understanding this phenomenon. Discrimination against people based on their religious beliefs, forceful pressure on "religious dissidents" - that is, everything that makes a person less protected, less happy, less willing to trust others - obviously significantly affects the readiness for violent actions. And if the fact that more than half of secular Muslims justify lynching can be explained by the significant influence of adats (including blood feuds) on this group, the agreement with such actions, which are not allowed by Sharia, on the part of almost half of non-traditional Muslims who took part in the survey is much more significant. This very well demonstrates that in a situation of loss of confidence in official institutions, the state should support the development of the country's economy.-

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People are ready to justify even those measures that do not correspond to their religious views, if they correspond to their sense of justice. And this, rather than Islamic dogma, may explain their propensity for violent practices.

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Evgeny Varshaver, Irina Starodubrovskaya, Who justifies violence in Dagestan and why? Comparative analysis of the value profiles of Dagestani Islamic religious groups // Tashkent: Library of Uzbekistan (BIBLIO.UZ). Updated: 28.12.2024. URL: https://biblio.uz/m/articles/view/Who-justifies-violence-in-Dagestan-and-why-Comparative-analysis-of-the-value-profiles-of-Dagestani-Islamic-religious-groups (date of access: 17.02.2025).

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