Libmonster ID: UZ-1279

Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan)1 at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries, it became the object of increased attention of world economic and political centers. This trend is due to the development of active competition between major regional and global powers for influence in the region; numerous cross-border threats and challenges emanating from it; and proven hydrocarbon reserves. The future of the region is uncertain. It depends on external factors, political stability, and the degree of internal integration.

Key words: Central Asia; regional integration; foreign policy vector of development; Russia, the USA and the EU; Islamic world; China and the Asia-Pacific region; regionalism.

For the global economy, Central Asia (CA) is primarily interesting as a source of raw materials. In the political sphere, for international players, the agenda includes such threats as the export of instability, terrorism and religious extremism, drug trafficking, migration, etc. In modern Central Asia, the struggle of external forces takes the form of competition between various integration projects supported by various non-regional forces. An important part of these projects is the struggle for the direction of transport communications, and especially pipelines.

Each international region is characterized by a different structure of formal and informal institutions. The former include international law, charters and decisions of the UN and other international organizations, and bilateral and multilateral treaties. The second category includes identity, cultural and civilizational norms and value systems of the region, and traditions of interaction developed in the course of historical development.

As for the post-Soviet space, a number of Western and some Russian researchers believe that it is disintegrating, and its member states are "attracted" to other international regions, which, according to Dmitry Trenin, a well-known political scientist at the Carnegie Moscow Center, have greater opportunities for maintaining stability and intraregional cooperation than the leading integrator of the CIS - Russia (Trenin, 2001; see also Nikitin, 2007).

1 The term "Central Asia" was introduced into political use in January 1993 by the decision of the summit of the five States of the region in Tashkent. Previously, in Russian literature, this territory was called "Central Asia and Kazakhstan". However, from the point of view of geographical science, Central Asia is a much larger region, including Mongolia and western China in addition to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and UNESCO is of the same opinion. Azerbaijan and the Russian territories bordering Kazakhstan, from the Astrakhan Region in the west to the Altai Territory in the east, can also be considered as a member of the Central Asian-Caspian Region.

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The higher the degree of institutionalization of international relations in a given region, the greater the role of formal and informal institutions. An example is modern Western Europe. There, the idea of mutually beneficial cooperation came to the fore in the 1990s. Against the background of the consequences of the collapse of the USSR, multilateral structures also acted effectively in the EU, which tried to replace the functions of individual states in a number of parameters. Due to the fact that the region, where interaction between its member countries took place with minimal transaction costs, it also became attractive for Eastern European states, which sought to minimize the costs of the transition period, including through Western European support.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION (CAR)

The political situation in the countries of the region is fraught with internal instability. The current authoritarian political regimes are based on the dominance of the figure of the president, who uses (in different proportions in different countries) various patronage and client networks and power structures to consolidate his power. For these types of systems, changing leaders is a major challenge. The purely age factor indicates the possibility of changing the president in the five-to seven-year term in the two largest countries of the region-Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The subsequent power struggle could lead to serious regional destabilization.

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which border the Ferghana Valley, are subject to very serious internal political threats related to the activities of religious extremist and terrorist groups.

From an economic point of view, the region's commodity-based economies are very weak and dependent on changes in world market conditions.

During the Soviet period, the Central Asian republics were politically and economically separated from the outside world by the "iron Curtain" and were mostly connected to other former Soviet republics. The degree of their internal economic cooperation was also quite high - inter-republican trade accounted for from 57 to 78% of their gross production.

After the collapse of the USSR, the traditional diversity and multi-vector nature of the region's foreign economic interests was quickly restored. Another external economic indicator was the weakening of trade relations within the region. This is explained, firstly, by the fact that they all produce different types of raw materials (often similar) and, therefore, need the markets of industrialized countries. Secondly, there is no effective intraregional integration between the states of the region, and there is no necessary institutional framework for trade interaction, since no one in the region is ready to sacrifice their short-term interests in order to create it. Thus, the share of other Central Asian countries in the external trade turnover of Kazakhstan, which has the largest economy in the region, did not exceed 3% even in the best years, and taking into account illegal trade and smuggling (including drugs) - 5 - 6% [Zhukov, 2006].

The 1997-1998 emerging market crisis, sharply exacerbated by the Russian default in August 1998, led to a customs war between Central Asian countries that were formally members of such an integration structure as the Central Asian Economic Community. Uzbekistan periodically cut off gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan cut off Uzbekistan's international telephone connections. Trains from Turkmenistan were even robbed on the Uzbek border.

A characteristic feature is also the fragility of foreign economic relations between the countries of the region. The hierarchy of major trading and investment partners is constantly changing. The following table shows the main foreign economic partners of the Central Asian states in the middle of the last decade.

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Main foreign economic partners of the Central Asian countries in 2004-2006

A country

Place/share in trading

Import (country and share in trade), %

Kazakhstan

Share of the five main partners

63

1

Russia - 96.4

2

China - 19.3

3

Germany - 7.4

4

5

Кыргызстан

Share of the five main partners

69.9

1

Russia - 38.1

2

China - 14.4

3

Kazakhstan - 11.7

4

USA - 11.7

5

Tadjikistan

Share of the five main partners

87.3

62.2

1

Netherlands - 40.7

Russia - 24.6

2

Turkey - 31.7

Kazakhstan - 10.8

3

Iran - 5.4

Uzbekistan-10.2

4

Uzbekistan - 4.8

China - 8.6

5

Russia - 4.7

Azerbaijan - 8

Uzbekistan

Share of the five main partners

59.2

68

1

Russia - 23.7

Russia - 27.6

2

Poland -11.6

South Korea - 15.1

3

China - 10.4

China - 10.3

4

Turkey - 7.6

Germany - 7.8

5

Kazakhstan - 5.9

Kazakhstan-7.2

Turkmenistan

Share of the five main partners

69.4

52.5

1

Ukraine - 47.7

UAE - 15.5

2

Iran - 16.4

Turkey - 11.1

3

Azerbaijan 5.3

Ukraine 9.1

4

Russia - 9

5

Germany - 7.8

Source: [Kazantsev, 2008, p. 111-112].

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From 1991 to the present, the countries of the region have been experiencing complex demodernization in various combinations in a number of areas. This is a decrease in the share of both the urban population (deurbanization) and industrial production relative to agricultural and/or final product within industrial production, a sharp drop in the standard of living and standards of education and health, and the outflow of labor resources.

The Central Asian states practically do not use the existing potential for cooperation in their economies, which was laid down in the Soviet era. In particular, the structure of resource allocation in the region could allow for efficient exchange of hydropower from upstream rivers of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for hydrocarbons from the underlying ones, and oil and gas from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and especially Turkmenistan.

Serious disagreements do not allow optimizing electricity generation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as establishing irrigation of fields in Uzbekistan and easing environmental problems in the Aral Sea. Uzbekistan hinders the construction of new hydroelectric power plants near its northern neighbors, and provides them with water discharge during periods of maximum electricity consumption, justifying this by ensuring the region's water balance.

Tensions around and within the Central African Republic are also heightened by the fact that the territories where significant hydrocarbon deposits are located are the subject of disagreements with their neighbors. The most significant conflict of this kind is the dispute between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over the deposits of the Caspian Sea. Iran also makes serious claims to the same sector.

The Central Asian states are largely dependent on external investors, obtaining new technologies for extracting natural resources, and developing the pipeline system. The geopolitical competition of external players for the region's resources and the contradictions between them constrain the development of the economy and even in the short term create uncertainty in the direction of export flows in the region. Thus, the United States prevents the transportation of oil and gas through Iran to Europe. As a result, this route is currently used only by European companies operating in the Caspian Sea under "swap" agreements with Iran.

The positions of Iran and Russia are an obstacle to the construction of pipelines across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. So far, Kazakhstan's oil is exported by tankers along this route, in particular, through the modernized port of Aktau.

The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, as well as differences between India and Pakistan, completely block the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan along the southern route.

THE MAIN VECTORS OF THE CAR'S FOREIGN POLICY. OPPORTUNITIES AND REALITY

The first vector is Russia and its strategic partners in the post-Soviet space (Belarus, Armenia). The orientation of the CAR towards Central Eurasia is a macroregion whose unity with Central Asia is historically determined [Solov'ev, 1998, book 1, pp. 243-245; kn. 2, pp. 42, 537, 541-542; Klyuchevsky, 1987, vol. 1, pp. 139-140]. Integration was reinforced by Soviet modernization. Currently, Russia is taking active steps to reintegrate the post-Soviet space, acting within the framework of such organizations as the EurAsEC, CSTO, and SCO, while continuing to play the role of the main guarantor of military stability in the region. It is the most important trading partner of Central Asia, and annually imports a large amount of labor from the region [Borishpolets,

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2007]. In addition, the "post-imperial ideology" is based on respect for the role that Russia and the USSR, Russian culture and the Russian language played in the modernization of the region. Moreover, in the liberal-modernizing version, this ideology practically does not differ from the pro-Western choice. After all, during the XVIII-XX centuries. Russia has served as a historical intermediary, albeit a specific one, in Central Asia's assimilation of Western culture and technology. In the socio-cultural field, a very serious synthesis of the cultures of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples of the region has taken place. The development of this direction is hindered by nationalist and extremist sentiments, the lack of a strategy on the part of Russia to transform and develop the potential of the past.

If the Central African Republic chooses Russia with a concomitant increase in anti-Western attitudes, it is inevitable that competition between Russia and China, on the one hand, and Western countries, on the other, will grow.

One way or another, all pro-Russian ideologies in Central Asia have "weak points". They orient the region in the direction of a space that has not yet sufficiently recovered from the consequences of the crisis associated with the collapse of the USSR, which causes a general sense of disillusionment in Russia among the political elites of Central Asia. In addition, Russia, while controlling the region's gas and oil transportation systems, retains the levers of control over revenues from the hydrocarbon resources of Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Hydrocarbons from these countries mainly reached the markets of the CIS countries, which were not able to pay for them at world prices. At the same time, Russian oil and gas were "released" for export to Europe.

The second vector of the region's foreign policy orientation is the United States and the EU, i.e. the Western world. The influence of European culture and identity on the region in the past was small and went indirectly through Russian influence. This was also facilitated by the migration waves from Eastern Europe in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, which included, among other things, the migration of Germans to Central Asia. Currently, the cultural influence of the West is growing rapidly due to the inclusion of Central Asia in the processes of globalization. In the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU's economic influence grew steadily in the region. Its countries have taken the first positions in trade with Central Asia, in financial and investment activities in the region, and in providing many other types of assistance.

Cooperation with the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been focused mainly in the military and political sphere within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace program and reached its peak during the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, which began in 2001. It is important to note here that this would not have been possible without the consent of the Russian leadership to provide military air corridors to the coalition air forces. Washington does not have direct opportunities to maintain and strengthen its influence in the region, despite military cooperation, which included the construction of a military base in Atyrau 2 [Kazakhstan Building..., 2003].

At the same time, non-State actors that rely on the power of the United States, such as transnational corporations (TNCs), play an important role in Central Asia. It is possible that the US oil lobby has played a significant role in increasing US interest in Central Asia since the mid-1990s. This was reflected, in particular, in the activation of the activities of Western oil companies in the Caspian Sea after the signing of the "Contract of the Century" with Azerbaijan in 2004, in projects for laying new pipeline routes (Trans-Caspian, Trans-Afghan).

2 This facility is one of the points of a joint project of the US and Kazakh military departments. Within its framework, assistance was provided to Kazbat. The interest of the US military department in the Atyrau region was justified, in particular, by the fact that considerable American capital has been invested in the region's oil, which needs reliable protection [Bratsrsky, 2005, pp. 186-187].

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The peak of a powerful lobbying campaign by American oil TNCs in this direction occurred in 1997. Its goal was to force the Clinton administration to step up its Central Asian policy, making the promotion of the interests of American oil companies its main goal. It was in 1997 that the Caspian region was declared a zone of "national interests" of the United States [Speech of the Assistant to the President of the United States..., 1997] 3.

The expert community also showed an increased interest in the Caspian region in the 1990s. Here we should mention the activities of the Heritage Foundation, the Johns Hopkins University Institute for Central Asia, and others. The expert community, like TNCs, has a significant influence on the formulation and structuring of the political priorities of Western countries in Central Asia.

The British Petroleum Corporation (BP), which became one of the main initiators of the West's political promotion in this region of the former Soviet Union, was not left out of this issue either.

The West, with the United States as a leader, acts here as a complex and multi-level structure in which the main interests are generally coordinated, which does not exclude certain differences in views and priorities. So, it is the United States that blocks the cooperation of European energy companies with Iran in the Caspian Sea.

It should be noted, however, that as the forecast estimates of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea decreased, so did American interest in the region. Moreover, it is the energy companies themselves - both American and British - that first "warmed up" interest in the region's hydrocarbon prospects, and later became one of the main initiators of a serious reassessment of the size of the Caspian Sea's reserves. Some Russian experts believe that the causal relationship in this case was different: the estimate of recoverable reserves was overestimated for political purposes [Rasizade, 2001, pp. 19-32].

After the collapse of the USSR, the leaders of Central Asia were declaratively ready to support the Western globalist project with its priority of individual rights over society, a competitive political system with free elections as the only legitimate form of political government, a free internal market, and the priority of these principles in relation to the national legislation of states [Negroponte, 1995, p.29]. However, the specific socio-political systems of Central Asia are difficult to adapt to these principles. Individualism contradicts traditional clannishness. Competitive democracy increases the political chances of Islamic radicals (such threats have occurred in Uzbekistan) and can provoke a civil conflict (war in Tajikistan). A market economy does not fit well with political systems based on authoritarian rule. The priority of international law comes into conflict with the" nationalisms " of young nations. The Central Asian countries cannot but pay attention to the alternative globalist criticism, which emphasizes that globalization in its current form preserves the division of the world into a "golden billion" and an exploited periphery, which inevitably includes the region.

A different version of the pro-Western choice implies a course towards economic and political integration with Western Europe and the United States. Since 1991, all Central Asian states, especially the political elites of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have been cooperating with NATO, the United States, and the EU. It is interesting to note that in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

3 The US interest in the CAR was driven not only by the active lobbying of energy companies, but also by the geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing. It is interesting to take revenge that at least half of the income of these companies received from the sale of their shares. It is interesting that from the very beginning, the statements of American politicians that the CAR is a "new Middle East" were not based on specially conducted research. The last surveys were carried out by scientific organizations of the USSR in the 1980s (Editor's note).

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there is also a higher level of support for pro-Russian ideologies. This is due to the historical role of Russia in the modernization and westernization of the region.

The goals of the Central Asian policy of the European Union were often hierarchically subordinate to the goals of the Russian policy of the EU. Even the "alternative transportation" projects, which are the main subject of disagreement with Russia, were often used as a tool of pressure on it. For example, the European policy of "energy diversification" in relation to Central Asia is partly a response to Russia's unwillingness to follow the principles of the European Energy Charter. From a formal point of view, by mid-2006, Russia had won the political struggle for Central Asia that it had been waging with the United States since the mid-1990s [Kazantsev, 2008, p.228]. Four of the five Central Asian states became simultaneously members of all integration projects supported by Russia (CIS, EurAsEC, CSTO, SCO).

The next significant vector of possible development is China and the Asia-Pacific region. Asianism (or pan - Asiatism) is a rather complex set of ideologies that are widespread in the modern Asia-Pacific region (APR) and India [Levin, 1999, p. 121-122]. The unity of these peoples was formed due to the formation of a giant trade zone connecting all the countries of the region (which were influenced by Chinese Confucian culture, Indian Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as Islam) [Braudel, vol.3, 1992, pp. 539-552]. The emergence of ideology began after the victory of Japan over Russia in the war of 1905-1907. During the Second World War, the Japanese committed many crimes, inciting other Asian peoples against themselves. Nevertheless, Japan's post-war economic recovery gradually softened their attitudes and encouraged Asiaticism, along with anti-colonial and anti-postcolonial sentiments, to incorporate ideas of socio-economic modernization based on traditional values and structures in trade and investment interaction with the West. The Asia-Pacific region has developed a model of development that is attractive to many non-Western societies, combining the successful development of a market economy with the preservation of national socio-political institutions. After Japan, new Asian "tigers" emerged: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. Since Deng Xiaoping's reforms, China has also experienced rapid economic growth. Now many experts are already talking about shifting the center of gravity of the world economy from the North Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region. It is dominated by authoritarian, semi-authoritarian or communist regimes. There are few "democracies"in the region. At the same time, some are very young (South Korea, Taiwan), while others have specific "Asian" features, such as the dominance of one party in Japan.

The adoption of an" Asian " identity could solve many problems of CAR development. In particular, it would remove the dilemma of "Islam or development". After all, among the successfully developing peoples of the Pacific basin, there are also Malaysians who profess Islam. However, foreign and domestic political obstacles are unavoidable on this path. Central Asia can "connect" to the Asia-Pacific region only through China, which activates the widespread fear in the region of falling under the control of its eastern neighbor and undergoing Sinicization. From a domestic political point of view, membership in the Asia-Pacific region requires high economic dynamics and limited state control over the economy. Elements of control may remain, but not in their current form, when the possession of power makes it possible to control private property.4
At the level of declarations, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan expressed their sympathies for the "Chinese way"in the early 1990s. In fact, neither the openness of the economy to

4 In these circumstances, the degree of proximity of business representatives to the head of state determines the opportunities for business development.

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The political elites of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were unable to provide the model of the Asia-Pacific region with a rapid influx of foreign investment.

Kazakhstan is currently approaching the ideology of Asianism for two reasons. On the one hand, thanks to the successful management of natural resources, the country is the only one in the region that has demonstrated high rates of economic growth. Currently, programs for industrial and even post-industrial development of the country are being created [Presidential Message..., 2008]. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is gradually moving away from European ideas of democracy. This is confirmed by the extension of the powers of the President, who has ruled the country since 1990, and the dominance of the pro-presidential Nur Otan party in Parliament.

The fourth vector of possible movement of the region is the Islamic world. Proponents of such a paradigm of CAR development rely on history 5. Even today, Islam in Central Asia is perceived by many as a component of culture and identity. Central Asian states also have economic contacts with the Islamic world. The Islamic choice can be considered to some extent as an alternative to the Western liberal-democratic model. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are particularly interested in strengthening the position of Islam in Central Asia. At the same time, they oppose the preservation of the Russian-Soviet cultural tradition in the region. Conservative circles in a number of Muslim countries do not support the Westernization of the Central African Republic, much less its "Asianization".

However, even in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where Islam's position was strongest before 1917, the Soviet legacy and the ruling elites ' commitment to secularism prevent full acceptance of the ideologies prevalent in Islamic countries. In addition, even within the Muslim world itself, for example in the OIC, it is not possible to establish effective cooperation even on such key issues of politics and international relations as the Arab-Israeli conflict or relations with the West. As for the Islamic Development Bank, it does not play any significant role in integration processes.

The Intergovernmental Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) was established by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as a regional integration organization in 1985. After the collapse of the USSR, it included five Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan, and an attempt was made to recreate the cultural and economic unity of the Eastern Islamic world. There are very large differences in the levels and rates of economic development and economic power among the ECO countries. Objective economic reasons that hinder integration are also overlaid with political differences. Much more intensive economic ties are formed between the ECO-countries and the industrialized countries that consume their raw materials.

In the countries of the Islamic tradition, there is an opinion about the possibility of changing the geopolitical orientation of Central Asia. To do this, oil and gas transportation routes from this region should go in southern directions. In this case, a conflict of interests becomes inevitable, on the one hand, with Russia, which naturally prefers northern routes, and on the other - with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, and above all with China, which benefits from an orientation to the east.

However, there is no consensus within the "Islamic community" regarding the geography of energy routes from Central Asia. For example, Pakistan is interested in transporting Central Asian oil and gas in the south-eastern direction in order to become a recipient of some of the raw materials (primarily Turkmen gas) and at the same time a transit country through which energy and commodity flows will pass

5 The rationale for this approach is confirmed by the works of V. V. Barthold, E. E. Bertels, I. S. Braginsky, and others.

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flows towards the Indian Ocean. Pakistan's rival is Iran, which needs a certain amount of Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas to cover the energy deficit that exists in the northern part of the Islamic Republic, in order to send its own hydrocarbon raw materials from the western part of the country to the West - to Europe and Turkey. For political reasons, Turkish-Iranian cooperation in this area is blocked, and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project is being pushed to the fore. With the active assistance of the West, it was planned to launch it as part of the TRACECA program - "The Great Silk Road". However, due to the agreements reached between Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 2007, the implementation of this project is not expected in the near future. The above circumstances allow us to conclude that the" world of Islam " has little influence on modern political processes in Central Asia and on its development in the energy sector.

With the beginning of the new millennium, the foreign policy priorities of the Central Asian states and their commitment to various development models began to take shape.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are following the path of synthesis of different ideologies - liberal-Eurasian, liberal-Islamic and modernizing. They take into account the objective features of the region, which do not allow it to become completely similar to either Europe or Asia. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the combination of modernization with local traditions fully corresponds to the spirit of "Asiaticism".

In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the role of the State and presidential power is particularly strong, the isolationist trend has prevailed. Attempts to reproduce it in the context of modern Tajikistan have not yielded much results, and Tajikistan, which remains a strategic partner of Russia, has not gone beyond a multi-vector policy in its foreign policy preferences.

So, if Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are ideologically equally close to all four possible development vectors, then Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are rather equally distant from them. This is evident in the foreign policy courses pursued by the two groups of countries. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are willing to participate in all possible integration associations both within and outside the CIS. On the contrary, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan avoid participating in any regional or international organizations. Turkmenistan, referring to its officially recognized status of a neutral state by the UN, announced several years ago that it would terminate its membership in the CIS, remaining in this international association of post-Soviet states only as an associate member. Uzbekistan, formally remaining a member of the CIS and CSTO, avoids participating in most of their events. Tajikistan, due to its difficult economic and political situation, proximity to the Afghan conflict zone, which threatens the security of this Central Asian republic, is forced to balance between various regional and non-regional players, without finally deciding on the priority vector of its foreign policy.

Table 2 shows the foreign policy priorities of the countries of the Central Asian region in the second half of the last decade.

Based on these data, we can draw the following conclusions:: 1) the foreign policy interests and priorities of the Central Asian countries are very uncertain both in terms of choosing key external partners and in terms of determining the region of the world they are targeting; 2) these priorities and interests are extremely unstable and subject to market changes.

For the sake of justice, it should be noted that geopolitical uncertainty was characteristic of Central Asia throughout the entire period of the region's existence, which historically appeared as a "crossroads" connecting the civilizations of the outskirts

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Table 2

Foreign policy interests and priorities of Central Asian countries in 2007-2008

A country

Areas of interest and partners

Foreign policy interests and priorities

Type of foreign policy

Kazakhstan

Economic sphere - Russia, China, post-Soviet states, USA, EU. Military and political sphere-Russia, China, USA.

1. Multi-vector policy.
2. Common integration projects with Russia.
3. Common investment projects with China.
4. Cooperation with American and European oil and gas companies and other major raw materials companies.
5. Military cooperation with NATO and the United States (construction of a naval base in Atyrau).

Open foreign policy. Course on integration.

Uzbekistan

Economic sphere - Russia, China, Asia-Pacific countries. Military and political sphere -Russia and China.

1. Friction with the US and the EU. The game is based on their geopolitical competition in the region with Russia and China.
2. Interest in foreign investment, especially from the Asia-Pacific region, China and Russia.
3. Interest in China and Russia as countries with minimal requirements for human rights and democratic standards.
4. NATO military base (Germany) in Termez.

Elements of isolationism. A course for the development of bilateral relations.

Кыргызстан

Economic sphere - EU, Russia, China, USA, Kazakhstan. Military and political sphere - Russia, China, USA.

1. Multi-vector policy.
2. Interest in investment from all possible external partners.
3. Large migration flows to Kazakhstan and Russia.
4. Military bases of NATO (USA) and Russia.

Open foreign policy. Course on integration.

Tadjikistan

Economic sphere - EU, Russia, China, USA, Kazakhstan, Iran. Military and political sphere - Russia, China, EU, USA.

1. Interest in investment from all possible external partners.
2. Large migration flows to Kazakhstan and Russia.
3. Military bases of Russia, NATO (France), there is information about India's informal interest in opening a military base in Aini.

Moderate integration policy. Connecting elements of open and closed foreign policy.

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Table 2 (end)

Turkmenistan

Economic sphere - Russia, EU, USA, China, Ukraine, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Turkey. The military-political sphere is a neutral status officially recognized by the UN.

1. Dependence of gas exports on Russian infrastructure.
2. Multi-vector gas export policy.
3. Search for alternative gas export routes. The main potential partners are China, the EU and the USA, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Iran.

Hard isolationism. A course for the development of bilateral relations.

Source: [Kazantsev, 2008, p. 111-112].

Eurasia. This was evident in ancient and medieval times, primarily in the form of ethnic migrations from Central Asia in many directions (Mackinder, 1995). As a result, Central Asia was connected by ethnic ties with almost all the regions of Eurasia. In addition, both in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, the region experienced an outflow of the working-age population to Russia, which contributed to strengthening ties between the peoples of Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

Central Asia was constantly exposed to the political influence of various external forces associated with the Islamic world, China, Russia, India, and Western Europe, and itself exerted considerable influence on them. All these factors together lead to the fact that the vague outlines of the development model and discrepancies in the choice of external partners for the countries of the region are inevitable. Currently, there are equal grounds to accept or reject any of the four "external" political orientations described above. The ruling political elites in the Central Asian states fear that the adoption of any of these vectors may undermine their positions and, along with this, the stability of the states. Therefore, the most advantageous option for the current Central Asian authorities is a model of political development and a vague ideology that does not impose serious obligations and does not threaten the political processes directed "from above".

This allowed some experts to define the current situation in the Central Asian countries with a foreign policy choice as "deferred neutrality" (see, for example: [Bogaturov, 2011, p. 25-27]). Its varieties can be considered the Kazakh doctrine of "Eurasianism", interpreted as" orientation " at the same time to Russia, the European Union, the United States and China. Other foreign policy ideologies are close to it, such as the" multi-vector policy "and the" open door "policy in Tajikistan, the concept of" silk road diplomacy " and the regional nuclear-free zone in Kyrgyzstan. A special case is Turkmenistan's neutrality, while Uzbekistan, which adheres to the course of "freedom of arms and unions", is actually guided in its foreign policy behavior by the ideas of"potential neutrality".

The Central Asian states try to avoid excesses in their foreign policy. On the one hand, they distance themselves from Russia and the images of "parts of the former USSR", and on the other hand, they manage to avoid the temptation to proclaim themselves "part of the West". However, it would be a mistake to consider the foreign policy of the Central Asian states as "neutrality". This policy has nothing to do not only with the classical neutrality of Switzerland and Sweden, but also with the neutrality of the ASEAN states. It is dictated by internal and external threats (instability in the Ferghana Valley, the proximity of the Central African Republic to the turbulent Afghanistan and Chinese Xinjiang).

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The lack of a well-defined development model in Central Asia as a whole brings this region closer to sub-Saharan Africa, where there is a similar situation of uncertainty in the civilizational choice. Therefore, in the long run, following such a policy course can lead the Central Asian states to the same results - to turning into failed states.

Another foreign policy trend characteristic of the region should also be noted. Today, the CAR States are actively seeking to involve external forces that would allow them to solve complex problems of survival and development. Russian expert E. Yatsenko rightly notes in this regard that the main interest of Central Asian countries is "to receive a proposal that solves the entire range of existing problems, from economic to civilizational. At one time, belonging to the Soviet Union implied just such a solution: protection from external threats and suppression of extremism, access to technology and infrastructure, integration into union and international economic relations, guarantees for the interests of local elites, and humanitarian development. Today, the national leadership of the Central Asian countries is looking for a new version of a comprehensive solution, different from the Soviet era" [Yatsenko, 2007].

On the one hand, the Central Asian states need an external partner that can solve the problems of the region in a complex way, as the union "center" did when the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were part of the USSR. On the other hand, due to a combination of external and internal political reasons, the newly independent Central Asian states are not ready to make a choice in favor of any one global and regional partner.

In the situation of the predominance of centrifugal forces in Central Asia, it is constructed as an international region by external forces. At the same time, each of them seeks to shape the region in accordance with its own interests, i.e., first of all, to create institutions in it that would contribute to the long-term involvement of Central Asia in the sphere of influence of the respective power. Since the different countries involved in the interaction represent different regions with different orders, they tend to "connect" Central Asia to the corresponding part of the world, which contributes to the erosion of regional identity in the Central Asian states.

The paradox is that the remaining unity of the region is achieved not by the work of centripetal forces, but by the equilibrium of centrifugal forces. Central Asia currently exists as a separate international political region because divergent external forces do not allow each other to completely dissolve this region in other, adjacent regions of the world.

Thus, the analysis of various aspects of international and regional cooperation shows that the Central Asian states are closer to the pole of minimal institutionalization. They try not to bind themselves to too burdensome obligations, and do not strictly follow any values and principles generally accepted in international practice. All this is fraught with serious consequences for the development of paradigms of international cooperation in this region of the world.

list of literature

Barthold, V. V., On the history of Arab Conquests in Central Asia, Sochineniya, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1964.

Bogaturov A.D. International Relations in Central Asia, Moscow, 2011.
Bolshakov O. G. Istoriya Khalifata [History of the Caliphate], Vol. 1-3, Moscow, 1989.

Borishpolets K. Migratsionnye riski stran Tsentral'noi Azii [Migration risks in Central Asian countries]. Issue 2 (22). February 2007.

Bratersky M. V. USA and Problem countries of Asia: justification, Development and implementation of policies in 1990-2005. Moscow: MONF-Institute of the USA and Canada, 2005.

page 85
Braudel F. Vremya mira [Time of Peace], vol. 3. Material'naia tsivilizatsiya, ekonomika i kapitalizm [Material Civilization, Economy and Capitalism], XV-XVIII centuries, Moscow, 1992.

Speech by Sandi Berger, Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on March 27, 1997 / / The Washington Times. 1997. 28 March.

S. Zhukov Economic interaction in the post-Soviet space / / Caucasus & Globalization. Journal of Socio-Political and Economic Research. 2006. Vol. 1 (1).

Kazantsev A. A. "Big Game" with unknown rules: world Politics and Central Asia. Moscow: MGIMO-Univsrsitst, 2008.

Klyuchevsky V. O. Sochineniya [Works]. In 9 t. Russian history course. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1987.

Levin Z. I. Obshchestvennaya mysl ' na Vostoke [Public Thought in the East]. Postcolonial period, Moscow, 1999.
H. Mackinder Geographical axis of history / / Polis. 1995. N 4.

N. Nazarbayev's presidential address. February 2008

Rasizads A. The myth of the hydrocarbon abundance of the Caspian Sea / / Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2001. N 4.

Yatsenko K. Geopolitics: Not to lose in Central Asia / / Vedomosti. 2007. N 166(1940). September 5.

Kazakhstan Building Military Base on Caspian With U.S. Help // RFE/RL Newsline. 2003. October 8.

Ncgroponte N. Being digital. N.Y.: Alfred Knopf, 1995.

Nikitin A. The End of the "Post-Soviet Space". The Changing Geopolitical Orientations of the Newly Independent States. L., 2007.

Trenin D. The End of Eurasia. M.: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001.

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