In Central Asia (CA), the national interests of Russia, China, the United States, the European Union, Iran, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and a number of other states intersect. This is due to the presence of significant reserves of oil, gas, natural uranium, gold and other minerals in the region. Cotton is grown in significant volumes here and electricity is generated from hydroelectric power stations.

One cannot ignore the important geostrategic position of this macro-region, which is located between the Middle East, Russia and China. That is why Washington seeks to maintain its military presence in Central Asia, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan. Moscow and Beijing are trying to limit the sphere of American influence here, realizing the impossibility of completely ousting the United States. The contradictions of the main foreign policy players: Russia, the United States and China are actively used by the Central Asian states in their own interests.

Turkey deserves special consideration. In the early 1990s. Ankara has tried to take a leading position in Central Asia. However, she didn't have the resources to do so. A similar but less successful attempt was made by Iran. In the second half of the 2000s, both countries once again stepped up their foreign policy in this area.

Key words: Central Asia, regional policy, USA, Russia, China, Turkey.

EMERGENCE OF CONTRADICTIONS

In the early 1990s, Russia made a number of serious mistakes in its policy in Central Asia. In particular, Moscow has stopped providing economic assistance to the states located there and largely curtailed political cooperation with them. At the same time, concerned about the state of regional security, the Russian leadership tried to support the ruling regimes, despite their "flirting" with the West and the abundance of problems of the Russian-speaking population living here. The mass exodus of this population to Russia1 had a negative impact on the economic development of the Central Asian states.

As a result of Russia's short-sighted policy, a "geopolitical void" has emerged in Central Asia, which other foreign policy players immediately tried to fill. This has a direct bearing on the power circles in the United States, for which the collapse of the Soviet Union

1 After the collapse of the USSR, approximately 20 million Russians remained in the former Soviet republics, of which about half (47%) lived in Central Asia: 6 million in Kazakhstan, 1.66 million in Uzbekistan, 0.91 million in Kyrgyzstan, 0.39 million in Tajikistan, and 0.34 million in Turkmenistan. About 3.3 million of them have left the region, so now there are about 6 million people living in Central Asia.

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The Union came as a big surprise, which was reflected in some confusion among the American elite. As a result, as noted by Russian expert A. Kazantsev from MGIMO of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the line pursued by the United States in relation to Central Asia did not differ from the general strategy in relation to the post-Soviet states: the Americans advocated the democratization of political life and the implementation of market transformations in the economy. Russia was considered the key state, while other newly independent states, in fact, were on the periphery of US foreign policy [Kazantsev, 2008, p. 166].

At that time, the United States was afraid that supporters of the Islamic path of development would come to power in the states of the region in question with the support of Iran. At the same time, it was not taken into account that the vast majority of Central Asian residents adhered to the Sunni direction of Islam, i.e. they were oriented not to Tehran, but to Riyadh. The idea of exporting the Islamic Revolution to Iran was no longer as popular as it was under Ayatollah Khomeini.

In addition, nuclear weapons were located on the territory of Kazakhstan, which created a serious threat of their proliferation, primarily among Muslim states. According to representatives of the US administration, this particular problem required urgent resolution. As a result, the United States, together with Russia, already in 1992 secured from the Kazakh leadership the signing of the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Armaments2 and the ratification of these agreements, which allowed the implementation of the American "Joint Threat Reduction Program" in relation to the Republic of Kazakhstan (ROK) [Shields, 1996, pp. 17-23].

Joint activities did not exclude the emergence of prerequisites for Russian-American contradictions. Thus, in October 1992, the United States adopted the law "On Support for Freedom", according to which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan began to provide assistance both directly and through the IMF and the World Bank. Military ties were established with the Central Asian states within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO Partnership for Peace program. In August 1993, a special coordinator for conflict resolution in the CIS was appointed, and a corresponding unit was formed in the US State Department, which developed the international project "Silk Road Strategy: XXI Century", which received legislative approval. During this initial period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States also promoted its interests through European organizations, supporting in this format, for example, such a "dead in the bose" project as the comprehensive program of the European Union Commission on the creation of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport information highway (TRACECA).

In 1993, after the Democratic Party came to power in the United States, Assistant to the President for National Security E. Lake put forward the concept of "engagement". According to this concept, Americans began to support the formation of new independent states and the implementation of democratic and market transformations in the post-Soviet space (Lake, 1994, pp. 29-38). Such a policy was seen as "friendly" to Russia, since it was believed that only by relieving the "imperial burden" can the democratic transformation in the Russian Federation be strengthened.

However, the Clinton administration was then pursuing a policy of saving available resources, so it was not ready to implement an active foreign policy in Central Asia. Democratic values promoted as a priority hindered the development of political cooperation with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Economic cooperation continued to develop and intensify after the signing of the "contract of the century" between Azerbaijan and Western oil companies in 1994. The agenda included the expansion of oil production in Kazakhstan and its transportation through the Caspian Sea, i.e. bypassing the Russian Federation [Bratersky, 2005, p. 179].

2 The START-1 Treaty.

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It should be noted that the bulk of Kazakhstan's oil is still transported through Russian territory. For this purpose, both the Soviet-era trunk oil pipeline system3 and the new oil pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)4 are used, which in mid-2004 reached the design capacity of 28 million tons per year. Later, due to the use of anti-turbulence additives, the CPC capacity was increased, which made it possible to increase the pumping volume to 35 million tons in 2010. In the future, it is possible to increase this characteristic to 67 million g of oil per year.

There is no doubt that some redistribution of Kazakh oil flows has led to economic rivalry between Russia and the United States. However, this competition was limited due to relatively small volumes of hydrocarbons.

In addition, as the United States penetrated Central Asia, the Chinese leadership increasingly tried to contain American influence in the region. However, at the official level, it was emphasized that "China is not looking for any special benefits in Central Asia and is not going to compete with other states" (Shin, 1996, p. 98).

Unwilling to engage in an open confrontation with Russia and the United States, Beijing began to focus on expanding trade and economic ties with Central Asian states. At the same time, he tried to minimize the negative impact of the processes taking place in Central Asia on his own adjacent areas with a large Muslim population.5
At that time, China was particularly interested in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan due to their long common border, significant economic potential and natural resources reserves (this is less relevant to Kyrgyzstan), the lack of stable religious traditions and the presence of Uyghur organizations on their territory. Attention to Tajikistan was limited to the problem of settling the common border and ensuring internal political stability, while Uzbekistan was seen as a state that tried to follow the "Chinese model of development".

In the first half of the 1990s, it was necessary to ensure regional stability, primarily on the territory of Tajikistan. That is why Beijing, as well as Moscow, tried their best to support the current authorities in the Central Asian states, which remained wary of pan-Turkism and fundamentalism, strictly limiting their spheres of influence. This hindered US attempts to impose the so-called "Turkish model" of development on the states located in the region.

At that time, contacts between the Central Asian states were limited to only one Chinese region - the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), whose rights to conduct foreign economic activity were significantly expanded. This made it possible to develop cross-border trade and effectively use the scientific, technical and material potential of neighboring states in the interests of the development of the XUAR.

In the spring of 1992, the Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted the "Decision to accelerate the movement towards reform and openness, accelerate the development of Xinjiang", which laid the foundation for the Xinjiang external openness policy. This is the first step-

3 In the period 1976-1980 the main oil pipelines Omsk Pavlodar, Kalamkas Shevchenko (Aktau) were built, in 1981-1985 the oil pipelines Pavlodar-Chimkent (now Shymkent)-Chardar (now Shardara)-Fsrgana, Prorva Guryev (Atyrau).

4 The International Joint-Stock Company "Caspian Pipeline Consortium" has built and since 2001 has been operating an oil pipeline with a length of 1,510 km. It connected the fields of Western Kazakhstan (Tengiz, Karachaganak) with the Russian Black Sea coast (Novorossiysk-2 sea terminal). The consortium's shareholders are: Russia-31% of the shares (Joint-Stock Company for Oil Transportation "Transneft", CPC Company), Kazakhstan-about 21% (JSC National Company "Kaz-MunayGas", Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC), as well as a number of foreign companies, among which the largest stakes are held by Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium Company (15%), LUKARCO B. V. (12.5%), Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company and Rosncft-Shell Caspian Ventures Limited (7.5% each).

5 The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China is now home to over 9 million Muslims. This includes 7.7 million Uighurs, 1.5 million Kazakhs, 140,000 Kyrgyz, 33,000 Tajiks and 15,000 Uzbeks.

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lagged the openness of borders, railway lines, and cities. As a result, the following cities became free for foreigners to visit: Kuldzha, Boley, Chugukchak and Urumqi.

In June of the same year, the "Preferential Policy of the XUAR for further expansion of foreign economic activity and encouragement of foreign capital investments"was approved. According to this document, enterprises with the participation of foreign capital in the "cooperation zones" received the right to conduct barter trade with the CIS countries and border states. As a result, "shop tourism" was developed, which by mid-1993 led to overstocking of the regional market with low-quality Chinese goods. At the same time, there was a flow of strategic raw materials, materials and equipment, as well as vehicles to the PRC. All this contributed to the formation of a negative attitude towards the Chinese at the domestic level. The situation was aggravated by the visa-free entry of Chinese people to Central Asian countries.

According to some data, by the end of 1993, the number of Chinese migrants in Kazakhstan alone reached 300-350 thousand people. [Kozlov, 1993]. Apparently, these figures are too high. Thus, the Border Service of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan believes that in the first three years of independence, no more than 150 thousand Chinese citizens could have arrived in the country [Sadovskaya, 2001, pp. 175-176]. However, this posed a serious problem for the Central Asian states. As a result, in early 1994, at the initiative of the Kazakh authorities, a visa regime was introduced for crossing the border with China.

In the spring of 1994, Premier Li Peng of the State Council of the People's Republic of China visited the region to solve the existing problems. In Tashkent, he outlined his vision of the principles of bilateral relations with the Central Asian states: good neighborliness and peaceful coexistence, mutually beneficial cooperation and universal prosperity, respect for the choice of the people of each country and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as support for sovereignty and stability in the region [Luzyanin, 2011].

During this visit, Li Peng visited Kazakhstan, where an Agreement on the Kazakh-Chinese state border was signed. In response, in early 1995, Beijing announced that it would provide security guarantees to the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with its accession to the NPT as a nuclear-weapon-free State.

It should be noted that China's relations with Kazakhstan were mutually beneficial and were not limited to trade and economic contacts. Thus, in 1995, Uyghur organizations became more active in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Given the heightened perception in China of the problem of ethnic separatism, in September of this year, the leaders of both states declared that they "oppose any kind of national separatism and do not allow separatist activities of any organizations and forces directed against the other side on their territory" [Joint Declaration..., 1995, p.69]. For its part, the Chinese leadership confirmed its desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea, not to commit any actions that harm its security and sovereignty, as well as to step up efforts to develop trade and economic cooperation. The development of China's cooperation with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states in both the economic and political spheres hindered the strengthening of American influence in the region.

In the first half of the 1990s, Russian-American contradictions in Central Asia were just emerging. At that time, Moscow considered Turkey a conduit for American influence as its main rival in Central Asia. This was due to Washington's active support for the Turkish leadership's regional policy. At the same time, the following factors were taken into account: a serious economic downturn in the Russian Federation, Turkey's strong ties with the West and a developed manufacturing industry, which served as an important addition for the Central Asian states.

Trying to fill the "geopolitical void" that has emerged, Ankara has pursued a policy of expansion in the post-Soviet space, which has caused a well-founded opinion-

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This situation in the Kremlin has led to intense political, ideological, and energy rivalries, including in Central Asia.

The United States saw Tehran as the main threat to its regional interests, so it was too suspicious of any actions of the Iranian leadership in the region, even in such areas as economy and culture. In particular, the Americans did everything possible to prevent any attempts to export oil and natural gas produced in Central Asia to Iran, transit them through Iranian territory, and supply hydrocarbons to the northern part of the country under the swap 6 scheme. Apparently, such pressure on Tehran was excessive. It did not take into account the serious cultural and religious differences between Iran and the states located in the region, the lack of strong religious traditions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the lack of significant resources in Tehran.

It should be noted that Kyrgyzstan was already strengthening its relations with the United States (the West) and China in line with the "multi-vector" policy, trying to get maximum dividends from competition between the main foreign policy players. As a result, the development of Russian-Kyrgyz relations was largely declarative, which was facilitated by Moscow's excessive orientation towards Western countries.

Kazakhstan also pursued a "multi-vector" foreign policy. It was considered by the country's leadership as an optimal tool in the conditions of an intra-continental situation, limited resources and foreign policy potential. However, with such an objectively justified choice, priorities in foreign policy turned out to be highly dependent on the personal factor and the current international situation.

Turkmenistan deserves special attention. The President of this country, S. Niyazov, did not have a well-thought-out foreign policy concept at all. Many of his actions were determined by market considerations, which devalued any declarations of strategic partnership. Trying to enlist external support, S. Niyazov spoke in Moscow from an Iro-Russian position, and in Washington from a pro - American one (Conversations with Abdi Kuliyev, 2001).

CONTRADICTIONS ARE GROWING

During the 1996 US presidential election campaign, the issue of combating "Russian neo-imperialism" in the post-Soviet space became very important. At that time, the Clinton administration came under heavy fire from Republicans for its excessively "soft" and "pro-Russian" policy. As a result, in 1997, M. Allwright, a hard - line foreign policy advocate, was appointed to the post of US Secretary of State. Central Asia, in coordination with the NATO leadership, was included in the area of responsibility of the Joint Central Command (BCC) The United States Armed Forces. After that, the commander of the BCC, General T. Franke, informed the international community that the activities of American troops in Central Asia will be determined by the policy of the states located here in relation to Russia.

At the same time, as A. Kazantsev notes, Russian-American rivalry in the region was limited to the military-political sphere, regional integration projects, oil and gas production and transportation [Kazantsev, 2008, p.169]. This was due to the relatively low attractiveness of Central Asia for the United States, the authoritarian form of government in Central Asian states, and the presence of deep interethnic contradictions.

Opposition to "Russian neo-imperialism" by the United States led to the creation of GUAM 7 in October 1997, which Uzbekistan joined in 1999.

Swap -6 is a transaction consisting of two opposite conversion operations for the same amount, concluded simultaneously.

7 The list includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

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At the same time, Americans supported the idea of regional integration, which led to the emergence of the following international organizations: Central Asian Economic Cooperation (1994-2002) and Central Asian Cooperation (2002-2005). These economic organizations proved to be short-lived due to the absence of Russia in their composition.

In the interests of boosting military cooperation with Central Asian countries, Washington initiated the creation of "Centrazbat" - a collective battalion of military personnel from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It was planned to be used in conjunction with NATO troops during peacekeeping operations.

In an effort to gain a solid and lasting foothold in Central Asia, the United States relied on Uzbekistan, which skillfully played on the Russian-American contradictions, including for the purpose of establishing itself as a regional leader. As a result, the Americans had to reconsider the need to "soften" the ruling regime in Tashkent. Uzbekistan, for its part, has launched an anti-Russian campaign within the country as part of its policy of revising history (Akhmedzhanov, 1995).

The deterioration of Russian-Uzbek relations was facilitated by gross mistakes made by representatives of the Yeltsin administration in the mid-to late 1990s, 8 Tashkent's refusal to take a hard line against the Taliban after the defeat of General Dostum's armed forces in 1997, and the growing Uzbek-Tajik contradictions. As a result, Uzbekistan began to implement a foreign policy strategy aimed at rapprochement with the United States and NATO. The intensity of Russian-Uzbek military cooperation began to noticeably decrease, becoming more and more protocol-based.

The Democratic administration of B. Clinton during his second term built its foreign policy on the basis of pragmatism. This allowed it to develop bilateral relations with the totalitarian regime of S. Niyazov (primarily with the aim of creating the trans-Caspian and trans-Afghan gas pipelines). The construction of the latter was necessary to gain leverage over the Taliban in Afghanistan and support the friendly regime in Pakistan. At the same time, Ashgabat's policy of "positive neutrality" and rejection of integration processes initiated by Russia in the post-Soviet space was strongly encouraged.

Kazakhstan implemented a real policy of "multi-vector approach". At the same time, it was believed that only the West could create an alternative to Russia at that time due to the relatively weak position of China. As a result, the Russian direction of Kazakhstan's foreign policy lost its monopoly position, which was largely explained by the limited resources available to the Russian Federation and the lack of advanced technologies. On the other hand, Astana had high expectations for the West, which many in it believed would ensure the security of the Republic of Kazakhstan without Moscow's involvement.

However, in 1999, serious problems arose in relations between Astana and Washington. At that time, 34 Mig-21 multirole fighters were delivered to the DPRK from Kazakhstan, sold at a price of $ 40 million each. The ROK ambassadors in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo were summoned for explanations. Washington has threatened to reconsider providing Kazakhstan with an annual financial aid of $ 70 million. Astana was forced to admit the fact of illegal delivery, explaining this by the actions of a group of people who acted in circumvention of the national export control system.

In the same year, the US Congress held hearings on the observance of human rights in the Republic of Kazakhstan, during which the failed presidential and parliamentary elections in the Republic came under fire from American critics. Scandalous investigations followed

8 In 1997, Tashkent asked Moscow to provide several Grad multiple launch rocket systems and 4 military boats for the Amu Darya flotilla on a free basis. However, the Russian leadership refused this very modest request.

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in relation to Swiss bank accounts, to which high-ranking officials of Kazakhstan, American companies transferred multimillion-dollar payments for the right to participate in oil projects. All this has created a favorable background for improving Russian-Kazakh relations. Vladimir Putin's rise to power has only accelerated this process. As a result, the Western direction in Kazakhstan's foreign policy has weakened.

In the future, relations between Astana and Washington were just as contradictory. Kazakhstan was interested in the influx of American investment in the country's oil and gas sector and receiving gratuitous assistance, but its leadership was panicked by the "color revolution" and considered unacceptable Western interference in the domestic political situation, which led not only to the activation of bilateral relations with the Russian Federation, but also practically excluded Kazakhstan's participation in the game on the contradictions of the main foreign policy players.

In the second half of the 1990s, Beijing's approach to the Central Asian states changed somewhat. The geopolitical interests of the PRC began to come to the fore in the context of the growing confrontation between Russia and the United States in the region, the growing influence of Islamists and their transition to terror tactics, and the creation of drug transit channels. In addition, the Afghan threat increased, which required establishing relations with Turkmenistan, which maintained contacts with the Taliban. The Chinese were also concerned about internal problems in Central Asia:

- interethnic contradictions (between Tajiks and Uzbeks, Russian-speaking and autochthonous populations);

- Border problems of Uzbekistan with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan;

- fight for natural resources (primarily water);

- civil war in Tajikistan (de facto division of the country into zones of influence, increasing drug trafficking);

- the revival and politicization of Islam [Farhad and Mairdan, 1999, pp. 276-290].

At first, Beijing remained an outside observer of the socio-political processes in Central Asia, limiting itself to the economic sphere. However, two reasons forced the PRC to reconsider this position:

1) aggravation of the problem of ethnic separatism in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, where in February 1997 in Kulja, near the border with Kazakhstan, mass demonstrations of Uyghurs took place, during which 10 people were killed and at least 60 were injured;

2) US interference in the internal affairs of Central Asian states.

China has begun to position itself as one of the guarantors of regional security. As a result, it has initiated consideration of the issue of ensuring collective security with the aim of creating an architecture in which Beijing would be given one of the main roles without pronounced dominance. For this purpose, an Agreement on confidence - building in the military sphere in the area of the 1st border was signed in Shanghai in April 1996, and an Agreement on mutual Reduction of armed forces in the border area was signed in Moscow in April of the following year. This served as the basis for the creation of the "Shanghai Five", which in addition to China included Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Since June 2001, after the accession of Uzbekistan, the "five" became known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The problem of settling the borders between the PRC and the ROK was resolved in July 1998, when an Additional Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China on the Kazakh-Chinese state border was signed in Almaty. In the spring of 1999, the Parliament of Kazakhstan ratified this supplementary agreement, according to which disputed land plots with a total area of 407 square kilometers were transferred to the PRC. In August of the same year, Bishkek signed a similar supplementary agreement with Kyrgyzstan. A trilateral Agreement between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the junction of the borders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and China was also signed there. Finally

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The border issue between Kazakhstan and China was resolved in July 2003, when the intergovernmental protocol entered into force after ratification by the parliaments of the two countries.

The creation of the Shanghai Five signaled the beginning of China's multilateral cooperation with the Central Asian States, which was positive. However, this led to the intensification of the activities of the "Uyghur separatists", who saw the agreements reached as a" green light for large-scale ethnic cleansing in East Turkestan " (Mukhlisov, 1997, p.87).

It should be noted that in the early 1990s, there was a process of migration of Chinese Uyghurs9 to Kazakhstan, which led to the expansion of the activities of their organizations in Central Asia, such as the Inter-Republican Uyghur Association, the United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan, and some others. Under these circumstances, Beijing had to restrict the entry of citizens from Kazakhstan to the XUAR. The Chinese authorities began to demand from the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan to strengthen the fight against Uighur activists. As a consequence, the activities of Uyghur separatist organizations in Kazakhstan were banned in February 1995. In 1998-1999, the Kazakh authorities began expelling Chinese Uyghurs who lived without official permission as passport violators, as well as arresting and deporting members of the Uyghur independence movement. This led to protests from the Uighur population's own people. Soon, leaders of Uighur separatist organizations found refuge in Kyrgyzstan, which became the center of their struggle for independence in the early 2000s.

Another area of China's regional policy at that time was an attempt to involve the Central Asian states in opposition to the developed countries. The latter were asked to moderate their requests in favor of third world countries. This was fully supported by President Boris Yeltsin. As a result, the Russian-Chinese joint Declaration on a multipolar world and the formation of a new international order was signed in Moscow in April 1997. This document demonstrated the readiness of Moscow and Beijing to resist American dominance at the global level [Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration..., 1997].

The real level of interaction between China and the Central Asian states was demonstrated by the visit of President N. Nazarbayev to Beijing in November 1999. During this visit, the following documents were adopted: a Joint declaration on further strengthening of comprehensive cooperation between China and Kazakhstan in the XXI century, a Communique on the full settlement of the border issue [Reference..., 2011], as well as intergovernmental agreements on providing Kazakhstan with gratuitous financial assistance, cooperation in the field of antimonopoly policy and combating unfair competition. At the same time, the Chinese side refused to sign the draft Joint Declaration on Strategic Cooperation and Partnership in the XXI Century prepared by Kazakhstan.

During this visit, President N. Nazarbayev once again expressed concern about the problem of transboundary rivers. In particular, the Republic of Kazakhstan opposed a significant reduction in the flow of the Black Irtysh, which became inevitable after the introduction of the Black Irtysh-Karamay irrigation channel. If these plans were implemented, the Chinese could start drawing 450 million cubic meters of water from the Irtysh River annually.The Chinese leadership, for its part, drew attention to the growth of religious extremism and national separatism in Central Asia.

Thus, in the second half of the 1990s, the contradictions between the United States, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other, significantly worsened. This was taken advantage of by the Uzbek leadership, which, having not received large-scale military assistance from Moscow,

9 Kazakhstan is now home to 185,000 Uighurs, who have close ties to their Chinese counterparts.

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it dramatically reversed its foreign policy course towards Washington. However, after the terrorist attacks in Tashkent and the tragic Batken events of 1999-2000, Uzbekistan became extremely sensitive to American criticism of its own level of democratic development, and the approach to relations with the United States was revised.

In addition, the United States continued to promote Turkey as a" natural " model of development along the Western path for the Central Asian states. This opened up additional opportunities for the Americans both to penetrate the macro-region with the help of intermediaries-the Turks, and to contain Russia, China and Iran there. There were serious reasons for such a bet on Turkey, due to the success of modernizing Turkish society and the high rate of economic development. Ankara also tried to implement modernization in Central Asia (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003), but, as mentioned above, it did not have enough resources (financial, economic, and cultural) for this purpose10, and by the end of the 1990s, the severity of the Russian-Turkish confrontation began to weaken.

Even in the face of strong pressure from the United States, Tehran has managed to achieve some success in economic cooperation with the countries of the region, implement a number of cultural projects, and promote the integration of the states located here. Among them, a special place was occupied by Tajikistan, which is close from the cultural, historical and civilizational points of view. It was Iran that played a special role in ending the civil war in this country. This was not perceived as a rivalry on the part of Russia or China due to the limited Iranian capabilities.

Iran's relations with other Central Asian states were rather complicated. Thus, the political rapprochement of Ashgabat with the Taliban movement, which is hostile to Tehran, had a negative impact on the development of Iranian-Turkmen relations. However, this did not prevent the start of operation of the 200-kilometer Korpedje-Kurdkui gas pipeline in December 1997, which somewhat reduced the importance of the Russian route for the transit of Turkmen gas.

The same thing happened in relation to Uzbekistan. At first, Tehran was enthusiastic about the country's religious revival, supporting Tashkent's accession to the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Organization for Economic Cooperation. However, later serious problems began to arise in bilateral relations. One of the reasons for this was that in the context of a sharp drop in the standard of living of the population and the strengthening of the influence of Islamic fundamentalism under the influence of internal reasons, the Uzbek authorities began to strictly regulate the daily life of the Muslim community, subjecting both clerics and ordinary believers to repression.

THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 led to radical changes in US policy in Central Asia. With Moscow's consent, the Americans received military bases in Uzbekistan (Khanabad) and Kyrgyzstan (Manas Airport near Bishkek). Military and political cooperation began to strengthen not only with Kazakhstan, but also with Tajikistan, which stopped focusing exclusively on Russia. The United States has managed to sign agreements with virtually all states located in the region, with the exception of Turkmenistan, in the interests of providing logistical support for the actions of troops in Afghanistan [Wishnick, 2004, p.2-4].

Under these circumstances, the Republican administration of George W. Bush significantly increased economic assistance to the Central Asian states. In particular, Uzbekistan began to receive annually gratuitous assistance in the amount of $ 300 million. [Terrorism..., 2004]. Military assistance to Kazakhstan has increased. So, since 2003, with the American financial support-

10 This was most pronounced during the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998. Then Ankara was not able to fulfill its obligations in Central Asia at all.

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With Soviet support, a naval base began to be built in Atyrau [Kazakhstan Building..., 2003].

Continuing to play on the Russian-American contradictions, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov stated the following in April 2002:: "The decisive role in relieving tension and danger on the southern borders of Uzbekistan was played exclusively by the United States, its determination and well-trained armed forces, and not by the parties to the Collective Security Treaty" [The United States did for Uzbekistan..., 2002]. It is difficult to disagree with this, but in 1999 Tashkent did not extend the validity of this agreement.

Tajikistan also took advantage of this situation, which led to a weakening of relations with the Russian Federation in the period 2001-2004. Trying to get the maximum benefit from the confrontation between Moscow and Washington, Dushanbe began to delay the ratification of the bilateral agreement on the status and conditions of the Russian military base on its territory, signed in 1999.Against this background, the accelerated withdrawal of units of the Russian border troops guarding the Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-Chinese borders began.

At that time, Washington stopped treating Central Asia as Russia's" backyard." According to the Americans, the joint attempts of the Russian Federation and the PRC to stabilize the situation in the region failed, and therefore it was necessary to increase interference in the internal affairs of the states located here [Bratersky, 2005, p.188]. Accordingly, as early as August 2002, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan received special attention from the Department of State's Division on Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

The American Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic supported the opposition's actions against President Akayev, which were initiated by the tragic events in the Aksy district of the Jalal-Abad region in March 2002. Similar, in fact, subversive activities were carried out in Uzbekistan, where various types of centers were created in the interests of the opposition. As a result, in March 2005, mass riots broke out in Kyrgyzstan, which led to the resignation of the liberal President A. Akayev. He was replaced by K. Bakiyev, who prefers an authoritarian management style.

The second setback for the Americans occurred in May of the same year in Uzbekistan after the tragic events in Andijan. The West initially provoked these events, and then condemned the actions of the Uzbek leadership, and President Islam Karimov was forced to once again sharply reorient his foreign policy towards Russia, limit cooperation with Washington and deprive it of its military base in Khanabad. This decision brought Tashkent benefits: Moscow openly supported the regime of I. Karimov. Thus, in June 2005, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated the following at a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels:: "We have quite reliable information: everything that happened in Andijan was inspired from the territory of Afghanistan" (Babkin, 2005). Consequently, the Uzbek authorities were confronted by the forces of international Islamic terrorism, so, according to S. Ivanov, there was no need to conduct an international investigation of the actions of the Uzbek authorities.

Kyrgyz President K. Bakiyev followed the same path. So, in February 2009, in Moscow, he promised Dmitry Medvedev to close the American military base "Manas". In response, Russia provided significant financial resources to the Kyrgyz Republic and agreed to provide a loan of $ 1.7 billion. for the construction of hydroelectric power stations. Two weeks later, the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) overwhelmingly decided to denounce the agreement with the United States on the presence of their military contingents at the Manas air base [The Kyrgyz Parliament voted..., 2009]. Immediately after that, President Bakiyev signed a corresponding decree and officially notified the American side of the closure of the base from August 18, 2009.

It would seem that the issue is finally resolved, and the Americans will have to leave Kyrgyzstan. However, the game wasn't over yet. At the end of June of the same year, Vashishton agreed with Bishkek to convert the base into a US Transit Center in

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Manas International Airport. The reason for the change in the Kyrgyz position was that Bishkek wanted to continue receiving $ 150 million in U.S. aid annually, as well as $ 40 million a year for renting an air base. In addition, the Americans promised to spend 37 million dollars. for the construction of a parking lot for aircraft and places for storing cargo. The existing military base provided employment for 600 local residents [Russia will pay Kyrgyzstan..., 2009].

Fulfilling its obligations, Russia transferred $ 150 million to Kyrgyzstan. in the form of gratuitous aid and $ 300 million. as a soft loan for a period of 40 years. However, Moscow did not provide other financial resources due to their misuse, 11 and supported the change of power in Bishkek in April of the following year.

There is no doubt that in the first half of the 2000s, Central Asia went from being the "world's periphery" to a geopolitically significant region that was being fought for. Among the major international players, success in this process was first achieved by the United States, and then by Russia. China, on the other hand, has taken a more detached position. He did not engage in direct confrontation with Washington and gave Moscow the impression that it was the latter that played the leading role in the region. With such a confrontation in Central Asia, in the context of political and economic instability, the PRC had new opportunities to increase its regional influence in order to recreate the "Greater China".

On the other hand, as D. Ge, an expert at the National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army of China, notes, the United States has accumulated enough forces at its military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia to provide operational control over certain zones and objects in China [Klimenko, 2005, p.65-66]. A similar point of view is shared by the Chinese researcher Ch. Huashen from Fudan University: "A possible long-term US military presence is changing the status of Central Asia as China's strategic rear. The US military presence in Central Asia can serve to transform this region from a strategic rear to a strategic front for China, in the event of serious conflicts and confrontations between China and the United States, for example, on the issue of Taiwan" [Huashen, 2005, p.42].

According to Chinese researchers, the presence of the US Armed Forces in Central Asia exacerbates rivalry between key foreign policy players, which destabilizes the situation in this region and increases its militarization. As the US military presence in Afghanistan is reduced, it is no longer necessary to maintain its military bases in Central Asia. In addition, according to Beijing, American bases are not able to protect the local population from terrorist attacks.

Taking into account the above, China has increased the grouping of its armed forces in the XUAR, stepped up the process of creating anti-terrorist mechanisms of the SCO and contacts with member states of this organization in order to limit their cooperation with Washington. At the same time, Beijing began to insist that the US military presence in Central Asia cannot create an alternative to the security guarantees provided by the Russian Federation and the PRC. This was stated at the SCO summit held in Astana in July 2005.

Another area of increased concern for Beijing was caused by the potential for a repeat of the "color revolutions"in Central Asia. The events of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan only reinforced these concerns. There is a real threat to Chinese national interests, including through the expansion of instability to the surrounding areas of the PRC. In view of this, Beijing began to study the possibility of its own military presence in the region, in particular on the territory of Kyrgyzstan [Panfilova et al., 2005]. In addition, large-scale anti-terrorist exercises have been held on a regular basis within the SCO.

11 This illegal activity was led by the President's son M. Bakiyev [Kyrgyzstan..., 2010].

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During this period, Iran's main foreign policy focus was on Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the emerging nuclear crisis. Turkey was extremely concerned about the possibility of creating an independent Kurdistan region in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Because of this, both Countries have reduced their interest in Central Asia.

UNSTABLE BALANCE

During the second term of the Republican George W. Bush administration (2005-2009), the fallacy of the "aggressive realism"policy became increasingly apparent. As a result, by mid-2006, Moscow had made significant progress in Central Asia: four out of five states had become members of integration projects initiated by Russia: the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the SCO, and the Eurasian Economic Community. Washington's actively supported anti-Russian integration projects (GUAM, the Commonwealth of Democratic Choice) have practically ceased to exist.

The new democratic administration of Barack Obama did not escalate relations with Moscow. She turned to the use of "smart" power, which led to a gradual restoration of relations with Uzbekistan, improving interaction with Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. This was confirmed by the participation of President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov in the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. In addition, the preservation of the Afghan economic crisis has contributed to the maintenance of partnership relations with Tajikistan. As a result, an unstable balance has emerged between key foreign policy players in Central Asia.

In the future, the following scenarios of development of the geopolitical situation in the region are possible [Ashimbayev, 2005, pp. 29-31]. The first scenario assumes maintaining the current status quo, which implies maneuvering key foreign policy players from mutual deterrence to broad cooperation and maintaining complex relations between countries located in the region. Such a scenario, which creates significant uncertainty, is the most realistic in the medium term.

The second scenario assumes that relations between the main external forces are escalating. This is possible if US-Chinese or Russian-American relations deteriorate significantly. As a result, the political fragmentation of the region will increase, i.e., the division according to the criterion of joining one or another external force. At the same time, local interstate and interethnic conflicts, primarily at the borders, are not excluded. In the current circumstances, such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

The third scenario implies a transition to a new quality of relations between key external forces, that is, establishing a balance of interests between them instead of a balance of power. This will make it possible to form constructive relations between the Central Asian states and strengthen integration processes in the region. According to M. Ashimbayev from the Institute of World Economy and Politics at the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the third scenario is more or less satisfied with the United States and China. In the long run, it meets the national interests of Russia and the Central Asian states. Otherwise, the region under consideration may become a "zone of backwardness, problems and instability" [Ashimbayev, 2005, pp. 31-32].

It should be noted that in conditions of unstable equilibrium, when the possibilities of playing on contradictions between key foreign policy players are quite limited, some Central Asian countries are trying to continue this game with the help of new allies, including Iran, Turkey and Arab countries. For example, since 2009, a significant number of negative publications have appeared in the Tajik media regarding Russia, which was held responsible for the internal and external problems of both the country and the region as a whole. According to the expert A. Kazantsev, such negative results are:

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publications are initiated by the part of the RT elite that tries to distance itself from the Russian Federation [Monitor..., 2009].

The current situation is in line with Turkish national interests. Ankara is an important economic partner for Tajikistan (second place among exporting countries), Turkmenistan (second place among importing countries) and Uzbekistan (fourth place among exporting countries). The Turkic language family includes not only historically and culturally close Turkmens, but also Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks. At the same time, due to linguistic differences, none of the countries located in the region implemented a project to create a single alphabet with Turkey.

In the context of the financial, economic and political sanctions imposed on Tehran by the West, the interest of the Iranian leadership in Central Asia has significantly increased, which has begun to seek to expand its sphere of influence by strengthening relations not only with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, but also with Kazakhstan.

Increased activity in the region of Turkey and Iran is likely to provoke a response from Russia and China. In addition to the policy of deterrence, it is possible to search for areas of mutually beneficial cooperation, primarily with Iran. For its part, the United States will strongly support Turkey and block the initiatives of the Iranian leadership. As a result, contradictions will once again grow between the main foreign policy players.

Thus, the Central Asian states periodically use the game of contradictions of the main foreign policy players in their own interests. Most actively, although for different reasons, this is done in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Other states try not to unnecessarily aggravate relations with the leading states, so they cover their actions with a "multi-vector" policy. However, not everyone is able to play on contradictions. A vivid example of this is the foreign policy activity of President Bakiyev. His desire to get funding from both Moscow and Washington was one of the reasons for his resignation in 2010.

The Eurasian Economic Union12 initiated by the Russian Federation, which was initially created by the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan on the basis of the Customs Union, has not yet acquired such clear outlines that it is possible to state a "breakthrough" in the Central Asian direction of Russian foreign policy.

The political leadership of the countries located in the region will continue to try to exploit the contradictions that persist between Russia, the United States and China, as well as Turkey, Iran and the Arab states. Therefore, it is advisable for the main foreign policy players to avoid confrontation and not get involved in regional conflicts. Only in this case will they be able to ensure their own national interests.

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Ashimbasv M. Sovremennaya geopoliticheskaya situatsiya v Tsentral'noi Azii v kontekste interesov mirovykh i regional'nykh derzhav [The current geopolitical situation in Central Asia in the context of the interests of world and regional Powers]. Proceedings of the international Conference. Edited by M. Lshimbaswa and J. Msnuti. Almaty, 2005.

12 On 3 October 2011, the Izvestia newspaper published an article written by Vladimir Putin. In it, the author discusses the creation of a Eurasian Union based on Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, "capable of becoming one of the poles of the modern world," and on October 5, Vladimir Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov said: "Moscow would like to create a single currency of the Eurasian Union with a single issuing center." On October 19, the heads of the Union countries made a decision on Kyrgyzstan's accession to the Customs Union. On January 1, 2012, the Common Economic Space (CES) began to operate on the territory of the three member countries of the Customs Union.

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