"A brilliant commander of the Great Patriotic War" - this is how Marshal K. E. Voroshilov in 1949 called his article written for the 70th anniversary of I. V. Stalin. In those years, there probably would not have been a person who would have publicly challenged this statement. Once an axiom, however, it has been the subject of controversy since the XX Congress of the CPSU. The fact that Stalin was the only person to hold the title of Generalissimo of the Soviet Union and was awarded two Orders of Victory (in 1944 and 1945) does not make him a military genius.

Iosif Vissarionovich wore marshal's shoulder straps with pleasure, loved it when people remembered it, especially in comparison with the leaders of the allied countries (our press wrote:"...Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill"). It should be borne in mind that the Soviet leader in the army, strictly speaking, never served, never systematically studied military affairs and became a Marshal of the Soviet Union, without having a single military rank before. His participation in the civil war was of a specific nature: as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and several fronts, he performed mainly political and administrative functions that had nothing to do with military command. However, it should be noted that Stalin himself often intervened in the operational activities of the military command.

Of course, he was not a commander in the original sense of the word, even during the Great Patriotic War. It would be more accurate to refer to him as a military leader and assess his contributions to our victory based on this fact. During the war, Stalin held almost all the highest positions in the state, including that of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a political leader, he undoubtedly had many strengths. Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, who met him more often than other commanders, recalled: "J. V. Stalin had not only a natural mind, but also surprisingly great knowledge. His ability to think analytically had to be observed during meetings of the Politburo, the State Defense Committee and permanent work in the Headquarters. Its conclusions were laconic, but profound in content and, as a rule, formed the basis of resolutions, directives and orders." Many state and military figures agreed with this conclusion.

The Supreme Commander always had a good understanding of the situation on the fronts, down to the division level, and he always remembered the composition and location of the reserves. Thanks to his phenomenal memory, he knew not only the commanders of the fronts and armies, but also the commanders of the corps and even many of the divisions. He always discussed many issues in detail with military leaders, diplomats, defense experts, and general designers.

Stalin's ability to quickly grasp the essence of complex military and political issues and to prioritize political interests over economic and strategic considerations played a significant role in the victory. For example, Winston Churchill was impressed by how quickly the "Russian dictator" grasped the essence of the "Torch" plan for the Allied invasion of North Africa, which, as the British Prime Minister wrote, "we had been working on for months."

At the same time, Stalin's performance as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was highly controversial. His lack of systematic military knowledge and combat experience, as well as his excessive self-confidence and belief in his own infallibility, had a negative impact on his leadership, especially during the early years of the war.

Due to his poor operational and strategic preparation, many of the decisions he made were highly unsuccessful. This was evident in the first directive issued by the Military Councils of the Fronts on June 23, 1941, which required the launch of counterattacks against the enemy that had invaded Soviet territory, despite the prevailing circumstances. As a result, our troops suffered significant defeats and incurred heavy losses. Or, for example, in 1942, following the successful Battle of Moscow, he insisted on a strategic offensive along the entire Soviet-German front, despite the lack of resources and capabilities in the Red Army. This reckless decision resulted in severe defeats near Lyuban, in Crimea, and near Kharkov, leading to the loss of the strategic initiative.

There are many different opinions about the leader's ability to strategically lead the troops. In our opinion, Marshal Zhukov expressed this opinion more strictly and objectively, not in his memoirs, which were heavily edited by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces, but in his speech at a plenary session of the Central Committee in 1956, which was free from the stifling influence of the personality cult. Unfortunately, the speech was never delivered, but its content remains significant.

''... From the very first minutes of the war, the country's top leadership, represented by Stalin, showed complete confusion in managing the country's defense, which the enemy used to gain a strong advantage.

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"He took matters into his own hands and dictated his will in all strategic areas," Zhukov said. "We didn't have a fully-fledged Supreme Command. There was Stalin, and according to the existing order, no one could make independent decisions without him, and to be honest, Stalin had very little understanding of operational and tactical matters at the beginning of the war. The General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense were disorganized and lacked Stalin's trust from the very beginning."

According to Marshal Vasilevsky, it was only after a year and a half of the war that Stalin began to understand tactical and operational-strategic issues to a greater extent. Vasilevsky shared this view: "Stalin's growth as a military leader was completed after the Battle of Stalingrad and especially after the Battle of Kursk, when he reached the pinnacle of strategic leadership. Stalin began to think in terms of modern warfare."

Did the military leaders around Stalin see his lack of competence in military affairs? They couldn't help but notice it, but they naturally didn't dare to say it out loud. Through their actions, they tried to adjust Stalin's instructions as much as possible and provide him with tactful guidance. According to historians, Marshals Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, Zhukov, and General of the Army Antonov had the greatest influence on Stalin's development as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Under their guidance, he learned the intricacies of operational art and strategy.

Gradually, thanks to his practical mind, the leader developed a suitable line of behavior. He began the process of planning an operation by giving general instructions, such as "We must not give the enemy a respite and drive them westward."quot; (these words are not the author's fantasies; they were literally uttered at a meeting at the Stavka in 1942). Subsequently, the General Staff began to develop a specific concept and plan for the operation, as well as the procedures for its implementation, coordination, logistics, etc. Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Antonov, the commanders of the fronts, and the chiefs of staff were involved in this process. The thinking of these talented military leaders fueled the leader's specific decisions. When Stalin presented the prepared materials, he listened to everyone's opinions and made comments on the plan's concept and details, the implementation timeline, and the Stavka's leadership. These summarizing remarks allowed him to present himself as the author of the entire idea. This approach allowed Stalin to maintain and enhance his reputation as a military leader.

It must be admitted that as the war progressed, Stalin's mistakes and miscalculations became less frequent, and he began to assess the capabilities of the Red Army and the enemy's potential more objectively. For example, during the preparations for the Battle of Kursk, he recognized the failure of his strategic offensive in 1942 and approved a plan that emphasized a deliberate defensive approach, even though the Soviet Armed Forces had the necessary strength for an offensive.

But Iosif Vissarionovich was obviously unable to completely get rid of his mistakes. The feeling of absolute superiority over other people, which had receded at the time of defeats, under the influence of the victories of the Red Army prevailed again. This is what Vasilevsky wrote bitterly about: "Take, for example, the planning and execution of the Libava operation initiated by Stalin. It was repeated three or four times to no avail, and several frontline commanders were dismissed for failure." "The operation north of Warsaw by the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front was conducted ineptly and illogically, resulting in the deaths of many tens of thousands of our people. Front Commander Rokossovsky repeatedly reported to Stalin that the terrain conditions made it impossible to conduct an offensive operation there, but his arguments were dismissed as immature."

There's a special discussion about the Supreme Leader's relationship with the general corps, which includes the people who would have made his own reputation worthless. He began the war with the massacre of a large group of military leaders who did not even have time to enter into a confrontation with the fascists-Generals G. M. Stern, A.D. Loktionov, Ya. V. Smushkevich, P. V. Rychagov, I. I. Proskurov, with the execution of Generals D. G. Pavlov, V. E. Klimovsky, A. A. Korobkov, A. T. Grigoriev, with the announcement of the generals who died in battle and were captured, V. I. Kachalov, P. G. Ponedelin, N. K. Kirillov, M. I. Potapov as traitors. Many high-ranking commanders were unfairly punished by Stalin's wrath during the war. On the other hand, he promoted and supported a number of military leaders who became the pride of the Armed Forces. He closely monitored the rise of K. K. Rokossovsky, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, L. A. Govorov, P. S. Rybalko, P. A. Rotmistrov, K. S. Moskalenko, and other talented generals who eventually became marshals.

For some people, he felt a sense of guilt for past offenses. For example, after agreeing to the arrest of Marshal K. A. Meretskov at the beginning of the war, he later treated him with marked sympathy when he was released, as if trying to make amends. In December 1941, he sent an unusual note to the marshal: "Dear Kirill Afanasyevich! The task assigned to you is a historic one. The liberation of Leningrad is a great achievement. I would like to see the upcoming offensive of the Volkhov Front not broken up into small skirmishes, but rather result in a single powerful blow against the enemy. I have no doubt that you will strive to turn this offensive into a single, unified blow against the enemy, overturning all the calculations of the German invaders. I wish you success."

"He was a combination of two people: a caring leader, a strategist who enjoyed the trust of the people and the army, and a cruel despot who drenched the country in blood," military historian Yuri Gorkov rightly notes. Unfortunately, this dual nature of Stalin's personality is often overlooked by those who still claim that without a dictatorial leader, our nation would have been doomed to defeat in the Great Patriotic War.

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