Libmonster ID: UZ-1397

On April 1, 2015, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences hosted a round table on "The Yemeni crisis: Domestic political aspects and external challenges". Opening the scientific event, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Corresponding Member. RAS V. V. Naumkin drew the attention of the audience to the deeply divided nature of society in Yemen.

In his report "Internal Political Aspects of the crisis in Yemen", CAI researcher S. N. Serebrov examined the causes of a new international military conflict: the strengthening of the political positions of the Houthi Ansarullah movement; the causes of diametric differences in assessments of the implementation of the international plan for a peaceful settlement of the Yemeni crisis,

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launched in 2011 between the KSA (one of its authors and leading sponsors) and the chief executive of the UN Security Council mission in Yemen to implement the same plan, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General John Kerry. Benomar; the impact of the KSA intervention (with the participation of 9 other coalition countries with the support of the United States) on the internal political situation in Yemen.

The Houthi Ansarullah movement in Yemen was born in 1997. By 2014, it had become one of the leading political forces in Yemen. Its origins lie in the Zaydite revival youth movement Shabab Mumin. Sayyid Hussein Badruddin al-Houthi became the main ideologue of Houthiism. Its success was facilitated by the high status of the authoritative Hashemite spiritual clan al-Houthi, which is associated with many Haulyan and Bakil tribes, which are dominant in the province of Saada. In 1997-2001, its activities were primarily aimed at protecting and rehabilitating the historical and cultural heritage of Zaydism, an autochthonous Islamic teaching followed by a third of the country's population, from the attacks of Wahhabism, a proselytizing teaching that came from the neighboring Saudi Kingdom in 1970. which is Sheikh Abdelmajid al-Zindani. It has formed the ideological core of the Nelah party since 1990. Wahhabis have criticized other schools of Islam for their unacceptable innovations (bida), and Shiites have been accused of heresy (takfir).

The transition from cultural and educational themes of the movement to political ones took place only after the ruling regime of President Saleh declared war on the Houthis in June 2004.A massive punitive operation using all branches of the military, special forces and police gave impetus to the transformation of the movement into a powerful political group with armed structures inside, which is mistakenly considered an insurgent movement. In fact, the Houthis have never made political statements about the intention to overthrow the regime by force or restore the imam's power in order to return to the monarchy, as they were often accused by the official authorities. The Houthis made their motto a phrase dropped by Sayyid Hussein in one of the lectures " Death to the United States! Death to Israel! Shame on the Jews! Victory to Islam!"

The period of the" Saadi wars " lasted from 2004 to 2010 and was characterized by a change in the movement's leader: Sayyid Hussein, who was killed in the war in September 2004, was replaced by his younger brother, Sayyid Abdelmalik Badruddin al-Houthi. He consistently emphasized the purely defensive and forced nature of the armed struggle of his movement, declaring his commitment to constitutional legality and respect for the rights of religious minorities, which he considered violated.

During the period of wars, two more significant events occurred that determined the direction of the movement's evolution for the future. First, the government forces launched against the Houthis were joined by Salafi armed militias mobilized by Islam, which gave the conflict a sectarian character of Salafis (Wahhabis) against the Zaidis; and second, the government coalition against the Houthis was openly joined by border units of the Saudi army. During the fighting, some of them were defeated and captured by the Houthis in late 2009, which accelerated the conclusion of another truce in February 2010.

An important role was played by the commander of the anti-Houthi front, General Ali Mohsina, who is committed to the ideology of Islam and a person close to the KSA military elites. His defection to Islam, which caused a split in the army in March 2011, shortly after the start of the revolution, helped diversify the Houthi movement's involvement in the Yemeni revolution: on the one hand, it supported the slogans of urban youth, the vanguard of the revolution, about changing the Saleh regime and implementing democratic reforms, and on the other, it launched a desperate resistance. Islam seized power in the country, reinforced many times by army units loyal to General Ali Mohsin. From the Houthi leader's point of view, the scenario of Islam's establishment in power posed a deadly threat not only to his movement and the entire Zaidi community in the country, but also to Yemeni cultural identity as such (including the Sunni stratum based on the Shafi'i school of Islam).

The Houthi-Islamist contradictions, which stemmed from religious hatred of Shiites on the part of radical Salafism, turned out to be the most important behind-the-scenes driver of the political process in Yemen during the entire period of the creation and implementation of the UN Security Council's plan for a peaceful settlement of the crisis there (April 2011-March 2015). Islah was a leading competitor of the Saleh General National Congress (GNC) in the struggle for the redistribution of power in Yemen within the framework of the GCC Initiative and the undisputed leader in the opposition to the Houthi Ansarullah movement. President Hadi, who succeeded Saleh in February 2012, was a transitional president.

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a figure whose duties included exclusively the implementation of the pre-drawn-up "road map" of the two-stage peace settlement plan.

In January 2014, the balance of power inside Yemen changed dramatically. Former President Saleh, who retained his position as chairman of the ruling VNK party and control positions in the power bloc, used the Houthi-Islamist conflict to promote the defeat of the Islamist power wing, with which he was divided not only by personal hostility, but also by blood feud - an assassination attempt in June 2011, in which he miraculously survived. This wing of Islam included the BM armed formations, the tribal militias of the Sheikhs of al-Ahmar and the military units of General Ali Mohsin. All of them were forced to leave the provinces in which they held seemingly unshakable positions and flee Sanaa under the onslaught of the Houthi militia.

On September 21, 2014, the Sanaa-based Ansarullah forces launched a political initiative to change the Basindwa Government and make adjustments to the political process, as reflected in the new Peace and National Partnership Treaty signed by all political parties in the country. In it, two more candidates were added to the traditional political contenders in the person of VNK and Islakh-the Peaceful Movement of the South (Hirak) and Ansarullah. The rights of other participants were also extended.

Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, J. Benomar personally attended the signing of the Treaty on September 21, 2014 and obtained its approval by the UN Security Council.

For Saudi Arabia, the new alignment of forces in Yemen was unacceptable. KSA stopped providing financial assistance to the republic under the terms of the GCC Initiative, and thus caused a government crisis in Yemen. On January 22, 2015, the new government headed by Bahah, faced with bankruptcy, resigned. On the same day, President Hadi also submitted a request for voluntary resignation.

UN Adviser J. R. R. Tolkien Benomar once again initiated the continuation of the political dialogue in Sana'a with the aim of creating interim government bodies in the republic. In these provisional Institutions, the Ansarullah movement, which had the political support of former President Saleh, was given important roles. By February 2015, an alliance of regular forces loyal to former President Saleh and Ansarullah had established control over 12 provinces in northern Yemen. Nevertheless, the Ansarullah leader emphasized his commitment to democratic reforms, which are embedded in the decisions of the Universal National Dialogue.

The beginning of the military intervention on March 25, 2015, interrupted the political dialogue in Sana'a, which was overseen by J. R. R. Tolkien. Benomar, and has repeatedly increased the risk of disintegration of a state depleted and drained of blood by systematic air bombing by Saudi aircraft into an unpredictable number of fragments.

K. M. Truevtsev, an employee of the Central Research Institute of Internal Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences, stressed that the events inside Yemen were a continuation of the political process that began during the "Arab Spring" in 2011. He described the situation after the overthrow of Ali Abdullah Saleh as a deep crisis of the power system established as a result of the 1962 revolution, civil war and the reunification of the North and South. In this system, presidential rule was based on the army, the dominant position of the Hashid and Baqil Zaydite tribal unions, with the former being favored, the relative consensus between the Zaydite and Shafi'i elites, and the intermittent broken consensus between the elites and the broader strata of the North and South.

The rule of Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi, which was established with the help of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council allies, was designed in part to restore the relative balance that was initially undermined by the confrontation between A. A. Saleh and the al-Ahmar clan that dominated the Hashid tribal union, and then almost destroyed by widespread popular protests and protests. the beginning of the civil war with the participation of military units, civil and tribal militias. At the same time, the Saudis were counting on further strengthening their own positions in Yemen.

However, A. M. Hadi failed to eliminate the power vacuum created after A. A. Saleh's departure. This weak representative of the South was an unacceptable figure for the northerners in terms of creating a new national consensus, and the looming shadow of Saudi dominance was intolerable for most Yemenis. Under these conditions, the supporters of the Houthi movement that has developed in the northern province of Saada succeeded in the second half of the year.

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2014-capture the capital of Yemen, Sana'a, and then gradually move in the direction of other cities and provinces of the country.

This can hardly be explained by the acceptance for the majority of the population of the original ideological positions of the Houthis, based on the traditions of Zaydism, including the idea of restoring the Zaydite imamate. However, the anti-Saudi and anti-American slogans of the movement, as well as a number of democratic slogans put forward by them, found increasing support, including among the lower and middle urban strata. Over time, the Houthis brought national and democratic ideas to the forefront. This made it possible for the movement to grow and join wider groups, including the Shafi'i strata and, most importantly, parts of the regular Yemeni army.

It is these factors that can explain the fact that after the departure of President AM Hadi from Sana'a to Aden, the movement managed to capture the predominantly Shafi'i city of Ibb, then Tihama with its largest cities of Hodeidah and Moha, and then the third most populous and politically important city of Taizz, mainly Shafi'i. After capturing Taizz, it passed through the southern Yemeni province of Lahj with lightning speed, meeting almost no resistance, and reached the approaches to Aden. The battle for Aden has become one of the most dramatic episodes of the civil struggle and probably the most persistent and bloody. Although some episodes of this confrontation continue to this day, nevertheless its main results are obvious. The rebels captured all the key points of the city: government offices, the presidential palace, the port and oil terminals. President A. M. Hadi fled to Oman and then to Saudi Arabia. The rebels then occupied Abyan Province and the Shabwa capital of Atak. Thus, most of the country's territory was under traffic control. Out of their control remained the provinces of Marib and Hadramaut, where Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State were strong.

Saudi Arabia, which has declared its support for AM Hadi, announced the beginning of military operations against Yemen. These actions included aerial bombardment of military positions, rebel infrastructure, and a number of major cities in the country. The international coalition created in support of Saudi Arabia included the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, except Oman, as well as Jordan and Egypt.

The actual results of the ground operation of the KSA troops in Yemen were problematic. The Saudi army, despite the presence of modern weapons, has no combat experience, unlike the Yemeni army. Without the support of other capable armies, the Saudis ' success in the war against Yemen looked doubtful. Pakistan has virtually refused to participate in such an operation, except in the event that military operations spread to the territory of Saudi Arabia itself. Egypt, despite statements about the hypothetical possibility of participation, was also in no hurry with this kind of support, having three areas of confrontation with Islamists in the west, near the border with Libya, in the east in the Sinai and in the center of the country, including Cairo. Military action without a ground operation was unlikely to lead to any success. The experience of modern wars in the Middle East showed that aerial bombardment could not deliver a crushing blow to the opposing side. This was especially true for a country like Yemen, where a significant part of the territory is located in mountain ranges.

Iran, which initially declared its support for the Houthis, sent its ships to the Gulf of Aden. However, there was no talk of direct confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and other coalition states.

G. G. Kosach (RSUH) in his speech "Saudi Arabia and the events in Yemen" stressed that the operation "Storm of Determination" was launched, according to the Saudi press, "on the instructions of the Servant of the Two Noble Shrines of King Salman bin Abdulaziz." The leading Power of the Cooperation Council has put forward several reasons to justify its air strikes (as well as actions aimed at the naval blockade of Yemeni ports) on the territory of a neighboring country. It was about "restoring the rule of law" (the return of Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi to the presidency), preventing "sliding into anarchy", which Iran was declared the culprit, as well as "ensuring the security" of the countries of the Cooperation Council. The operation, which was provided with logistical and intelligence support by the United States, became possible after Hadi appealed for help to the heads of the countries of the Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia's actions took on the character of direct intervention, but only after the Houthis announced their refusal to participate in the "national dialogue" process, and their paramilitary groups approached the border with the United States.

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Aden. The logic of Saudi actions was determined by the development of the internal Yemeni situation, the events of 2011 destabilized Yemen, which was the result of a violation of the consensus between the elites of the tribalist and regionally fragmented society, as well as their desire to expand the number of participants in the internal conflict to include external (for the south of the Arabian Peninsula) forces. By intervening in the evolution of the intra-Yemeni conflict. Saudi Arabia acted in the interests of creating a balance of power between the internal Yemeni elites that would best serve its interests, excluding the intervention of those state and non-state regional players (Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah) that Riyadh considered its "strategic opponents". Carrying out a military operation. Saudi Arabia did not rule out methods of political action - the "Gulf initiative" remained the basis for the implementation of the future intra-Yemeni dialogue, in which the Houthis were to become a participant.

There was no reason to believe that Operation Storm of Resolve would be the threshold for a new full-scale regional conflict. Saudi statements about the Iranian "intervention" (the presence of Hezbollah fighters in Yemen) were intended to create information support for the operation and influence the course of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. At the same time, Saudi Arabia (as evidenced by publications in the Saudi press) was not convinced of the need for a ground operation. This step was financially burdensome, entailed significant casualties among the armed forces, increased centrifugal trends in Yemen, leading to a serious and temporarily prolonged hotbed of tension on the southern border of Saudi Arabia and undesirable international consequences for it.

E. S. Melkumyan (CAII) in her report "Small Gulf States and developments in Yemen" noted that the small states of the Persian Gulf, members of the GCC-Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Oman participated (with the exception of Oman) in Operation Storm of Determination, conducted by the air and naval forces Saudi Arabia. Oman's position was determined by the peculiarities of its foreign policy, which has never taken harsh positions in relation to Arab countries. Another important factor that determined Oman's non-participation in the operation may be its close relations with Iran. Finally, Oman's refusal to provide military support for the operation may also be related to the fact that the country's current ruler, Sultan Qaboos, is ill and the Omani political establishment is preoccupied with internal political issues. The rulers of other States expressed their full support for Saudi Arabia, emphasizing their commitment to a peaceful solution to the conflict in Yemen and calling on the warring parties to engage in national dialogue and return to the principles of the GCC initiative launched in 2011. As for Kuwait, it feared a possible threat to its national security from Yemen. The Kuwaiti press reported on the detention of members of groups associated with the Houthis, the strengthening of security measures at the borders of Kuwait and the tightening of customs procedures in order to prevent the entry of undesirable elements and weapons into the country. The role of the small Gulf States in the Saudi-led operation in Yemen was of a supporting nature. Their involvement in air raids on Houthi concentration centers was more political than military.

L. M. Ravandi-Fadai, in her report "Iran's Position on Yemen" (CIBS IB RAS), noted that Iran's role in Yemen is greatly exaggerated. Iran does not see Yemen as an object of strategic importance either for its internal interests or for its ambitions to strengthen its influence in the Middle East. Yemen, despite its wealth of fish and oil, is one of the poorest Arab countries, and social discontent is constantly growing. In the summer, the government abolished subsidies for petroleum products, which led to a significant increase in gasoline prices. Shiites are particularly active in opposing the current government, accusing it of being corrupt.

According to the speaker, Iran's sphere of interests does not include participation in the operation in Yemen. Iran's economy is still suffering from Western sanctions. This would be a heavy and unnecessary burden for Iran. Iran supports Lebanon's Hezbollah because it sees it as a strategic resource against Israel. Lebanon is located next to Israel, and Israel is a threat from the point of view of Iran.

The speaker stressed that the role of confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis is clearly exaggerated. These conflicts are often given an interfaith connotation. Undoubtedly,

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the confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis exists, but this is not the reason for the war. The problem lies in the complex relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and in the attitude of Saudi Arabia to Iran.

In her opinion, there is nothing in common between the Jafarite Shiites and the Zaydi Shiites, either in customs or traditions. The Zaydites are a branch of Shiite Islam that is very close to Sunnism. The Zaydites and Shafi'is adhere to the same teaching of Imam Shafi'i, a Sunni (here there is an ideological influence of Iran). The Houthi movement, which has been active in northern Yemen since the early 1990s, is of cultural significance, as it is aimed at reviving the Zaydi culture. The Zaydites are not religious fanatics, their goal is to protect Zaydism from the attacks of Wahhabism. For a long time, fighting between the Houthis and the government unfolded in a mountainous area in northwestern Yemen, with Riyadh providing military support to the government army. The Houthis accuse the Government of being an agent of Wahhabism (with the support of Saudi Arabia) and relying solely on the Sunni community.

N. V. Sukhov (Central Research Institute of Internal Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences) described the position of Egypt, whose officials convinced the country's public opinion that there were at least four good reasons for an armed invasion of Yemen: 1) the rebel Houthi rebels seized the capital of the country, overthrew the legitimate president and, violating all agreements, established their power throughout Yemen; 2) Iran was behind the Houthis, who sought to create a ring of forces hostile to the KSA, passing through Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and closing through Yemen; 3) the defeat of the KSA. the Houthis would allow a return to the negotiation process and resolve the situation in Yemen; 4) the military operation is necessary to counter the terrorist threat from al-Qaeda. The Egyptian Air Force and Navy actively participated in the Yemen campaign from its very beginning. Egyptian warships, together with Saudi ones, provided protection of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and blockaded Yemeni ports. Egyptian generals led by President al-Sisi did not seek to participate in a ground operation, remembering the sad result of the Egyptian army's fighting against the Zaydites in the 1960s. Official statements by the Egyptian president prepared the country's public opinion for the possible participation of the army in a ground operation. It declared loyalty to Arab unity, Egypt's duty to protect Muslim holy sites in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, to restore order and establish law on the territory of "fraternal" Yemen, etc. The reasons for active military propaganda aimed at the population were obvious. Egypt could not refuse to send ground troops to Yemen, since its budget is almost entirely dependent on subsidies from the KSA and other GCC countries.

In her speech titled "Oman and Yemen: the Escalation of the political situation in Yemen," G. E. Fazelyanova (Institute of Internal Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences) emphasized that Oman has taken a neutral position in the context of the aggravation of the military-political crisis in Yemen. On the one hand, the Sultanate supported the legitimacy of the decision taken at the Arab League summit in Sharm el-Sheikh on March 29, 2015 to conduct a military operation in Yemen by the forces of the Saudi-led coalition, and on the other hand refrained from military participation in it. According to the head of the Omani delegation to the Arab League summit, representative of Sultan Qaboos Asad bin Tariq Al-Said, Oman supported a peaceful settlement of the Yemeni crisis.

In the context of the escalation of instability in Yemen, three areas were identified in the system of relations between Oman and Yemen: mediation, humanitarian and security issues. There was growing concern about the risk of infiltration of the Sultanate of Oman by various extremist and terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which was based in Yemen. The length of the Oman-Yemen border is about 300 km, and the surrounding areas are mostly sparsely populated. Since the beginning of the air military operation in Yemen, the readiness of the opposition and other forces to start the negotiation process has been confirmed. In particular, Abdel Aziz Al-Jabbari, Secretary General of the Yemeni Justice and Construction Party, which heads the Yemeni National Salvation Bloc, said on Facebook that he and the former secretary General of the party, Sultan Al-Atwani, held a meeting with Omani Foreign Minister Youssef bin Alawi, during which they called on the Omani side to intervene and put an end to the conflict. an end to the war and crisis in Yemen. Al-Jabbari asked Oman to act as a mediator, using its good relations with its neighbors and regional Powers. Oman, which has consistently advocated a peaceful solution to the Yemeni crisis, in early April 2015 informed the UN of its readiness to assist in mediating the settlement of the conflict.

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Oman assisted in the evacuation through its territory of citizens of various States wishing to leave Yemen, embassies of a number of Western states, including the United Kingdom (at the request of the Queen of England), and Arab embassies. Oman controlled the border with Yemen in order to prevent weapons, foreign fighters and terrorists, in particular members of al-Qaeda, from entering its territory.

Oman's foreign policy has been a skilful and careful balancing act between its Western allies, GCC neighbors, and Iran, while maintaining strong relations with the United States and Britain. Oman has also sought to maintain normal relations with Iran. An example of this is the mediation role that Oman played between the United States and Iran in the months leading up to the signing of the interim agreement on resolving the nuclear dossier between Iran and the P5+1 (5 permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) in November 2013. In November 2014, Oman hosted a two-day high-level meeting and negotiations between Iran, the United States and the European Union ahead of the deadline for a decision on Iran's nuclear program. Oman's strengthening economic ties with Iran could lead to more strained relations with Saudi Arabia, which has called for a scenario of aggressive containment of Iran. However, Oman has been careful not to worsen relations with its GCC neighbor, which promised $ 10 billion in aid over 10 years in 2011. It is not clear exactly how much money has already been transferred to Oman. The Sultanate has adopted an anti-terrorist program that supports the US campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

N. A. Zamaraeva (CBSE of the Institute of Political Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences) in her speech "Pakistan: position on the Yemeni crisis" described the alignment of domestic political forces, which later contributed to the development of a resolution by the country's parliament. It was a response to the request of Crown Prince Mughrin bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia to join the military coalition of ten Arab states: "Pakistan should remain neutral in the Yemeni conflict in order to be able to play an active diplomatic role to resolve the crisis...". At the same time, Islamabad committed to continue to seek efforts to resolve the crisis, promote unity of the Muslim Ummah, And in the event of a violation of the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia or a threat to the holy sites, Pakistan will support its people. Initially, on March 26, Prime Minister of Pakistan M. Nawaz Sharif announced "unconditional" support for the actions of the military coalition in Yemen.

Since the beginning of hostilities in Yemen, the GCC has exerted enormous pressure on Islamabad, demanding to send military fighters, naval vessels and ground troops to the conflict zone. Many in Pakistan feared that supporting the KSA's military intervention could trigger another wave of sectarian clashes in the country. Events in the Middle East have also caused a split in Pakistan's Sunni community. At the same time, the leadership of the right-wing party Jamaat Ulema-i-Pakistan accused the KSA of making unilateral decisions without taking into account the opinion of the Muslim world represented by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The Sunni Movement Council has called on the Government to make efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully.

Minister of Defense of Pakistan H. Asif (a member of the ruling PML-N) said that in March-April 2015, there were about 1 thousand Pakistani military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Pakistan maintains long-term military-technical cooperation with the KSA. Since March 19, 2015, the KSA has been conducting annual joint exercises codenamed Ex Samsam-5 near the Saudi city of Taif in difficult mountainous terrain. 292 Pakistani military personnel from the special forces and the Air Force, ground aviation services and units of the KSA border troops were involved in them. The official purpose of the exercise is to maintain close military ties with Saudi Arabia and exchange experience.

The Pakistani media leaked information about the plans of the KSA " ... within three to four years to deploy a full corps of the Pakistani army under the command of the KSA." At the same time, Riyadh intended to conclude contracts only with Sunni military personnel. Given that the confessional composition of the federal army is divided into approximately 70% Sunnis and 30% Shiites, this thesis has caused harsh statements in Pakistan.

The General Staff of the Pakistan Federal Army did not consider sending troops to Yemen, given several circumstances. First, in the spring of 2015, a significant part of the troops were involved in a military operation against militants in the Pashtun tribal area on the border with Afghanistan (since April 2015, an operation to return temporarily displaced persons has been launched

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transfer of displaced persons back to North Waziristan; organizing the transfer of local residents requires an additional number of military personnel). Second, the rise of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan and their threat to the national Unity Government. For Pakistan, this again created a danger of cross-border crossings of militants and, accordingly, the mobilization of internal forces to repel them. As the Yemeni crisis grows in the absence of legitimacy for the actions of the Arab military coalition, Pakistani parliamentarians have refused to send ground troops of the federal army to Yemen.

On April 22, 2015, the KSA announced the cessation of airstrikes on Houthi positions in Yemen, emphasizing that the coalition Air Forces had successfully thwarted security threats to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the same time, a new campaign called "Restore Hope" was announced, which aims to fight terrorism and find a political solution in Yemen.

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