A deep systemic crisis in Russia is associated with a specific migration situation that arose as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Millions of Russians in a number of countries of the "near abroad" actually found themselves in the position of foreigners both for Russia and for the countries of residence. In the latter countries, economic, cultural, and legal discrimination against the Russian population has created a problem of their repatriation, forced relocation of a very significant contingent of people to their historical homeland. This migration movement is complemented by the influx of non - national labor from post-Soviet and other states, especially those adjacent to Russia's eastern regions, both seasonally and over a longer period of time, both legally and illegally. As a result, the problem of immigration, its regulation, control, territorial distribution of migrants, etc. has become very relevant and vital for our country in many respects - economic, socio-political, demographic, etc.

An adequate response to immigration challenges requires the implementation of a targeted, well-thought-out state policy. So far, it is hardly possible to consider the immigration policy of the Russian authorities as such, which is largely due to the complexity of the problem itself, the crisis state of the economy and social sphere, permanent financial tension, etc. And no less - the lack of conceptual and targeted clarity in migration issues, which will inevitably become more acute. Therefore, it is important that the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation know and take into account the world experience in this area, in particular, the experience of Western Europe - one of the three "classic" centers (along with North America and Australia) of attraction for migrants from other regions.

WESTERN EUROPE AS ONE OF THE CENTERS OF GLOBAL IMMIGRATION

In the post-war period, international migration took on a global scale, affecting almost all countries of the world in one way or another. In 1965-1990, the average annual rate of quantitative migration growth was 1.7%. For economically developed countries, this indicator was 2.2, for developing countries-1.3, including Africa-2.7, Asia-0.5, Latin America-0.8% 1 . As we can see, the most "mobile" population during this period was (and probably still is) Africa, although the main part of cross-country migrations here did not go beyond its borders.

Of the 152 Countries for which the International Labour Organization had data, in 1990 67, 55 and 15 countries were classified as "large receiving", "large sending" and "simultaneously receiving and sending", respectively. Twenty years earlier (in 1970), these categories included 39, 29, and 4 countries.-

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new ones 2 . Thus, in 20 years, the number of countries with significant migration processes has almost doubled.

According to the OECD, Western Europe is the second largest center of global immigration after North America. Experts of this organization give the following territorial distribution of the" alien " (immigrant) population and foreign labor force by the mid-1990s (thousand people): 3 :

Foreign population

Foreign labor force

North America (USA, Canada)

29571

14245

Western Europe (15 countries)

19428

7569

Australia

3908

2238

By historical standards, the migrations of the twentieth century are much less significant than the mass transoceanic migrations of people in the previous century. However, unlike in the past, labor migration and its integration in new locations have become very acute problems in the domestic politics of both sending and receiving countries, as well as in relations between them.

A fairly significant influx of immigrants to Western Europe in the 19th century was mainly limited to three countries: France (1.1 million people). foreigners in 1906), Germany (960,000 in 1907) and Switzerland (0.5 million in 1910). 4 and in general, it was much lower than the emigration of Europeans to North America and Australia. After the Second World War, there was a significant change in migration flows: European emigration outside the continent significantly decreased simultaneously with the growth of intra-European migration and an increase in immigration from Asia, Africa,and the Caribbean. The main driver of these changes was the growing demand for labor in Western Europe.

The economies of the countries of the region, except for Switzerland and Sweden, were seriously affected during the war. The recovery and development of national economies has been rapid, thanks in part to American aid. High economic dynamics created such labor needs that could not be met only by their own resources. There was a need to attract more and more foreign labor to cover both its general shortage and a particularly acute shortage of workers in the areas of low-paid, dangerous or socially "unquoted" employment: agriculture, metallurgy, construction, mines, the automotive industry (conveyor assembly), municipal services (garbage collection), etc. etc. These areas (the so-called secondary labor market) experienced an acute shortage of labor, leaving for industries with more attractive working conditions. The niches that opened up were filled with immigrants - a lowly, hard-pressed labor force. So, in the 1970s, the staff of Paris garbage collectors (heavy night work with a salary barely exceeding the official minimum) consisted of 34% of foreigners.

In 1950-1975, the foreign population of Western Europe increased from 5 to 15 million. 5 One of the sources of immigration to the economically dynamic countries of the region was the less developed European periphery (Mediterranean countries, Ireland, Finland), which supplied labor both in an organized manner (interstate agreements, direct recruitment by enterprises, etc.) and by gravity (individual migration). Another stream of immigrants came from the former colonies of European metropolises.

The geography of the European immigration system has consistently expanded from links between neighboring countries (Ireland - > Great Britain; Finland - >

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- >Sweden; Italy, Spain -> France, Germany, Switzerland) to the European and near non-European periphery (Portugal, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Maghreb countries) and further to the ex-colonial territories (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Tropical Africa, the Caribbean). Mass emigration to the former metropolises was stimulated by a number of factors: the relative weakness of language barriers; the processes of decomposition of traditional ways of life and management, which generated both intra-country (rural-urban) and outward movement of people; the growing demographic dynamics on the colonial periphery; the development and cheapening of means of transport.

Migration from the former colonies became large and important for Great Britain, France, and Holland. Belgium, for various reasons, did not use the emigration opportunities of its large colony in Africa, "replacing" them with other sources of cheap labor, especially in Morocco. At the beginning of 1992, only about 7% of the nearly 190,000-strong army of African immigrants in this country were natives of Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, and more than 3/4 were Moroccans. For 1945-1961. The UK has received more than 0.5 million immigrants from the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean and Africa. In the next twenty years, the number of colonial migrants almost tripled (1.5 million in 1981). 6 A similar process took place in France (by 1970, there were over 600,000 Algerians, 140,000 Moroccans, and 90,000 Tunisians) 7 The influx of immigrants from West Africa, the Caribbean (the"overseas departments" of Martinique and Guadeloupe), and Reunion also increased, although to a much smaller extent. For the Netherlands, the main source of colonial labor imports until the early 1960s was Indonesia, then Suriname took over.

Overall, foreign labor has made a significant contribution to the economic recovery and growth of Western European countries. According to many Western economists, " the post-war economic miracle in Europe would not have happened without immigration, which provided an unlimited supply of labor... in the 50s and 60s" 8 .

By the mid-1970s, the period of more or less organized import of the necessary labor force for Western European farms was over. The oil crisis of 1973-1974, which hit all oil-exporting countries hard, at the same time gave a powerful acceleration to the processes of restructuring and technological modernization of production in the centers of the world economy, including Western Europe. The decline in economic activity caused by the sharp increase in energy costs as a result of the Arab oil embargo caused, for the first time since the war, a serious increase in the unemployment of labor - not only imported, but also own. Technological modernization of the economy was also carried out in the same direction. All this pushed labor-exporting states to stop recruiting foreign workers.

There were also serious social reasons for a drastic change in immigration policy. The current situation can be illustrated by the example of Germany. By the beginning of the 1960s, instead of temporary and mainly male immigration, which the German authorities had originally hoped for, the country had a permanent foreign (mainly Turkish) population, a good half of which had been staying in Germany for more than 10 years and in which the proportion of married men was systematically increasing. The mass arrival of families, the strong territorial (focal) concentration of foreigners, and the complex problems of their integration into the country's socio - economic structures generated negative attitudes towards immigration both in the ruling circles and in public opinion. In November 1973, the importation of new labor was banned. The post-war migration dynamics in Germany clearly reflect the impact of this ban. In 1956-

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In 1975, the number of foreign workers here increased 25.5 times, from 80,000 to 2.04 million. In the next 10 years, it fell by almost 1/4, and then began to grow again, but at a pace not comparable to the previous ones (by 61% in 1986-1995). 9

Severe restrictions on labor (and other) immigration have been established in most Western European countries. In France, for example, the number of registered entries decreased threefold in 1974-1994, to less than 60,000 in the last year of this period 10 . At the same time, it was actually only about immigrants from non-Western European countries, primarily developing ones, since within the region the free movement of people was not subject to restrictions. Attempts were also made, though mostly unsuccessfully, to organize the voluntary final repatriation of foreigners. Ultimately, this weakened but did not stop the migration influx, as "along with the official cessation of immigration, the host countries are not allowed to leave the country... develop laws that facilitate family reunification under certain conditions. In fact, the very essence of immigration has changed: from labor immigration, it has turned into settlement immigration" 11

The specific migration situation in Western Europe was determined, of course, by the policies of the host countries. However, the overall situation here (and around the world) was also affected - in the opposite direction - by factors related to the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in most of the periphery of the world economy. The ineffectiveness of postcolonial strategies of "catch-up" development, the demographic "explosion" and the growth of unemployment, the spread of poverty and hunger, and political instability, which was particularly pronounced in Africa, generated increasingly powerful migration pressure on developed countries.

The result of the "collision" of the above-mentioned situations - the transformation of the previously necessary foreign labor force for Western Europe into a relatively excessive one, on the one hand, and the growing migration pressure on this region, on the other, was a significant slowdown, but not a stop to the growth of the foreign population in it. The growth rate in 1975-1995 was about half that of the previous 20 years. According to the OECD, in the 1990s, the number and proportion of all economically active foreigners was as follows: (Table 1

The most numerous immigrant groups are located in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. But in terms of the share of foreigners in the population, these states have average indicators. Luxembourg and Switzerland are the leaders here. Since the mid-1970s, the role of Southern European countries - Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece-has radically changed. In the past, they were suppliers of labor to the more economically developed countries of the region, they turned into importers of it, while significant numbers of their citizens remained abroad.

One of the components of this mobile migration situation is the African one.

Afro-European migration has caused and continues to cause heated political discussions on both sides of the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, their high intensity contrasts with the rather modest overall place of Africans in the entire population of host countries. Only in Belgium, the Netherlands and France do they account for more than 1%, in the rest-from 0.1 to 0.5%. The share of the African diaspora in the entire population of the region does not reach 1%. The African component is more noticeable in the foreign population of Western European countries, and especially in the population of non-Western European origin (tab. 2 ). One in five foreigners in Belgium, one in six in Spain, one in three in Italy, and one in four in the Netherlands is African. And in France and Portugal, Africans account for almost half of the foreign population.-

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Table 1

Foreign population and labor force in Western Europe, 1996

A country

Foreign population

Foreign labor force

Number of employees (thousands)

Share of the total population (%)

Number of employees (thousands)

Share of the total population (%)

Austria

728

9.0

328

10.0

Belgium

912

9.0

196 *

6.5

Denmark **

238

4.7

84

3.0

France

3597 ***

6.3

1573

6.2

Germany

7314

8.9

2559

9.1

Irish

118

3.2

53

3.5

Italy **

1095

2.0

332

1.7

Luxembourg

43

34.1

117

53.8

Holland

680

4.4

218

3.1

Norway

158

3.6

55

2.6

Portugal

173

1.7

87

1.8

Spain

539

1.3

162

1.0

Sweden

526

6.0

218

5.1

Switzerland

1338

19.0

709

17.9

Great Britain

1972

3.4

878

3.4

Total:

19431

5.3

7569

5.2

-------

Notes: * - 1989; ** - 1995; *** - 1990

Source: SOPEMI/OECD. Paris, 1998.

villages. But in most countries of the region, the "Africanization" of the foreign population looks much more modest.

Given the" calm " nature of the migration dynamics (at least without its refugee component) in the 1990s, it is reasonable to assume that the possible changes in the "favor" of Africans in the largest host countries (France, Belgium, Holland, Southern European states) are unlikely to be so large as to significantly change these indicators.

In the entire population that appears in the tab. 2 In the mid-1990s, foreigners of non-Western European origin accounted for 2.8%, or 10.5 million, of the total population of Western European countries, including about 2.8 million Africans. By country of origin, the latter were distributed as follows (as of 1.01.1992): (Table 3).

The lion's share (almost 3/4) of African emigration to Western Europe is supplied by the Maghreb countries, and more than half of this mass comes from Morocco, the most populous State in the subregion. In addition to the main French area of their concentration in Europe (572 thousand in 1990), Moroccans form large communities in Holland (about 150 thousand), Belgium (over 130 thousand), Italy (about 120 thousand). Their presence is significant in Spain and Germany. The Tunisian community in France in 1990 numbered more than 200 thousand people, in Italy - 60 thousand. Several thousand Tunisian immigrants were in Germany.

By the 1990s, Algeria remained the first Maghreb immigrant colony in France, although it declined significantly in the 1980s (the number of legal Algerian immigrants in France fell from 790,000 in 1982 to 614,000 in 1990). 12

France is also the largest recipient of migrants from Tropical Africa. As of the mid-1990s, their number here was estimated at 300,000-more than a third of all immigration to the European Union area from this sub-region 13. This is

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Table 2

Share of people from Africa in the total population of Western European countries, in their foreign population and in the foreign population of non-Western European origin as of 1.01.1992, %

A country

In the entire population

In the foreign population

In the foreign population of non-Western European origin

Belgium

1.9

20.4

52.0

Denmark

0.2

4.8

7.0

Germany

0.3

4.0

5.7

Greece

0.2

9.8

14.4

Spain

0.2

17.4

32.8

France

2.9

45.4

71.9

Italy

0.3

31.7

40.7

Luxembourg

0.3

1.0

10.2

Holland

1.3

27.0

36.0

Portugal

0.5

42.1

58.2

Great Britain

0.3

9.7

16.5

Austria

0.1

1.6

1.9

Finland

0.1

8.6

12.9

Iceland

0.1

3.0

6.4

Norway

0.2

7.1

11.8

Sweden

0.3

4.6

8.6

Switzerland

0.3

1.9

6.1

All countries

0.8

17.6

27.1

Источник: Office Statistique des Communautes Europeennes (EUROSTAT). Data are provided by: Revue europeenne des migrations intemationales. P. 1994. V. 10. N 3. P. 190.

Table 3

Distribution of Africans in Western Europe by country of origin

Country of origin

Number of employees (thousands)

Specific gravity(%)

Country of origin

Number of employees (thousands)

Specific gravity(%)

Africa

2763

100

including:

Morocco

1081

39.1

Мали

38

1.4

Algeria

641

23.2

Cape Verde Islands

38

1.4

Tunisia

275

10.0

Ethiopia

34

1.1

Nigeria

65

2.3

SOUTH AFRICA

23

0.7

Senegal

65

2.3

Mauritius

21

0.7

Ghana

63

2.3

Cameroon

21

0.7

Egypt

53

1.9

Somalia

19

0.7

Zaire

44

1.6

Others

282

10.2

Source: EUROSTAT ("Revue europeenne..."). P. 195

mostly immigrants from former French colonies and other Francophone countries (Zaire, Mauritius). France accounted for 96% of all Malians living in the EU, 79% of Ivorians, 57% of Senegalese, 42% of Zaire, and only 4% of Ghanaians and 1% of Nigerians 14

The distribution of all African immigration among host countries at the beginning of 1992 was as follows (%) 15 :

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France

57.7

Spain

2.2

Germany

8.4

Portugal

1.7

Holland

7.0

Sweden

0.8

Great Britain

6.9

Switzerland

0.8

Belgium

6.7

Greece

0.7

Italy

6.0

Others

1.1

With the exception of France, which is out of competition in this respect, the recipient countries can be divided into two groups: those with significant (6-9%) and low (less than 3%) "quotas" for receiving African migrants. The first group includes Germany, Holland, Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy, while the second group includes the rest of the region's countries. Immigrants from the former Portuguese colonies in Africa make up the majority of immigrants in Portugal. The main flow of Afro-European migration is along the North Africa - France axis and (partially) further north. At the same time, since the mid-1970s, the role of Spain and Italy - both transit and host - has been growing. France is home to about 97% of Algerian, 68% Tunisian and 47% Moroccan immigrants. 16 , most immigrants are from Senegal, Congo, Mali, Mauritius, Cameroon, and other French-speaking countries. Moroccans also settle in Holland, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Germany; Tunisians - in Germany and Italy. The line English-speaking countries-Great Britain accounts for only a very modest part of the migration movement.

IMMIGRATION IN THE 1970S AND 1990S: STRUCTURAL CHANGES

The main changes in the migration sphere caused by the cessation or sharp decrease in the admission of foreign labor to Western Europe in 1973-1974 were as follows. First, the growth of the region's foreign population has slowed significantly. Secondly, the composition of legal immigration has changed. Third, illegal immigration increased.

The first aspect of change was discussed above. As for the change in the structure of legal immigration, it was mainly reflected in the shift of its center of gravity towards the family component. Family immigration, that is, the arrival of family members to its head - a husband and father working in a foreign country-did not begin, of course, in the 1970s. It emerged after workers who went abroad settled there for a long time, and increased as the foreign labor force became a permanent structural element of the labor market in host countries. By the early 1970s, labor immigration was generally a combination of an influx of labor and its family accompaniment. The latter accounted for 30% of the foreign population in Germany, 40% in Switzerland, 47% in the Netherlands, 54% in France, and 64% in Belgium 17 etc.

With the end of the legal entry of foreign labor, immigration along the line of connecting families did not end. Relatives of immigrants retained the right of entry, although it became increasingly difficult to implement it, especially since the early 1980s. European Governments have sought to curb family immigration in order to avoid the proliferation of ethnic (and racial) minorities whose socio-economic status, culture, and religion made their integration into host societies very difficult. Nevertheless, this expansion continued, which affected the gender structure of ethnic minorities. In the Netherlands, for example, from 1977 to 1986, the number of women per 100 men increased among Moroccans from 36 to 64, and among Turks from 32 to 72 18 Approximately the same was observed in other host countries.

The family component of the immigrant colonies expanded not only due to the arrival of wives and children. In the Muslim part of immigration, changes in the gender structure caused an accelerated growth rate in comparison with other ethnic groups.-

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Table 4

Germany. Share of ethnic groups in the foreign labor force (I) and in the total birth rate among the foreign population (II)

Ethnic group

1970

1975

1980

1988

I

II

I

II

I

II

I

II

Italians

19.6

18.3

14.3

10.7

15.3

11.9

10.3

10.1

The Yugoslavs

21.7

14.6

20.4

15.5

17.3

12.5

18.1

8.0

Spaniards

8.8

2.8

6.1

2.0

4.2

2.1

3.8

2.2

The Turks

18.2

23.6

26.6

41.9

29.2

44.2

33.1

41.7

Source: Calculated from: Europe: a New Immigration Continent. P. 31, 37.

rapid population growth. This can be seen from a comparison of the specific weights of various ethnic minorities in the total foreign labor force and in the total birth rate among the foreign population. In Germany, for example, this comparison shows the clear superiority of the Turkish colony over the southern European ones (Table 4).

The primacy of Muslims in the demographic dynamics of immigrant colonies is also unquestionable in most other countries, although under the influence of a number of factors, their birth rate decreases inversely in proportion to the increase in the immigrant "length of service". "The decrease in the influx (of immigrants) was largely offset by the on-site reproduction of foreign families, in particular those who recently arrived from the third world and maintained a high birth rate, even if this demographic behavior is rapidly approaching the model of host countries." 19 .

Another consequence of changes in immigration policies in Western European countries since the mid-1970s has been an increase in the hidden influx of people to the region. In the context of increasing migration pressure from the South on the centers of the world economy, restrictive measures of European governments against legal labor migration naturally increased illegal migration. "Illegal migration, by definition, is a product of laws that control migration" 20 .

In Western Europe, illegal immigration and employment became quite widespread in the 1960s. According to some estimates, illegal immigrants made up as much as 10% of the total foreign population in the region in the early 1970s, and this figure seems to have increased further 21 According to the French Office for International Migration, in 1991-1998, the number of illegal immigrants in Western Europe increased by 60% - from 1.8 million to 3 million. 22 According to other estimates, the growth rate was much higher. Thus, the International Center for Migration Policy Development (Vienna) estimates that the annual influx of illegal immigrants to the European Union countries increased from about 40 thousand to 400 thousand people in 1993-1999. 23 .

Unlike Germany and Switzerland, which strictly controlled the congress of foreign workers and unconditionally expelled illegal immigrants when they were identified, in most other countries, the authorities turned a blind eye to "paperless" workers. The atmosphere was particularly liberal in France and Belgium, where such immigrants were usually easily registered, at least as long as there was a high demand for unskilled labor. The situation has changed significantly with the deterioration of the economic environment, rising unemployment, and the emergence of anti-immigrant sentiment and political movements in the host countries. In the 1970s and 1990s, immigration controls were tightened almost everywhere. At the same time, many host countries, or rather certain sectors of their economies, continued to demand "imported" labor, which was cheap and free-

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legal - due to the reluctance of local workers to perform work in such sectors. After 1974, illegal entry of immigrants continued with the complicity of firms in such industries as construction and public works, services, clothing manufacturing, and agriculture.

The demand for "paperless" immigrants is undeclared, shadowy. And it is quite stable, since the shadow economy, according to some estimates, accounts for an average of 12% of GDP in Western Europe (in Spain-up to 20%, in Italy - up to 30%) 24 . Therefore, it is almost impossible to stop illegal immigration as long as there are "invisible" economic zones in the host countries that offer "invisible" jobs. Moreover, in an effort to end permanent immigration, European countries "welcome, although often silently, temporary immigration that corresponds to the structure of the labor market" 25 . In this situation, the problem of illegal border crossings is not very serious. As practice shows, it is generally successfully solved through informal systems of intermediaries, professional guides, assistance from diasporas, etc. "Nowadays, when it is easier to cross borders than to get a residence permit, most of those who settle in an illegal situation for a long time regularly arrive on the territory of the European Union" 26 .

In the last quarter In the 20th century, the structure of immigration was also influenced by a factor that did not depend on the migration policy of Western European states: the emergence and strengthening of the phenomenon of refugees from the regions of the South. The complication of the socio-economic, political, and environmental situation in many peripheral countries, especially in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, ethno-religious conflicts, which often turned into bloody civil wars, and natural disasters created flows of internally displaced persons and refugees. Most of them in developing countries do not usually have the means to travel long distances. This, as well as the desire to return to their places of permanent residence as soon as possible, encourages such people to seek temporary shelter first of all in their own country and only then outside it, in neighboring countries. This is precisely the behavior of refugees in Africa (and indeed in other regions of the South). In 1996, for example, there were about 300,000 Somalis in Ethiopia, 676,000 refugees from limitrophic countries, mainly from Rwanda, in Zaire, and 665,000 people from Liberia and Sierra Leone in Guinea 27 . But those who had the appropriate opportunities (a small part of the total mass of internally displaced persons) still found themselves outside the continent in the position of "asylum seekers" and "refugees".

The difference between both is as follows. The first ones are people who submit an appropriate application to the immigration services. Consideration of applications (often on an individual basis and with the right to appeal) can be quite lengthy, and during this time applicants are located and can work in a given country. At the end of the process, some applicants (usually a smaller number) receive refugee status, that is, the right to stay and work in the host State. And about the same number remain there without any rights (illegal immigrants) 28 .

The concept of "refugees" has undergone a certain evolution. According to the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted under the auspices of the United Nations by Western European countries during the Cold War, this category included practically only residents of Eastern Europe who fled to the West and applied for permanent asylum there for political reasons. By the New York Protocol of 1967, the Geneva Convention, which obliges States parties to respect the principle of non-refoulement (prohibiting the forced return of refugees if they may be subject to persecution or other dangers), was extended to other regions, which made it possible for a massive influx of "southern" refugees to developed countries. Fearing

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As a result of this development, the latter preferred to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need in their places of residence rather than in their own territories. This is the orientation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose budget is closely dependent on voluntary contributions (gifts) from developed countries. These funds allow the Office to finance refugee camps in Africa, the Middle East and other regions (which, of course, could not completely save donor countries from the influx of internally displaced persons from the South).

In Western Europe, the problem of "southern" refugees began around the mid-1970s, when individuals and then groups of people began to appear here in search of asylum. In the 1980s, the scale of refugee activity steadily expanded. The rate can be judged from the following data: from 1983 to 1992, the annual number of asylum applicants in the main host countries of Western Europe increased almost 13 times - from 65.4 thousand to 825.3 thousand, totaling more than 3 million people in 10 years 29 By the mid-1990s, the willingness of developed countries to continue the expensive reception of refugees (food, accommodation, legal services, financial support) significantly decreased. To a large extent, this was due to the fact that after the disappearance of the "socialist community" of Central and Eastern European states, the problem of refugees lost its former ideological content. In 1996, the number of asylum applicants in Western Europe was almost three times lower than in 1992. It is possible that this decline was partly "offset" by the above-mentioned increase in illegal entry into the region 30

The country distribution of the registered influx of asylum seekers and refugees is very uneven. This is due to many factors, including the reputation of a particular host state in terms of its attitude to the refugee problem, the nature of economic and political ties between individual countries of the North and South, geopolitical conditions, differences in the interpretation of the right to asylum, etc. In Germany, for example, such a right introduced for political reasons (promotion of refugees from the GDR) to the Basic Law, remained a constitutional norm until mid-1993, when the legislation in this part was modified. Similar liberalism towards refugees has not been observed in other States of the region. Consequence: Germany accounted for the lion's share of refugees accepted in Western Europe. Thus, in 1985-1994, 3/4 of all asylum applications in this region were received by the German immigration authorities. In 1996, according to the UNHCR, Germany received about 150,000 such applications, surpassing the UK by 4.3 times, Holland by 6.7 times, France by 8.6 times, Belgium by 12 times, Sweden by 26 times, etc. 31

In recent years, German authorities have tightened the procedure for accepting asylum seekers, which reduced their number to 90 thousand in 1999. Similar measures were implemented or prepared by other countries, including Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The latter received over 70,000 asylum applications in 1999, and more than 100,000 previous applicants were awaiting the decision of the British authorities on their applications. In an effort to stop or restrict immigration, the British Parliament passed a new law (Immigration and Asylum Act), which came into force in April 2000 and significantly complicated the conditions for asylum seekers to stay in the country after they submitted their applications 32 Belgium introduced a new procedure for accepting political asylum seekers in January 2001. Whereas earlier applicants received a monthly allowance of more than $ 600 per person for the entire period of consideration of the case (which is many months, if not years), under the new system they receive "in-kind" support in refugee camps instead of money.-

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resettled persons, where it is easier to control them and organize deportation in case of refusal of asylum 33 . This change in attitudes towards refugees and all immigration (especially "southern" immigration) was largely determined by the maturing of xenophobic and racist elements in the public opinion of Western Europe, which was reflected in the overall socio-political situation in the main host countries of the region.

IMMIGRANTS AND THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN HOST COUNTRIES

In the period between the two World Wars, the main suppliers of immigrants to the economically advanced states of Europe were the countries of the European periphery. This source remained very significant in the 1950s and 1960s, although its share declined quite rapidly under the pressure of immigration from non-European regions. The racial and cultural homogeneity of European immigrants with the local population did not protect them from manifestations of hostility on the part of the latter. But the gradual integration of newcomers into the society of host countries in general did not cause any serious problems. A more complex situation was created as the ethno-racial and cultural appearance of immigration became more and more visible in Africa and Asia. Immigrants, especially those with reunited families, settled in a foreign country for a long time, but almost forever. Even if the fathers still thought - often platonically-about returning to their homeland, the children usually did not have such a desire, and the third generation - even more so. Subjective and mental evolution of this kind is based on objective reality: the risks for the returning emigrant family are too great, because practically no African country has created stable conditions for the effective (financially and morally win-win) inclusion of returnees in local socio-economic structures.

This did not mean, of course, that non-European immigrants were already very well off in their host countries. By all vital parameters, the vast majority of them are, as a rule, in a worse situation compared to the local population. In addition, their foreignness makes them the first, if not the main "victims" of any socio-economic complications. The growing need for mutual community support and solidarity in such circumstances largely explains the fact that non-European immigrants usually do not want (even if they can) to "dissolve" into host societies. At the same time, the protective function of such behavior in the immigrant colonies reinforces or confirms their other "function" - the main target of Western European racism, which was particularly pronounced in the 1970s and 1990s.

Racism as a political and ideological phenomenon has deep historical roots in Western Europe. According to the English sociologist S. Castles, they are "in the ideologies of white supremacy that supported colonialism, in the processes of ethnic exclusion as an element of the development of nation - states, in chauvinist and nationalist ideologies associated with intra-European conflict, in behavior and actions towards immigrant minorities" 34

French authors J. Chalian and J. Minet noted in the early 1990s that the growing process of family reunification of immigrants, the prolonged economic crisis, and the increase in illegal immigration " aggravated the social discontent of a significant part of the local population. This is a discontent born of real difficulties that are not related only to immigrants, it quickly turned into xenophobia and racism all over the world. (Western) Europe (emphasis added. - Yu. P. ) 35 . The source of this unhealthy climate is the lack of "a genuine policy of admission and integration... Ethnic ghettos were formed everywhere. In France, it is mainly about social ghettos, where particularisms (of immigrant colonies) were

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Table 5

Degree of pronounced racism (% of respondents)

A country

Definitely racists

More like racists

A little racist

Definitely not racists

eu

9

24

33

34

Belgium

22

33

27

19

Denmark

12

31

40

17

Germany

8

26

34

32

Greece

6

21

31

43

Spain

4

16

31

49

France

16

32

27

25

Irish

4

20

32

45

Italy

9

21

35

35

Luxembourg

2

12

33

54

Netherlands

5

26

46

24

Austria

14

28

32

26

Portugal

3

14

25

58

Finland

10

25

43

22

Sweden

2

16

40

42

Great Britain

8

24

34

35

Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 6.12.2000.

reinforced as a means of defense against Western culture... But these ghettos, which for various reasons usually correspond to the wishes of both the host countries and the immigrants, have made the conditions of integration of the latter even more fruitless and have strengthened the process of their integration. rejection by the local population" 36

These assessments are perhaps too categorical when it comes to the policy of integration of immigrants (it varies from country to country), but they are quite correct when it comes to public opinion in Western Europe. The results of a survey conducted in the spring of 1997 by the European sociological organization Eurobarometer aimed at identifying the level of xenophobic sentiments in 15 EU member states are significant (Table 5). (The survey was timed to coincide with the"year against Racism in Europe". A similar survey in 2001 yielded similar results.)

Only a third of the region's population absolutely rejects racism. The other third is not alien to it, and the same number of Europeans openly express strong racist feelings, including 9 belong to the absolute racists. The largest share of the latter (22%) is in Belgium, followed by France (16), Austria (14), Denmark (12%). At the opposite pole are Sweden, Luxembourg (2% each), Portugal (3), Spain and Ireland (4% each). Xenophobic attitudes are strongly expressed in countries with relatively liberal immigration policies that allow immigrants to "take away" jobs from the indigenous population and "drive down the price" of labor. (Luxembourg is an exception, but the vast majority of the very significant foreign population in this mini - state is made up of Europeans.)

These data indicate a rather contradictory attitude of the population of Western Europe towards immigrants. Active xenophobes and racists make up a minority-but very significant-of Europeans. Having a sympathetic social rear represented by a mass of "sympathizers", this minority becomes the majority, largely creating an anti-immigrant socio-psychological climate used by organized right-wing extremist groups.

In the United Kingdom, such groups, especially the National Front, grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s, despite a series of anti-racist legislation that included anti-racism laws.-

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After 1965, the racists compensated for the modesty of their electoral success with frequent acts of violence against "yellow" and "black" immigrants - sometimes with the complicity of the police. In the 1980s and 1990s, this repeatedly caused violent protests by unsettled immigrant youth, which forced the authorities to take a number of measures to reduce youth unemployment, expand access to education for ethnic minorities, improve living conditions for immigrants in urban areas, change police practices, etc. 37

The situation is similar in France, where anti-immigrant sentiments in society allowed the right-wing extremist National Front to become a significant political force by the early 1990s. The NF program provides for the complete cessation of immigration, the expulsion of foreign workers, and the revision of the citizenship law in order, in particular, to make it more difficult for second-generation Algerian immigrants to obtain French citizenship. 38 This rise of the right was preceded by major riots in a number of French cities, sparked by immigrant protests against widespread unemployment and police brutality. Since the late 1980s, the authorities have developed a series of special programs to improve housing conditions, expand access to education, and increase employment for immigrant youth 39

The problem of racism and racist violence also exists in the Netherlands, where the far-right Center Party systematically advocates the repatriation of immigrants, blaming them for unemployment. In Sweden, where the immigrant population is only relatively small and consists of non-Europeans, the Swedish Party is the political bearer of racism 40 In recent years, the right-wing parties in Austria (Freedom Party) and Switzerland (People's Party) have significantly strengthened their electoral positions.

Right-wing extremism periodically (after regular terrorist attacks against "foreigners") came to the fore of German political life. It is especially noticeable in the eastern lands, where the growing activity of the extreme right was already noted in the early 1990s, immediately after the unification of the country. Later, terrorist attacks were also committed in the West. One of them (July 27, 2000 in Dusseldorf) was directed against immigrants from Russia. A month earlier, the ultras had killed an African in Dessau. These events put the topic of violent racism and its social context in the spotlight of the general public, the media, and politicians. It was noted that in the political sense, the emergence of anti-immigrant radicalism took place under the shadow of official slogans such as "the boat is loaded", "asylum seekers abuse the right to asylum", etc., the tone of which did not change with the transition of power from Christian Democrats to Social Democrats.

Recently, there has been an increase in the anti-immigrant atmosphere in Spain. The number of neo-Nazi activists known to the police was growing 41 . Xenophobia spread rapidly, and there were outbreaks of racial violence. One of the most severe cases occurred in February 2000 in the area of the small Spanish town of Ejido in the south of the country (50-60 thousand inhabitants, including about 11 thousand immigrants, mostly Moroccan agricultural workers, half of whom are illegal). For almost a week, local residents carried out lynching: they beat up Moroccans on suspicion of murdering three Spaniards, smashed and burned their homes, etc. This rampant violence received a wide response and was condemned by the EU leadership. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of a further increase in xenophobia and the corresponding political consequence-the strengthening of right-wing extremist organizations.

(To be continued)

стр. 97

ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ

1 Рассчитано по: Ziotnik H. The Dimensions of International Migration. The Hague, 1998. Paper for the Technical Symposium on International Migration and Development, UN.

2 International Migration Review. 1995. V. 29. N 3. P. 794.

3 Stalker P. Workers Without Frontiers, The Impact of Globalisation on International Migration. Geneva, 2000. P. 42.

4 Simon G. Geodinamique des migrations intemationales dans Ie monde. P., 1995. P. 69.

5 Ibid. P. 86.

6 Castles S., Miller M. The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modem World. L., 1993. P. 72.

7 Ibid.

8 Hollifield J. Immigrants, Markets and States. The Political Economy of Postwar Europe. L., 1992. P. 4.

9 Europe: a new immigration continent. Policies and politics in comparative perspective. Hambourg, 1992. P. 31; SOPEMI/OECD, 1998.

10 Politique africaine. Octobre 1998, N 71. P. 80.

11 Chaliand G., Minces J. Etat de crise. P., 1993. P. 121.

12 G. Op. cit. P. 302, 350; SOPEMI/OECD, 1992, tabl. 9.

13 Politique africaine. Octobre 1997. N 67. P. 5. Quantitative estimates of immigration are very approximate, which is due, in particular, according to researchers from the French Center for Population and Development (CEPED), to imperfect statistical systems and difficulties in accounting for illegal immigration. Thus, according to official European statistics, in 1988-1992, 23,000 adult migrants moved to Europe from seven West African countries (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal). The Organization for Migration and Urbanization in West Africa (RE-MUAO) estimates, based on surveys, that the actual number reached 111 thousand (La chronique du CEPED. 1998. N 30. P. 2).

14 Ibid. P. 14.

15 EUROSTAT.

16 Wenden С. de. L'immigration en Europe. P., 1999. P. 32.

17 G. Op. cit. P. 278.

18 Стокер П. Работа иностранцев. M., 1996. С. 124.

19 G. Op. cit. P. 281.

20 M. Op. cit. P. 90.

21 Ibid. P. 91.

22 Politique africaine. Octobre 1998. N 71. P. 81.

23 The Economist. Octobre 16, 1999. P. 32.

24 Simon G. Op. cit. P. 190. (При этом национальная рабочая сила покрывает не менее 9/10 трудовых затрат в теневых сферах и лишь остальные приходится на иностранцев.)

25 Wenden С. de. Op. cit. P. 12.

26 Ibid. P. 17.

27 Ibid. P. 68.

28 The changing course of international migration. P., OECD, 1993. P. 11.

29 Стокер П. Указ. соч. С. 221.

30 Wenden С. de. Op. cit. P. 67, 68; The Economist. October 16, 1999. P. 32.

31 Wenden С. de. Op. cit. P. 69, 70.

32 The Moscow Times. April. 4, 2000.

33 Компас. N 6, 8.02.2001.

34 Castles S. Migrations and Minorities in Europe. Perspectives for the 1990s: Eleven Hypotheses // Rasisme and Migration in Western Europe. Oxford, 1993. P. 25.

35 Chaliand G., Minces J. Op. cit. P. 136.

36 Ibid.

37 Castles S., Miller M. Op. cit. P. 202.

38 Hollifield J. Op. cit. P. 191.

39 Castles S., Miller M. Op. cit. P. 207.

40 Ibid. P. 211,218.

41 The Economist. February 19, 2000. P. 33.

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