The World War that began on August 1, 1914, changed the political situation in almost all the states of the Middle East. Afghanistan did not participate in the fighting, but both warring factions sought to win it over: Germany and Turkey persistently pushed Emir Habibullah Khan to oppose Russia and England, and they, in turn, tried to keep the Kabul ruler within the established system of relations and prevent him from joining the central powers.
Key words: great Powers, World War I, Russian-British relations, German influence, Persia, Afghanistan.
In 1915-1916, the German-Turkish military-diplomatic mission of O. Niedermayer and W. von Hentig was stationed in Afghanistan. Soviet researchers P. I. Khoteev, M. A. Babakhodzhaev, N. Ravich, and K. Sokolov-Strakhov, as well as English and American authors L. Adamek, R. Stewart, W. Fraser-Tytler, and P. Saike wrote about it in their time [Babakhodzhaev, 1960; Ravich, 1933; Sokolov-Strakhov, 1929; Khoteev, 1977; Adamec, 1965; Fraser-Tytler, 1950; Stewart, 1973; Sykes, 1940]. However, they focused on studying the activities of the German-Turkish emissaries after their arrival in Afghanistan, and therefore all the events immediately preceding their appearance there are still poorly understood. Meanwhile, the answers to questions about how and why agents of Germany and Turkey ended up on Afghan territory in 1915 are very important for understanding the situation in the region as a whole, as well as clarifying the nature and features of the development of Anglo-Russian relations on the Afghan issue during the First World War.
August 8, 1914-Viceroy of India Ch. Harding sent a message to Habibullah Khan, in which he announced the outbreak of war in Europe and recommended that in the current situation "to maintain absolute neutrality, taking special measures for the security of the state border" [Stewart, 1973, p. 7]. The Kabul ruler followed this advice. On August 19, he replied: Harding, explaining his decision as follows:: "When security is guaranteed... the Government of Afghanistan is protected from the harmful and diabolical intentions of its enemies and there is no harm to its honor and dignity, and its current independent position is maintained and maintained, the population tells the government to remain neutral " [AWPRI, f. 147, op. 486, d. 345, l. 15].
However, the state of affairs in Afghanistan was different from the picture outlined by the Emir. According to the Russian military agent in Khorasan, Lieutenant Colonel L. N. Skurat, Khabibullah Khan's subjects were "openly pro-German" and "the whole course of military operations was reduced to one thing-German victories" [AVPRI, op. 485, d. 755, l. 142]. The command of the Turkestan Military District generally had little confidence in Habibullah Khan's statements about neutrality. August 23, 1914 Chief of Staff of the TurkVO
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Major General I. Z. Odishelidze telegraphed to the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGS): "Emir... he may try to unite [the population. - K. S.] with the idea of fighting against the infidel Russians, who are supposedly weakening as a result of the war in the West, and will risk an adventure" [AVPRI, op. 486, d. 345, l. 4].
Such news alarmed the tsarist authorities. Russian Foreign Minister S. D. Sazonov authorized the Ambassador in London to request additional information from the British side on the situation in Afghanistan (he was counting on the support of the British government in deterring the emir) [AVPRI, op. 486, d. 345, l. 6]. A. K. Benckendorf assured him in response that, according to the Vice-President of the Russian Foreign Ministry, - the king, Habibullah Khan "does not intend to violate neutrality" [AVPRI, on. 486, d. 345, l. 9].
From other sources, the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Military Ministry received less optimistic reports. L. N. Skurat reported to the head of the GUGS that " the sympathies of the ruling circles [of Afghanistan. - CS] are directed to the side... enemies" of Russia and England, and warned that, " if the arena... Turkey will also perform... performance of the Afghans... it cannot be considered improbable" [AVPRI, op. 485, d. 755, l. 147, 148]. Such fears were fully justified, and given the information received in Petrograd from Constantinople [AVPRI, op. 486, d. 345, l. 16], a rather unfavorable prospect loomed for the Entente powers, but they could not radically influence the course of events. They could only rely on the promises of Habibullah Khan and at the same time prepare to repel a possible strike from his side.
What was feared in both London and Petrograd soon happened. On November 12, 1914, Turkey entered the war. This made the Russian and British authorities even more closely monitor the events taking place in Afghanistan. The strengthening of pro-Turkish sentiment there was inevitable, and they did not dare to respond with anything concrete. The Viceroy only sent another message to the Emir urging him to remain neutral. He became very careful when dealing with Habibullah Khan. He was obliged to do this by reducing the number of troops in India after the start of the war. Offensive operations against the Afghan army were out of the question. According to K. D. Nabokov, Consul General of Russia in Calcutta, the meaning of the steps taken by the Anglo-Indian government was to "avoid complications on the border of Afghanistan" [International Relations..., 1935(1), p. 306].
The tsarist diplomats and military acted in a similar way. The Governor-General of Turkestan, F. V. Martson, ordered the border authorities subordinate to him to adhere "in relation to Afghanistan... the most correct course of action", avoiding " everything that could aggravate... good-neighborly relations with this country " [AVPRI, f. 147, op. 485, d. 755, l. 153]. At the same time, neither Tashkent nor Petrograd had any firm confidence that the measures taken would be sufficient to contain their troubled neighbor. "Fanaticism of the Afghans can flare up against the will of the emir," said V. O. von Klemm, head of the Third political department of the Russian Foreign Ministry [AVPRI, f. 147, op. 486, d. 345, l. 12]. He and other Foreign Ministry officials were seriously concerned about reports of the strengthening of Habibullah Khan's troops in the border areas with Russia. In addition, there were data on the expansion of the activities of Afghan agents in Central Asia and the supply of weapons to the territory of Bukhara [AVPRI, op. 485, d. 755, l. 154].
Under these circumstances, Petrograd decided to directly appeal to the Viceroy of India with a request to specify joint steps in the event of an Afghan attack. So far, it was only about planning joint military events. On November 11, V. O. Klemm telegraphed K. D. Nabokov: "The Governor-General [of Turkestan - K. S.] recognizes... it is desirable that, in the event of the opening of military operations by the Afghans, they should be energetically pressured by India with armed force" [International Relations..., 1935(1), p. 17].
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The Consul General in Calcutta was in constant contact with the Viceroy and his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and therefore immediately informed them of the proposal. However, Ch. Harding and G. McMahon politely declined it. From their point of view, the request of the tsarist authorities testified to the desire of Petrograd to use the situation to strike at Afghanistan from two sides. The result, in their opinion, would be the establishment of Russia's control over part of its territory. Naturally, the Anglo-Indian leadership could not agree with this. The situation, although becoming more complicated, remained quite controlled, and therefore Charles Harding did not yet see the need to give in to the tsarist administration in this matter. He told K. D. Nabokov that " the Indian government does not consider the military preparations of Afghanistan dangerous." To make it more convincing, the Viceroy acquainted the Russian representative with a letter from Habibullah Khan, in which he spoke about his friendship with England and "his firm intention not to actively oppose it" [International Relations..., 1935(1), p.303].
Ch's response Harding, however, was not satisfied with the Russian side. Alarming telegrams were constantly sent to Petrograd. Political agent in Bukhara A. K. Belyaev and Vice-Consul in Seistan B. C. Romanovsky reported on major disagreements in the Afghan government and an attempt to assassinate the emir. According to them, the Turkish Sultan Mehmed V turned to Habibullah Khan with a request for support, but he refused him, which caused a negative reaction in his inner circle [AVPRI, f. 147, on. 486, d. 345, l. 25, 36]. L. N. Skurat transmitted information about the conflict Habibullah Khan with his brother Nasrullah Khan. The latter, taking advantage of the departure of the ruler to Jalalabad, in January 1915 ordered the sale of weapons to the population and sent a significant amount of them to the tribes on the Indian border. Only the direct intervention of the Emir forced Nasrullah Khan to temporarily abandon such actions [AVPRI, f. 147, op. 485, d. 755, l. 170-171]. Intelligence of the Turkestan Military District reported on the concentration of government troops in the north of Afghanistan. Tashkent even received information that the beginning of military operations against Russia is scheduled for mid-March [AVPRI, f. 147, op. 486, d. 345, l. 34].
All this testified to one thing: Turkey's joining the Entente's opponents encouraged the Afghans, raised their spirits. The Sultan's armies were expected to defeat the "infidels" and were prepared to actively support them. Contacts established in the past between the Afghan ruling circles and the Turkish political elite were actively developing. Emissaries of the Sultan visited Kabul in the autumn and winter of 1914, offering Habibullah Khan to act against England and Russia, but he did not agree to this.
Nevertheless, what was happening in Afghanistan no longer just alarmed, but frightened both of its neighbors. The tsarist diplomats did not hide their fear. On February 17, A. K. Belyaev asked fellow Foreign Minister A. A. Neratov to " increase the garrisons [on the territory of the Bukhara Emirate] as soon as possible. - K. S.] at least by secondary troops" [AVPRI, f. 147, op. 486, d. 345, l. 38]. Requests were constantly being sent to Calcutta for more information about the Emir's plans and to determine the degree of readiness of the Anglo-Indian army to repel an attack from Afghanistan.
The British authorities were no less alarmed than the Russian authorities [Hardinge, 1947, p. 131-132], but they wanted to create the appearance of their complete control over the situation. C. Harding, in conversations with K. D. Nabokov, skillfully concealed the true state of affairs, seriously belittling the degree of threat emanating from Kabul. From the beginning of January to the end of June 1915, the Russian Consul General sent telegrams to Petrograd from Calcutta, where not a word was said about the conflict in the Afghan leadership, about calls for war and arming the population. On the contrary, they stated that" the Emir responds [to the Viceroy.-K. S.] with expressions of friendship "and intends to" maintain a strict order of conduct".
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neutrality", that it has a "peaceful mood" and therefore "there is no indication of the possibility of hostile actions of Afghanistan" [Blue Book..., 1918, pp. 36-37, 45, 52].
Of course, it was profitable for the British cabinet to keep Russia away from everything that was happening in the domain of Habibullah Khan. To tell the truth was to involve the tsarist authorities in a new discussion of the Afghan problem and inevitably face additional difficulties. In London, apparently, they decided not to do this unless absolutely necessary. In addition, the British government believed Ch. Harding believes that the measures taken in India are sufficient to deter militant Afghans. However, this did not take into account the fact that in his calculations, the Viceroy proceeded more from past assessments and personal expectations than from a real vision of the situation.
Back in the autumn of 1914, three divisions on the north-western border of India were put on alert. As Ch. himself later wrote in his memoirs. According to Harding, he made this decision because "he understood that with the outbreak of war in Europe, the Emir would be subject to strong pressure from the mullahs and tribes who would want to use the opportunity to attack us" (Hardinge, 1947, p.100). However, the measures taken did not make a drastic change in the course of events, and by the end of 1914, according to the Viceroy, "the situation on the border... inspired serious concern" [Hardinge, 1947, p.107]. Nevertheless, he was quite coolly following the increasing attacks of Pashtuns on British garrisons, relying on the promises of the emir. "I have always succeeded in maintaining friendly relations with the ruler of Afghanistan... and I was sure of his loyalty" [Hardinge, 1947, p. 100], - wrote Ch. Harding after the war.
However, Habibullah Khan's personal affinity and willingness to maintain neutrality did not guarantee that the population and Afghan political circles would adopt a similar position. The Russian Consul General in Calcutta cautiously remarked: "Afghanistan is a political entity only in name... Kabul is not always able to direct and control what is happening on the outskirts" [Blue Book..., 1918, p. 32]. It was this fact that the British authorities left almost without attention, relying in fact only on the prudence of the emir, and they imposed this view on the tsarist diplomats.
Thus, from the beginning of the war until mid-1915, the Entente Allies were unable to coordinate their actions in relation to Afghanistan. The British side primarily defended its own interests, trying not to give Russia a reason to interfere in its affairs. Only when there was an immediate threat of German armed groups entering Afghanistan did the Russian and British authorities realize the need for closer cooperation.
German military and political circles were particularly interested in Afghanistan as a country bordering the British possessions in India. They began direct preparations for conducting special operations there in wartime conditions already in mid-August 1914, having decided to persuade the emir to speak out against England. At the same time, it was planned to carry out sabotage from the Afghan territory in Russian Turkestan, Western China, Persia and provide constant assistance to the Pashtun tribes. All this, according to Berlin's calculations, would force Great Britain and Russia to at least maintain the presence of a significant number of troops in India and Central Asia, which would facilitate the position of the German armies in the European theater of operations.
The German government decided to organize the penetration of its agents into Afghanistan with the help of the Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha. He said that a military-diplomatic mission was being sent to Kabul from Istanbul, and suggested that several Kaiser officers should be included in its composition. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany
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T. Bethmann-Hollweg and Chief of the General Staff H. I. L. Moltke supported this idea, but all military personnel assigned to participate in the Turkish expedition were ordered to follow the instructions of the German military leadership only.
In early September 1914, 23 German officers headed by W. Wassmus arrived in Istanbul, and in December 25 more headed by O. Niedermayer (Adamec, 1965, p.84). By mid-January 1915, both groups were concentrated in Baghdad, where Colonel Rauf Bey's Turkish detachment was already stationed. Final preparations for the transition to Afghanistan began: separate groups were formed, routes of movement were determined, and powers were clarified. Concerning the latter, there were serious disagreements between Wassmus and Niedermayer, on the one hand, and Rauf Bey, on the other. As the Soviet researcher P. I. Khoteev wrote, the German military claimed leadership and did not want to obey the orders of the Turkish command. As a result, they gained the right to act independently and left for Isfahan at the end of March (Khoteev, 1977, p.165).
At this time, the question of strengthening the expedition of W. Wassmus and O. Niedermayer was considered in Berlin. It was decided to send a political mission with her to Afghanistan under the leadership of W. von Hentig, former secretary of the German Embassy in Tehran. He was authorized to conduct official negotiations with Habibulloikhan and establish diplomatic relations between Germany and Afghanistan (Adamec, 1965, p.85). The mission included Indian political emigrants Mahendra Pratap and Maulana Barakatulla, through whom it was planned to establish contacts with anti - British organizations in India, two immigrants from Buner (who arrived in Germany from the United States) and several dozen prisoners of war-former soldiers of the British army, Pashtuns by ethnicity. With their help, German representatives had to contact the tribes on the Indian north-western border (Adamec, 1965, p. 84-85; Pratap, 1947, p. 43).
On April 10, 1915, the group left Berlin. It was supposed to enter Afghanistan from the territory of Persia, together with other German detachments, but first V. von Hentig and M. Pratap visited Istanbul, where they discussed issues of interaction with the Turkish authorities. They met with Sultan Mehmed V, Grand Vizier Halim Pasha, and Foreign Minister Talaat Pasha, and received letters of transmittal to the Afghan Emir. However, these meetings were essentially formal. The conversation with Enver Pasha was more businesslike. By his order, the Turkish officer Kazembek was included in the German expedition, in addition, V. von Hentig received guarantees of providing any necessary assistance [Pratap, 1947, p. 44].
After the negotiations, the mission left for Baghdad, and from there, via Khanekin and Kermanshah, arrived in Isfahan. Here was the main gathering point for German detachments heading to Afghanistan. They planned to quickly and quietly cross the central regions of Persia and reach Herat. It was quite possible to do this with good preparation and coordination of actions. The Shah's authorities did not interfere with the Germans, and sometimes even supported them. The same is true of the Swedish officers of the Persian Gendarmerie. Finally, and most importantly, Russia and England did not at that time have forces on the territory of Persia capable of giving a decisive rebuff or at least creating serious obstacles to the advance of the Germans. From spring to mid-summer of 1915, Russian and British diplomats had to counteract the increase in their activity, relying on insignificant military teams that were attached to diplomatic missions. Larger army units were stationed in the north and south of the country, but they had their own tasks and could not take control of the central provinces of Persia either.
Thus, when on June 16, 1915, the first batch of German officers, led by G. Wagner and V. Paschen, moved from Isfahan to the Afghan border, the path was difficult for them.
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is open. In addition, at this point, neither the Russian nor British authorities were yet aware of the ultimate goal of the German enterprise. On July 1, Sazonov sent a telegram to the Ambassador in Tehran, N. S. Etter: "The incessant shipments of German officers, weapons, machine guns, and shells to Isfahan are beginning to take on alarming proportions... The matter begins to take on the character of preparing an entire armed expedition... I do not understand what purpose the Germans can pursue" [International Relations..., 1935(2), p. 260].
Meanwhile, several more German detachments headed by G. Focht, K. Zugmaier, V. Seiler, V. Wassmus, O. Niedermayer moved to the borders of Afghanistan. The Consul General in Mashhad, N. Nikolsky, and the Vice-Consul in Birgend, B. S. Romanovsky, informed N. S. Etter of their approximate routes ("to Mashhad, Haf, Kerman"), after which he informed S. D. Sazonov that the German caravans were trying to " get closer to our [Russian-K. S.] Afghanistan and Baluchisgany borders "[International relations..., 1935(2), pp. 319-320]. The Viceroy of India received similar information from the British Embassy in Tehran.
Retaliatory measures now had to be taken without delay. And this was indeed done, but on an insufficient scale. Neither Russian nor British diplomats in Persia, let alone the official authorities of Russia and Great Britain, had a clear idea of what was happening until July 8-10. Therefore, their first decisions did not reduce the threat of a breakthrough of the German expedition to Afghanistan. For example, the Consul General in Mashhad N. Nikolsky, not having sufficient information about the number and armament of the German detachments advancing from Isfahan to Tebes, asked N. S. Etter to instruct him with a group of Cossacks to arrest them [AVPRI, f. 194, on. 528/2, d. 91, l. 140], and Comrade In the same situation, Russian Foreign Minister A. A. Neratov ordered General F. V. Martson to send a 25-man Cossack detachment to the Haf [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 21].
The Anglo-Indian authorities assessed the situation in much the same way: on July 5, Ch. Harding requested the opinion of the British ambassador in Tehran on the expediency of establishing a "military guard" on the eastern border of Persia (instead of doing it immediately) and advised for the time being to act independently [International Relations..., 1935(2), pp. 319-320].
In the following days, both sides closely monitored the situation, analyzed previously received information about the mood in Afghanistan and came to the conclusion that it was necessary at all costs to prevent the penetration of German and Turkish emissaries into its territory. The Anglo-Indian authorities were already leaning towards the most unfavorable scenario. On July 10, N. S. Etter informed S. D. Sazonov that the Viceroy of India admits the possibility of launching "broad military operations on the Afghan border and in Baluchistan in the near future" [AVPRI, f. 147, op. 486, d.345, l. 51]. The Russian Foreign Minister also feared this. "If the German caravans reach Afghanistan..., there will be very little hope that the Afghans will not interfere in the war" [International Relations..., 1935(2), p. 456], - he wrote to the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General N. N. Yanushkevich.
The success of the Allies in the Entente now largely depended on how soon they agreed on joint actions against the German detachments on the approaches to Afghanistan and whether they could implement their plans in a very limited time. This was understood both in Petrograd and in London. On July 13, S. D. Sazonov sent a telegram to the British Foreign Secretary E. Gray, in which, after briefly describing the situation, he proposed to join forces to capture German officers [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 33]. The head of the Foreign Office turned to Charles Harding, who, through K. D. Nabokov, informed the Russian side of the plan to capture the Kaiser's agents.
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The British authorities pledged to cover Seistan and the Persian-Baluchistan border with their troops, and the Russians were to take control of the Mashhad-Torbete-Haderiye-Birjand line, and it was specifically stipulated that" for the sake of achieving a common goal "the military could "not adhere too much to the border of the" spheres of influence" " [AVPRI, f. 147, op. 486, D. 345, L. 62]. These proposals were readily accepted in Petrograd, and on July 19 Sazonov informed N. S. Etter and General F. V. Martson about them.
By that time, Russian and British representatives in Persia had new information about the movement of German armed detachments. It became known about the arrival of one of them in Tebes [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 28], and the other in Gunabad [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 125]. N. Nikolsky decided to immediately use the available material against them. at the disposal of the 2nd Semirechensk Cossack Regiment. He left most of it in Mashhad in case a German caravan appeared there, and sent one hundred, led by Kesaul Bedarev, to patrol the road to Torbet-Haderiye. This was done by him on July 17, before receiving an official order to cover the Afghan border. Then N. Nikolsky ordered Colonel Kulikov, commander of the 2nd Semirechensk regiment, to allocate fifty men to occupy the town of Torbete-Heyderie itself. Thanks to such prompt actions, a detachment of 68 Cossacks under the command of Lieutenant Bortnikov arrived there on July 25 [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 40]. Although it was a weak barrier, but with the available forces, it was impossible to count on more.
Meanwhile, the British government was asking the tsarist authorities to put the entire area between Mashhad and Birjand under surveillance as quickly as possible, and even send troops to Kerman. The Russian military command itself understood that it was urgently necessary to send additional forces to the Persian-Afghan border. On July 23, the Governor-General of Turkestan telegraphed S. D. Sazonov that the number of German military personnel in the Tebes and Gunabad areas is 500, which means that the one and a half hundred Cossacks sent against them from Mashhad by N. Nikolsky is clearly insufficient [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 123]. To detain German military caravans, F. V. Martson sent an additional 1st Semirechensk Regiment from the reserve, noting that he could not allocate more for Persia. According to the calculations of the Turkestan Military District headquarters, the total number of Russian troops in Khorasan after the arrival of reinforcements should have been 1000 people. It was considered that this would be "quite sufficient to fully guarantee success" [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 124].
On July 26, the 1st Semirechensk Cossack Regiment under the command of Colonel Gushchin began moving from Ashgabat to Mashhad. However, the situation in the Afghan border area was such that even at the fastest pace of movement, his units could not start performing the task in a timely manner. And it itself was too serious for a not so large military contingent. A 1,000-man detachment was to control a 450-km stretch from Mashhad to Birjand.
The problematic nature of success became clear to the Russian authorities by the end of July. On the 24th, Vice-Consul B. S. Romanovsky reported to N. S. Etter about the arrival of a German detachment in Kain and asked him to send Cossacks to support it as soon as possible [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 38], but Gushchin's regiment, intended just for this purpose, was located back in Ashgabat. There was only one option left - to send a hundred podjesaul Bedareva to the Kain-Birgend area. General F. V. Martson ordered this, although he understood that the allocated forces would not even be enough to delay the German armed detachments until the main forces of the 1st Semirechensk Regiment arrived [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 118]. B.C. Romanovsky still hoped for
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the help of the Anglo-Indian troops, but the first British units crossed the Persian-Baluchistan border only on the night of July 30-31, and they were mainly oriented to the territory south of Birgend [AVPRI, f. 194, on. 528/2, d. 91, l. 62].
So the lack of troops and weak organization of actions once again failed Russia and Great Britain. At the right moment, they were unable to stop the German military detachments moving into Afghanistan. When Bedarev's detachment managed to encircle the groups of G. Wagner and V. Pashen in Kain on July 30, there was no one to support the Cossacks. All day they exchanged fire with the enemy, and at night the Germans broke out of the ring (and Bedarev's team at that time had only 60 people left) and they left in the direction of Thun. "Due to the ambiguity of intelligence data "(AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 191), they were not pursued. Thus, in the first days of August, G. Wagner and V. Pashen found themselves on Afghan territory.
The leaders of the German expedition O. Niedermayer and V. von Hentig, as well as the Indians and Turkish officer Kazem Bek who were with them, were discovered on August 15 near the village of Rushinabad by a detachment of centurion Baykov from the 2nd Semirechensk Cossack regiment. Together with B. C. Romanovsky, he tried to capture this party, but without success. The vice-consul in Birgend later reported to N. Nikolsky: "The pursuit was on the trail of a gang that was a day and a half ahead of the pass and was moving very quickly to Afghanistan. Catch up with them... it was not possible; the pursuit stopped in the village of Takhtavan, 50 versts from the border" [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 111]. O. Niedermayer's group crossed it on the night of August 19-20.
The success of the Germans was greatly facilitated by the skillful actions and misinformation of the Russian and British commanders. Moving through the territory of Persia, they spread false rumors about their intention to go to Afghanistan through Mashhad, in the expectation that the main forces allocated for their capture would be drawn there. This is what actually happened. By August 6, the Cossacks of the 1st Semirechensk regiment were concentrated between Mashhad and Torbete-Heyderie, and further south, up to Birjend, the Afghan border was covered only by weak cavalry barriers. In fact, the British area of responsibility remained unprotected. The Royal Infantry occupied the most important points of Seistan, but almost did not monitor the roads, so after the breakthrough of V. Paschen, G. Wagner and O. Niedermayer's detachments into Afghanistan, V. Zeiler's group penetrated there (through Shiraz and Kerman).
For Russia and Great Britain, the situation remained unfavorable even further. When, in early September, data appeared about the possibility of new German provocations on the Persian-Afghan border, Colonel Gushchin's detachment numbered, not counting the sick, 450 people [AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/2, d. 91, l. 172]. Naturally, they could not properly cover the Mashhad-Birjand line.
Thus, with the outbreak of the First World War, the role of Afghanistan in international affairs has changed significantly. Germany and Turkey decided to use it in the fight against England and Russia. The danger of drawing Afghanistan into the fighting was already great. The population and almost the entire ruling elite opposed the policy of neutrality pursued by Emir Habibullah Khan.
In August 1915, the military-diplomatic mission of O. Niedermayer and W. von Hentig arrived in Afghanistan (Babakhodjaev, 1960; Simonov, 2013). This became possible due to the lack of coordination between the actions of Russia and the UK. The British authorities, despite the threat of the Afghans coming out in support of Germany and Turkey, did not want to discuss this problem with the tsarist government. Until the summer of 1915. they relied only on their own resources and on their friendship with the Emir. As a result, when the German detachments were near the borders of Afghanistan, it was not possible to organize a serious rebuff to them.
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list of literature
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI).
Babakhodzhasv M. A. Missia Nidsrmaisra-Gsntiga v Afganganii (1915-1916) [The mission of the Nidsrmaisra-Gsntiga in Afghanistan (1915-1916)]. Kratkiej postiki Instituta vostokovedeniya AN SSSR, Issue 37, Moscow, 1960.
International Relations in the era of Imperialism: documents from the archives of the Tsarist and Provisional governments (1878-1917). Ser. III: 1914-1917. Vol. 6.Part 2. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1935(1).
International Relations in the era of Imperialism: documents from the archives of the Tsarist and Provisional governments (1878-1917). Ser. III: 1914-1917. Vol. 8.Part 1. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1935(2).
Ravich N. The Raised Veil (The Struggle in Afghanistan during the Imperialist War). 1933. № 10.
Simonov K. V. German mission in Afghanistan during the First World War// Historical, philosophical, political and legal sciences, cultural studies and art criticism. Questions of theory and practice. Tambov: Gramota Publ., 2013, No. 8 (34), Part II. http://www.gramota.nct/matcrials/3/2013/8-2/.
The blue book. Collection of secret documents extracted from the archive of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow: NKID, 1918.
Sokolov-Strakhov K. Afghanistan in the World War of 1914-1918. 1929. Books 26-27.
Hotsv P. I. Germano-afganskie peregotovki 1915-1916 gg. [German-Afghan negotiations of 1915-1916]. Oriental Studies, L., 1977, Issue 20, No. 395.
Adamcc L.W. Afghanistan: 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965.
Frascr-Tytler W.K. Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia. L.: Oxford University Press, 1950.
HardingcCh. My Indian Years: 1910-1916. L.: John Murray, 1947.
Pratap M. My Life Story of Fifty-Five Years. Dchradun: World Federation, 1947.
Stewart R.T. Fire in Afghanistan: 1914-1929. N.Y.: Garden City, 1973.
Sykcs P. A History of Afghanistan: Vol. 2. L.: Macmillan & Co Ltd., 1940.
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