THE KHUBSUGUL UPRISING OF 1932 IN MONGOLIA*
A brief reconstruction of the armed uprising of 1932, the largest in Mongolia in the XX century, is given. It was caused not by the activities of the Panchen Lama IX and Japan, but by the "left course" pursued and then canceled by the leadership of the MPRP on the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and the Comintern. This uprising can be considered a civil war.
Keywords: 1932 uprising, Khubsugul uprising, civil war, Mongolia, Buddhism, communism, Panchen Lama IX.
There were many dramatic events in the history of Mongolia in the 20th century. One of them is the armed uprising of 1932. There are several reports on it, mainly from the archive of the former Ministry of Internal Affairs of the MNR [Tserenbalzhir, 1990; Ganbold, 2000; Luvsan-Ochir, 2003; Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013]. However, the available descriptions are rather fragmentary, and a number of important materials in other archives have not yet been studied. The use of these documents, along with those published earlier, is important for reconstructing this conflict and revealing its essence: was it inspired from abroad by a rebellion of high lamas and former feudal lords, or a popular uprising?
"LEFT COURSE" IN THE MPR
By 1928, the leadership of the CPSU (b) and the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) had strengthened their line of struggle against the "right-wing danger" in the MNR. This is reflected in the directives for the MPRP aimed at bringing the "left" to power [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 59, l. 1-2; d. 62, l. 3-9, f. 17, op. 3; d. 673, l. 3]. To participate in the At the seventh Congress of the MPRP, a Comintern delegation headed by B. Schmeral arrived in Ulaanbaatar. Under her leadership, a platform of the "Khudon opposition" was developed with a number of radical provisions for combating the right, high lamas and former feudal lords, using their income for the poor, eliminating exploitation, etc. [ibid., f. 495, op. 152, d. 74, l. 5-12].
At the Seventh Congress of the MPRP (October 23 - December 10, 1928), the delegation supported the "left" [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 74, l. 355-365]. The result was their victory and a change in the party leadership. Mongolia began a "left course" (1929-1932) modeled on the course of collectivization (1928-1933, the main stage - 1930-1933) in the USSR. The "left course" was supervised by Soviet representatives in the MPR [ibid., op. 154, d. 88, l. 12-14; d. 118, l. 40-40a]. Since 1929, confiscation of the property of former feudal lords and high lamas began [ibid., op. 152, d. 118, l. 28], collectivization [ibid., d. 88, l. 65-69, d. 116, l. 60],
* We thank S. Chuluun, O. Batsaikhan, Sue Byrne, and all the staff of the Archives of Mongolia and Russia who assisted in obtaining the materials.
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the tax reform that introduced a progressive tax on the property of monasteries [ibid., f. 495, op. 152, d. 92, l. 9-10a]. True, collectivization did not find full support even among the Arats, who were dominated by individualism [ibid., d. 91, l.15; TSAFSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 378, l. 359].
On February 21-April 3, 1930, the eighth Congress of the MPRP was held, which, with the support of the Comintern, declared the goal of building socialism, combating feudal and capitalist elements, and prioritizing public property. A set of tasks was set to undermine the influence of the clergy, reduce it and discredit it [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 105, l. 56-81].
To pay the new taxes, some monasteries were forced to sell religious utensils and books, and collect alms [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 71, tal 6-7; kh. n. 38, tal 57-58; kh.n. 76, tal 26-29]. In the event of a tax shortage, the property of the treasurer (nyarav) and the property manager of the monastery was sealed or the property of the higher lamas was confiscated [ibid., kh. n. 39, tal 103-105; kh. n. 86, tal 2; kh. n. 15, tal 78-79, 96-97]. From the beginning of the "left course" (1928) to 1932, about 43,555 monks entered the world, while 51,345 remained [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 143, l. 133].
There are many examples of repression, insults and violence against believers, destruction of religious objects, and crude anti-religious propaganda [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 79, tal 71-72; kh. n. 195, tal 141-149, 178; RGASPI, f. 495, op. 19, d. 380, l. 14-28; Erdenasaikhan, 2013, p. 401; Dashpurev and Soni, 1992, p. 22].
The number of partnerships, artels, and communes grew, but the number of livestock decreased, cattle were plundered, and collective farms collapsed in some places [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 143, l. 35]. Supporting the "left course", the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) already in 1930 pointed out to the leadership of the MPRP "certain excesses" and mistakes [ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 790, l. 1; d. 803, l. 9; d. 781, l. 3, op. 152; D. 114, l. 64-79]. The MPR accepted the relevant documents. For example, the resolution of the 21st plenum of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the MPRP of June 18, 1930 prescribed not to expel lamas by force from monasteries, but to alienate them economically [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 3, kh. n. 168, tal 90].
In western and northwestern Mongolia, where the 1932 uprising took place, the left course was carried out very intensively. In April 1930, there were more farms of "feudal lords and officials" that were subject to confiscation than farms of "poor people" that were not subject to it [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 118, l. 40]. The supply of goods was disrupted. When harvesting meat in the Khubsugul aimag, there was confusion, often cattle were taken by force [ibid., d. 140, l. 19, 56-61]. Later, the "leftist bends" there were called one of the main reasons for the uprising [ibid., l.26, 56-59; TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 84-102].
The "left course" led to a general destabilization in the MNR. In 1930, there were uprisings in the aimags of Chandman-ula, Khan-Taishiri, Tsetserleg-Mandal, and Bogdo-khan-ula [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 114, l. 2-13]. The most widespread was the Tugsbuyant uprising in the aimag of Chandman-ula, which was suppressed with great brutality [Erdenesaikhan, 2013, pp. 47-51]. In 1931, there was a mass migration of the population from the border areas of the South Gobi, Uverkhangai, and Altai aimags [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, 120, l. 84-97; Simukov, 1994, p. 146-150] (the administrative division changed that year). In February-March 1932, there were riots in the South Gobi aimag [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d.140, l. 11], in March - in the East and Altai [ibid., l. 4, 5, 7].
PREPARATION AND PROGRESS OF THE UPRISING
Several underground groups have emerged in the north of the MNR. In 1931, a group from the Tariatyn-khure monastery in the Archangay aimag was uncovered, preparing an uprising [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 128, tal 8-9]. By the end of 1931, some lama leaders who were preparing an uprising in the Khubsugul aimag were arrested. Early 1932 leadership
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It was passed to Ch. Sambu-duvchin from the monastery of Asgatyn-khure [Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, pp. 118-121, 197-198].
Apparently, the uprising began spontaneously on April 10 or 11, 1932, in the Khyalgant monastery of the Rashant somon in the Khubsugul aimag. Approximately 10 lamas of this monastery with lay people led by the former feudal lord Chojinsuren, zav. The cooperative store Jamsrandorj and the former collective farm chairman Sanjid, armed with flintlocks, burdans and sticks, surrounded the somon administration to seize it [Tserenbaljir, 1990, pp. 19-24, 32-35]. On April 12-13, the rebels arrived at the Rashantyn-khure monastery (Pandita-gegen-khure, Darav-pandita-gegen-khure) the same somon, 60 km from Hyalgant. Along the way, they destroyed state institutions and mobilized people [Batsaikhan, 2007, p. 259]. From Rashantyn-khure, the rebels began to send people to various places to arrest responsible workers, mobilize horses, and take weapons from the Russians and Chinese [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d.140, l. 18].
The aimag authorities received the first message in the evening of April 11 or in the morning of April 12, but lost time to check and only in the evening of April 13 did they inform the center, set up a headquarters in the Khatgal center, and sent messengers to the monasteries [Tserenbaljir, 1990, pp. 19-22, 34-35]. On April 14, the Central Committee of the MPRP and the government appointed a five-member plenipotentiary commission: J. Lhumbe (Chairman), C. Givapil (Deputy Head of the State Internal Security Service), Sanjmatav (Ministry of War), Tseden-Ish 1 (Central Committee of the Revolutionary Youth League) [Batsaikhan, 2007, pp. 260-261]. The GVO created a maneuverable military detachment from students of the GVO school and sent them from Ulaanbaatar to the aimag on April 15. The detachment was led by Givapil (Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 19-22, 34-35). He was accompanied by the Soviet instructor E. N. Isakov [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 21].
Centers of the 1932 Uprising
1 - Тэсийн-хурэ (Дуурэгч-вангийн-хурэ); 2 - Цаган-Бургасын-хурэ; 3 - Аригийн-хурэ; 4 - Сангийн-Далай; 5 - Джалханцза-хутагтын-хурэ; 6 - Бугсийн-хурэ; 7 - Рашантын-хурэ; 8 - Хялгантын-хийд; 9 - Баянголын-хурэ; 10 - Барун-Асгатын-хурэ; 11 - Дзун-Хангай; 12 - Барун-Хангай; 13 - Хамба-гэгэний-хурэ (Идэр-хамбын-хурэ); 14 - Шумултайн-хурэ; 15 - Тариатын-хурэ; 16 - Улястайн-хурэ; 17 - Байдрагийн-хийд; 18 - Гурван-Булаг; 19 - Тэс; 20 - Тэлмэн; 21 - Цогт; 22 - Хурэ-Марал; 23 - Эрдэнэ-Мандал; 24 - Дзабхан-Мандал; 25 - Шилустэй; 26 - Дзун-Асгатын-хурэ; 27 - Дархад-дацан; 28 - Баян-Дзурх; 29 - Арын-хурэ.
1 Soviet Buryat Ts. E. Gochitsky (Dashbalyn).
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On April 14-16, the rebels joined forces with the lamas of Rashantyn-khure, there were more than 300 of them, according to other sources - 500. They robbed the school and killed about 10 local workers - members of the MPRP and Revsomol [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 18]. By April 15, the rebels occupied 6 monasteries of the Khubsugul and northern Archangay aimags: Rashant, Ikh-ula, Namnan, Ar-Bulag, Tsetserleg, Bayan-Tsagan. The monasteries of Shar-Tolgoi, Tsagan-Bulag, and Datsan Darkhad joined the uprising. The number of insurgents reached 1,900. On April 16, they occupied Tosontsengal and Bayanagt somons, and the Somon leadership fled [Tserenbaljir, 1990, pp. 23-24, 43, 49]. Detachments of 10-20 insurgents went to 8 somons of Khubsugul and Archangay. They mobilized arats, horse-drawn transport, and food, looted somon trade and economic organizations, and explained the goals of the uprising [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 22-24, 49]. The influence of the insurgents began to penetrate into the Dzabkhan aimag [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 22].
By the decision of the Maly Khural and the government, the GVO formed a detachment under the command of D. Nyasaldag and sent it to Rashant. There the rebels were already confronted by the local detachment of T. Puntsagnamzhil. Detachments of J. Lhumbe and C. Givapila also attacked the rebels. Approximately on April 20, the Galindev detachment arrived in Somon Rashant and waited for the Givapil detachment (Tserenbaljir, 1990, p. 37). At that time, Galindev's detachment had 60 men, while Givapil's had 50 [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 18]. On April 20, 200 armed rebels arrived in Somon Muren, taking the Arats they met. The aimag authorities created a volunteer detachment of 38 people with rifles, and appointed Dashzhantsan from the GVO as the commander. Some Arats supported the Reds, others sympathized with the rebels. According to defectors, in one battle with the Khubsugul detachment, the rebels lost 4 people, the results of the second battle are unknown [ibid., l. 16].
On April 21, Givapil moved to Rashantyn-khure, leaving 20 people in Tariat with instructions to conduct intelligence, observe lamas, agitate, and arrest counterrevolutionaries [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 38-39].
On April 23, the Givapil and Galindev detachments grouped up 13 km from Rashantyn-khure. They split into two groups to take the two points that the rebels had occupied that day. After a three-hour battle, the Reds occupied the monastery. They did not have any dead or wounded, the rebels killed 2 people, several were wounded. The Reds arrested 60 arats, 150 lamas, captured 38 kremnevok and berdan, and about 100 horses. About 300 rebels fled. Most of the rebels were Arats, former monks, a small percentage of lamas, members of the MPRP and the Revolutionary Youth League [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 18, 52]. According to another report, more than 200 of the 700 insurgents were captured [ibid., p. 52]. According to third sources, approx. 20 rebels out of 600, 204 were captured [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 38-39].
According to the memoirs of G. Erendo, the soldiers tried to drive the rebels out of the monastery for several days. This was achieved after shelling and hand-to-hand combat. The monastery, where there were women and children, caught fire [Lomakina, 1975, p. 94]. Later, the head of the Provisional Defense Council, D. Ulziibat, justified the fires by saying that the Reds did not set fire to or destroy monasteries, but "there were cases of fire" from cannon fire and throwing grenades [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 186-191].
After the capture of Rashant, Lhumbe did not organize a pursuit for 2-3 days. The insurgents began to create new centers of resistance [Batsaikhan, 2007, p. 261]. By April 17-26, 1932, the uprising covered the monasteries of Pandit-gegen (Rashant), Golstekhiyd (Hyalgant), Bayan-gol, Asgat, Bugsa, Jalkhantzi, Ariga, Tsagan-Bulan. After the liquidation of the uprising in the monasteries of Pandit-gegen and Asgat, the main points were Bugsiin-khure (400 rebels) and Jalkhantsa-khure (up to 500 people) [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 26]. In total, more than 2 thousand people participated in the uprising in the monasteries of Rashant, Asgat, Bugs, Jalkhantsi and Tesa [ibid., p. 52].
On April 25, the uprising began in Shara-Tolgoi (100 km south-east of Monda), Tsagan-Buren (50 km south-east of Khatgal), Ara-khure (60 km south-east of Khat-
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gala), Darkhad-khure and Yeronhiin-Ahambu (80 versts south-east of Monda). In Darkhad, the rebels created two detachments: one they wanted to send to Khatgal, the other to Khankh. A detachment of 100 men advanced on Khatgal and on April 25 was 50 versts away from it. They were joined by 100 unarmed lamas [ibid., l. 1].
On April 26, Lhumbe, Givanil and Gombo units joined forces and attacked Asgatyn Khure on April 27. Of the 200 insurgents, some were killed, wounded, captured, and some left [ibid., l. 52]. The Reds had no losses. On April 29, 140 Givapil soldiers, local militia members and activists surrounded 400 insurgents at the Buxiin Khure monastery and engaged in battle. He marched for 7 hours, then the Reds took the monastery. The rebels lost 12 killed, 150 prisoners, no one knows how many wounded, 150 escaped. Red losses-2 wounded [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 43].
G. Erendo recalled: "The rebels were driven along the Selenga, the order was not to kill, but to go over to the side of the republic <...> They waited for 4 days, they hit them with machine guns on the 5th. About 200 women and children came, pinned them to the rock and over their heads gave a queue. They rushed to Selenga on horseback, but almost all drowned." In Their-Dulan, the Reds defeated about 500 rebels using armored cars. "The llamas are swarming, banging on the armor, shouting." They captured the armored cars, but the artillery battery that arrived in time solved the problem [Lomakina, 1975, p. 95; Lomakina, 2006, p. 174-175].
According to a report to the special department of the GVO dated May 10, 1932, on May 1, the rebels occupied Duuregch-wangiin-khure. The Somon administration did not resist, a detachment of 40 armed men fled before their arrival [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 185, tal 161-162].
Reinforcements were moving toward the Reds. On May 1, the detachment arrived in Somon Saikhan, in the evening - in the collective farm Jargalant. On May 2, the detachment arrived in Somon Bayan-Akhcha, then in Arshantul. Here they met a local red squad of 35 men with a machine gun. It turned out that more than 40 people were killed here on April 12 during a successful rebel raid. On May 3, information was received about the occupation of Somon Tsetserleg by the rebels. This rebel detachment of 100-150 people was led by taiji (nobles) of Baljinim and Shajbadrah [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 55].
On May 4, the government detachment was divided into two parts: one went to Somon Tsetserleg, the other to Selenga to connect with Lhumbe and Givapil. In the evening, the detachment crossed the Selenga River, then came to Muren. There was already a detachment of 235 red volunteers, armed with 70 berdans, 70 flintlocks, and wooden pikes. On May 5, the detachment went to join up with Givapil. They joined forces 35 km north of Muren to attack the monasteries of Jalkhangzi, Duuregch-wan and Bugs, where, according to information, there were up to 2,000 rebels [ibid., p. 55].
On May 6 or 7 [ibid., l. 52] Gombo's detachment engaged 500-600 insurgents and captured Jalkhantsa-khure. The rebels ' losses were 30 killed and 37 captured, while the Reds had no losses. 130 rebels fled towards Duuregch-van, where there were still 400 of their associates [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 185, tal 161-162]. On May 8, there was a fierce battle at Duuregch-wangiin-khure with 700 or 900 rebels. The latter made 5-7 attacks, moving in a solid mass, despite machine-gun fire, converging with the Reds at 50 paces. More than 100 insurgents were killed in the battle, many were seriously wounded, and 150 laymen and 200 monks were captured. The Reds shot 12 leaders of the rebels, the rest were released or imprisoned for different periods [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 52, 55].
Due to the fact that there were not enough forces to suppress the uprising, a second commission was sent from the center, headed by Dendev, chairman of the audit commission of the MPRP Central Committee. He arrived on May 5. The two commissions were united in Khatgala. The detachment of D. Nyasaldag was divided into 2-3 units and guarded the Somon centers (Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 46-47).
Under the pressure of the Reds, some of the rebels left for the Archangai and Dzabkhan aimags. According to the decision of Lhumbe, the leadership of Shanghai from its 14th cavalry detachment, some units and employees organized two detachments. One was sent to Hubsugul-
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one aimag, the other was left for the protection of the Tariat. On May 5, the GVO received a report from the Tariat that a detachment of Gonchigdorj, Namjan and Sambu that day joined the battle at Aryn-khure with 1050 rebels, of whom 17 were killed, 42 captured, and the rest fled. They were commanded by Dugarzhav [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 48-49].
At the beginning of May, near Shumultain Khure, D. Damdinsuren's insurgents killed an employee of the GVO Ts. Donrov and Soviet security officer V. E. Koloss, who were driving behind a 40-man detachment from Uliassutai and were ambushed [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 49; Luvsan-Ochir, 2003]. On May 7, Gonchigdorj and Namjan's unit encountered a large Damdinsuren unit (about 1,000 men) and suffered heavy losses. On May 9, Damdinsuren occupied Tariatyn-khure. There he created his own center (Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 48-50).
On May 9, 1932, the State Defense Council of the MNR declared a state of emergency in Khubsugul and Archangay. The Military Council of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MNRA) was instructed to eliminate the movement as soon as possible. For this purpose, a temporary defense council was created in both aimags, consisting of a member of the military Council of the MPRA and the military department of the MPRP. Ulziibat, secretary of the Arkhangelsk aimag Committee of the MPRP of Gonchigdorj, head of the administration of this aimag of Dambarinchin, commander of the 10th division of Gombosuren, its commissar Gombozhav, Soviet military school instructor T. V. Yushkevich, head of the GVO department in Arkhangelsk Galindev. Forces were allocated from the garrisons of Tsetserleg and Uliassutai [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 174, tal 179]. On May 13, the 27th plenum of the MPRP Central Committee secretariat approved this resolution [ibid., tal 178; Luvsan-Ochir, 2003].
MNRA soldiers formed 4 detachments, which were sent from Ulaanbaatar to Khubsugul and Archangay on May 10-29. They came under the command of Ulziibat. They included cadets of the Ulaanbaatar Military School, soldiers of the 1st cavalry Division and the signal regiment, artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft. The 16th Ubsunur Rifle Regiment, the Kobdos cavalry Regiment, the 8th Dzabkhan and the 17th Archangai regiments numbering up to 1,300 men were sent [Ganbold, 2002, pp. 45-46].
A counter-revolutionary movement was also taking place in the Altai Aimag. In the southern part of the South Gobi aimag, it was eliminated. There, the Minister of Trade and Industry G. Sodnom gathered a red detachment of 70-80 people and arrived in Archangay. With him were S. Galindev from the HVO, L. Ayushzhav, school teacher D. Dash, Sambu, Soviet doctor S. M. Nemoy [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-4], chief instructor of the OGPU in the MPR V. S. Kiyakovsky. His horses were recaptured by the rebels, and the car had to be left at the ferry. On May 13, the Reds attacked the rebels on foot from the south-east of Tariatyn-khure. Sodnom and more than 20 others were captured [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 48-49]. The Reds abandoned 3 machine guns, about 18 people went over to the rebels during the battle, the rest fled [Luvsan-Ochir, 2003]. Sodnom, Nemoy, Kiyakovsky and Isakov were killed (on different days).
On May 17, Ulziibat's detachment headed for Tariatyn-khure. His report to the Military Council on the actions of 71 days in May-June against 11 detachments of 2,420 insurgents has been preserved [Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, p. 110]. Ulziibat suppressed the uprising in the somons of Tariat, Khangai, Ikh-ula, Ikh-Jargalant, Ider and Bayan Dzurkh. Events unfolded like this.
Leaving 200 lamas to guard the monastery, Damdinsuren with the main force (about 600 people) left Tariat on May 18. May 19 in the Gua Mountains in the Gichganyin-gol area ("Hezhegerzhin-gol") 60-70 km south of Tariatyn-khure there was a battle between Damdinsuren and Ulziibat. In battle, the Reds were supported by aircraft, cannons, armored vehicles ("tankette"), and machine guns [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 53; Luvsan-Ochir et al., 2003; Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, p. 338-341]. The reconnaissance plane found two large groups of insurgents ready to attack from different directions. The pilots dropped shrapnel bombs, then supported the motorized infantry attack with machine-gun fire [Kotelnikov, 2012]. Killed approx. 70 insurgents, 74 captured, 1 Shosh machine gun, 2 berdans, 23 flintlock rifles, 80 horses, 1 banner, camels, etc. were captured. The Reds crossed the Gichganiin-gol river
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("Khizhigyn") on Tariat. On the river they found 6 boxes of Japanese rifle cartridges and 560 pieces of Russian ones [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 186-191; Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 53; Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, p. 338-341].
In addition to the battle of Gichganyin Gol, there were several other cases of aerial bombing, for example, at a monastery where rebel commanders were stationed. But their effectiveness was low. The planes mainly conducted reconnaissance, scattered leaflets, and provided communications [Kotelnikov, 2012].
After the battle, Ulziibat allocated 2 saber platoons for the pursuit. They captured the wounded rebel commander Sanjzhav, his assistant Dagva, a member of the Small Khural Darsuren and 30 lamas, weapons and ammunition [Tserenbaljir, 1990, p.53; Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, p. 338-341].
The second battle took place on the Khunzhil river ("Khugzhilyn-Ekhi locality"), in the Ikh-Jargalant somon of the Archangay aimag of that time. 40 insurgents were killed, including the commander Dendev ("Dondyp"), 15 were captured, 10 left with Damdinsuren. The Reds captured 2 Degtyarev machine guns, 5 disks with cartridges, 2 Mauser guns, 3 rifles, etc. One red was wounded [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 186-191]. The third fight took place on the river Terhiin gol. 30 insurgents were killed and 39 captured. The Reds killed 1 MPRP activist [ibid.]. The fourth battle was at Khunzhil-hiid in the area of Dod-Tsetsuh ("Lower Tsitsuhei"). The detachments of Damdinsuren in 462 and Prince Dalai-wan about 100 people participated. More than 100 rebels were killed. The Reds killed 1. A group of about 500 people in Duuregch-wangiin-khure dispersed [ibid.]. The fifth battle took place in the area of Bor-Burgas ("Bogo-Burgastay"), somon Bayan-Dzurkh, Archangay. 50 insurgents were killed, and another 50 were captured, including the "green cap" (Mong. nogoon malgayt) Дамдинсурэн, Дархан-хубилган, жанжин Ринцэн. None of the rebels left [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 186-191; Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, p. 338 - 341]. Later, Ulziibat shot Damdinsuren, as he was wounded, walked with difficulty and interfered with further work [Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, p. 314].
The sixth fight took place in the Zhanzhugin-Ekhin area. 70 insurgents were killed, 5 were captured, and 1 red cadet was wounded. The seventh battle in the Bolagan-Hirundai-Ehin area was fought with separate groups. 20 insurgents were killed, 1 Degtyarev machine gun, 2 disks, 1 berdan, 5 flints were captured. Two groups of rebels fled. During the eighth battle in Tosontsengel-Muren, 40 insurgents were killed, 15 were captured, and 1 gegen and 1 commander were killed. Captured 2 Mauser guns and 3 rifles. The number of insurgents killed in the ninth battle in the area of Tsetsuh ("Tsitsuhei") is not established, the "gang" of 250 people was defeated and fled. In the tenth battle in the area of Khonkhiryn-Nuru, 30 rebels were killed and 6 were captured. The eleventh battle in the Shara-Saboktay area claimed the lives of 40 rebels, 23 were taken prisoner. 3 reds were wounded. 4 insurgents were killed in a shootout with a "gang" of 30 people (the twelfth battle in the area of Khonkhiryn-Ekhin). In the thirteenth battle in the area of Zuun-nur, about 90 were killed, 20 rebels were captured. 4 reds from the Revolutionary Committee and 3 cadets of the OVU were killed. The fourteenth battle took place on the northern shore of Lake Baikal. Sangiin-Dalai with a detachment of 300 people under the command of Tugzh and Zhamts. Of these, about 100 escaped, the number of those killed has not been established. The Reds killed 1 [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 186-191].
By May 11, the uprising had spread to the Dzabkhan and Archangay aimags. Small detachments of Reds were sent to the monasteries of Idar-Khambyn-khure, Samgaldai, and Khojulai, but they could not defeat the counter-revolutionaries. The rebels took a number of somon departments, and the aimach center became their target. Of the 21 somons of the Dzabkhan aimag, the uprising took place in 9 in the north-western part. In the south, in the somon of Shilustei, the accountant Galag created a detachment of 138 people [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 184, tal 40-46].
In May, an uprising began in the Uverkhangai aimag. Around May 10, employees were arrested in the Gurvan-Bulag somon and the kolkhoz office was seized. On May 18, 300 people from Baidragiin-khure, armed with flintlocks, entered the Zag somon center (now Bayankhongor aimag), destroyed party and Komsomol organizations, urtons, robbed the collective farm, and sent the Arats and workers who met to their center. The uprising spread to the west of the aimag: somons of Mandal, Zag, Gurvan-Bulag, Khure-Maral, Tsagan-gol and Bayan-Bulag (now in Bayankhongor) [Tserenbaljir, 1990, pp. 55-56, 64]. A detachment of G. Sodnom and Soviet chekist K. Batorun was sent there from the center for liqui-
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a group of 500 people who proclaimed 2-3 khubilgans: five-, ten-year-old boys. When this detachment broke up the group in Uverhangai, the commander of the armored regiment Jamyanzhav went there to finally eliminate the uprising. Since the rebels destroyed the telegraph service, it was supported by an airplane. A detachment of Malzh and the Soviet instructor Sergeev was singled out [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-4].
In other aimags, the uprising continued. On June 10-11, the Reds captured Ulastain Khure in the Jargalant Somon. The rebels lost 65 people killed, 30 fled. Red losses - 1 killed, 8 wounded. On June 13, 700 insurgents gathered in the somons of Ih-ula, Tsehar, and Solongo, and there were 100 more nearby. Their numbers grew, and the people treated them well. In the first half of June, a number of battles took place in the Khubsugul aimag [MUUTA, f. 4, d.4, kh. n. 185, tal 180-191]. The uprising was suppressed by June 24, but some of the rebels hid in the mountains. On June 29, a detachment of G. Sodnom was sent to eliminate a group of 100 people led by Zhime in Tosontsengel somon. In July, 160 rebels of this somon surrendered [Tserenbaljir, 1990, p. 64].
The uprising spread to the Darbat aimag. In the border somons of Under-Khangai and Dzun-Khangai, about 200 feudal lords and" kulaks " began to rob cooperatives.
At the beginning of June, there were two battles, out of 200 insurgents, 7 leaders and 8 cavalrymen were killed, and 15 cavalrymen from the GVO detachment were killed [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 58]. According to the report of the MNRA commander G. Damid of June 6, there were 250 rebels. Under pressure from a detachment of the 4th Kobdos Regiment, they moved to Tanna-Tuva, but the detachment pursued them and defeated them, and then began to operate at Uliassutai [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-4].
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) closely followed the course of the uprising, (see: [Stalin and Kaganovich, 2001, pp. 136-137, 143-144, 156-158]), and on May 16, 1932, discussed the Mongolian question. It was pointed out that the main mistake of the MNR leadership was blindly copying the policy of the Soviet government; the MNR is a "people's revolutionary democratic bourgeois republic". This lack of understanding is the main reason for the growing uprising. It is necessary to eliminate this mistake, as well as to defeat the rebels [RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 884, l. 3]. In this spirit, the joint resolution of the ECCI and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of May 29, which was sent to the Central Committee of the MPRP, was maintained [ibid., op.162, d. 12, l. 167-170]. The Politburo ordered a number of departments to change the methods of trade with Mongolia in order to improve supply [ibid., d. 886, l. 13]. The 3rd extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the MPRP on June 29-30 and the 17th extraordinary session of the Small Khural of the MPRP on July 2 adopted decisions according to these instructions. The "left bias" was replaced by the "new course" [ibid., op. 152, d. 140, l. 36-46]. This eased the situation of the people, eased the persecution of religion, and made an important contribution to ending the uprising.
By July-August 1932, the uprising was largely suppressed. But the insurgents joined their ranks and resumed fighting [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 64].
On July 9, the red detachment of Malzha (Commissar Galdan, instructor Sergeev) defeated the rebels in the Zo-nuru Mountains north of Asgatyn-khure. On July 30, they were seen in the Asgat Mountains. The terrain there is difficult to reach, and there were not enough forces to encircle [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 185, tal 84].
On July 26, more than 100 insurgents under the command of D. Sumyaa gathered in the Khojul (Kozhulat) area of the Narangay somon. They had 20 rapid-fire rifles and many flintlocks. On July 22, 30 people attacked Somon Tosontsengal, killed 2 employees, and the rest fled. On July 22, Somon Chandman's unit was attacked by 20 insurgents, 8 of them were killed, 4 were captured. More than 1,000 counter-revolutionaries led by Damdinbishrelt and T. Samdan gathered in the north of Sangiin Dalai. Another detachment - more than 100 rebels - began to mobilize the Arats. They were going to occupy the somons of Idar, Bayan-Dzurkh, and theirs-Jargalant. Employees of the Idr fled to Tariat, Bayan-Dzurkha-to Muren. In Khubsugul, 500 insurgents gathered in the localities of Khukh-Sav and Tsagan-Burgas, and in Bugsiyn-khure - it is not known how many. Local employees fled [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 185, tal 184-185].
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On August 4, Namzhan reported: there are counter-revolutionaries in 7 somons, where there are no soldiers, they are mobilizing Arats, killing employees. Their number in the Ehi-ula Somon is 150, Bayan - Dzurkh, Sangiin-Dalai and Idar-100 each, Jargalant - 300. On July 1, they took the Ehi-ula center, killed 10 employees, in Chandmani - 10, in Tosontsengel-3. Detachments of employees handed over their weapons, and counter-revolutionaries armed themselves with them [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 185, tal 186-187].
By August 7, 1932, the Reds had suppressed the uprising in the somons of Buren-Togtoh and Tumur-Bulag, but the counter-revolutionaries remained there because the people were on their side. At the beginning of July, 200 insurgents were fighting in Hohhav for two days, and the Reds retreated to Muren. There are 300 insurgents gathered in these two somons, they have 100 berdans, rifles, and a lot of ammunition. There were their leaders from 4 aimags: Zhamts, Sambu, Zhagal-gegen, Zhav, Tugzh. On August 3, the rebels entered Burenkhan and attacked the soldiers on guard. The fighting lasted for three days. There was information that 300 insurgents gathered in the area of Hunkhurbai somon Mun-Tsagan-ula, their commander's name was Tavi. Two red detachments left without finishing off the counter-revolutionaries, the GVO was recalled to Ulaanbaatar, there was no agitation among the people. At the disposal of the commission were the Dendava detachment in Muren-36 people with 2 machine guns, each with a rifle; the Tserendorzh detachment in the center of the thermal power plant-40 people with rifles, 2 machine guns, 20 more red partisans; the security detachment in the center of Burenkhan and partisans in the Shuya area-50 people, 30 rifles, 20 berdan; in somon Rashant center-50 partisans, 20 rifles, 20 berdan; in Khubsugul somon-25 partisans, 20 rifles, 2 machine guns [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 195, tal 10-13].
On August 26, the rebels captured guards and watchmen in the Idar-Tsetserleg somon, and killed the commissar of the 8th regiment in the Telman Somon. On August 29, about 200 people looted and started a fire in the center of Ulagchin somon. August 30 approx. 300 rebels surrounded the center of Somon Numrag. Detachments of darbats2 and a detachment from Kobdo were sent against them, and a detachment of Tsendae was sent from the center to Numrag and Ulagchin [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 65-67].
Since September 1, the GVO has formed a new unit in Tsetserleg, the center of Archangel. It was headed by the head of the 17th regiment Zundui. In Their-ula, the rebels led by Sh. Zhurom and V. Magnay killed 10 people. A 130-man Vanchig detachment with 6 machine guns was sent against them. A detachment from the special regiment of the GVO led by Tserendorzh with 2 machine guns was sent to Muren. A detachment of GVO with Murdeleg was sent to guard the Selenga crossing. From the main military school of Ulaanbaatar, 200 people were sent under the command of Choymbol with 11 machine guns. Their goal was to destroy the Hubsugul rebels. To Taesin-khure, where there were 200 insurgents, a special regiment of the GVO was sent under the command of S. Dandev with 2 machine guns. About 50 rebels led by Shagdar and Damba were located in Dordogiin Khure, 120 km south-west of Khatgal (Tserenbaljir, 1990, pp. 66-67). Together with Dandev, the Soviet instructor Grossman and other reinforcement detachments were sent [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-4].
In early September 1932, Sambu-duvchin and Zhamc occupied the Erdene-Bulgan somon, the Selenga river crossing near Rashantyn-khure. Six groups were reported to have moved: 250 people led by Ayuurzana, 130 km east of Tsetserleg, to Khan-ula somon of Erdene Mandalay. It was joined by 50 local residents. In Archangai and Dzabkhan there were rebels from the villages of Sumyaa and Magnaya, and in their Somon-ula-Sh. Zhura. 130 soldiers of D. Vanchig with 8 machine guns were sent to pursue Zhur and Magny. In the Taesin-hure monastery, a squad of Dandew was defending itself. On August 20, they had a battle with the rebels, destroyed 30 of them, wounded 30 more, and lost 1 killed and 2 wounded [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 67-68]. Some detachments formed from Khatgal activists refused to fight and left.
On September 5 and 6, Zundui had two battles with counter-revolutionaries, losing a man. The Ayuurzana and Bassana rebels escaped, 10 of them were killed, 7 of them were captured.
2 The Western Mongolian people.
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3 were shot. On September 5, Vanchig's detachment captured 10 rebel scouts near Dugan Khojul and killed one of them. On September 7, Vanchig was occupied by Dugan Khojul and pursued by a detachment of 100 insurgents under the command of Shagdar-duvchin, Tarav and Tsogo (Tserenbaljir, 1990, pp. 68-69).
In early September, in the area of Khojul, the Reds engaged in a battle with the rebels led by Magnay, Zhur, Badrakh, Sumyaa. One of the Reds was slightly wounded, and the rebel losses are unknown. Badrah, Zhur, Namzhan, Tsojin captured Them-ulu, the Reds blocked the road for them. After the battle, these rebel groups dispersed in groups of 1-2 people, some returned home and contacted the Reds. The latter captured the Dalaiwan [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 184, tal 56].
At the end of September, the Zundui detachment joined up with the Hubsugul detachment. Near the Chulut river, they tried to destroy the detachment of Ayuurzana and Zhamts. On October 11, a red partisan detachment led by Sharhu in the north of Sangiin Dalai engaged in a battle with the Zhava detachment, the latter was killed. On October 13, in the area of Hanui, the Zundui detachment had a battle with the Ayuurzana detachment. 80 rebels were killed, 14 captured, the rest escaped, 3 Reds were killed. Magnai with several leaders and Sumyaa with 3 people surrendered to Vanchig. On October 23, Sambadiv surrendered. On October 27, Zhur and Shagdar were captured. The rebels of Sambu-duvchin and Zhamts in the Khubsugul aimag laid down their weapons and dispersed, but the commanders themselves disappeared. On October 28, Choymbol's detachment captured the rebel commander Tugzha; in August - September, Tov and Zhav surrendered; Khasyg was poisoned, and his 160 men surrendered. In October, Ayuurzana and Samba-duvchin were arrested [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 69-74]. Erendo arrested T. Samdan ("Bor-gegen") [Lomakina, 1975; Lomakina, 2006].
A group of insurgents appeared in the south-in the Altai aimag. Government raids and looting were reported there even before the Hubsugul uprising (see above). According to Damid's report, on June 6, at that time, 4 more "gangs" crossed the border in Altai [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-4]. On September 27, a detachment of 81 people took control of the Tsogt somon, burned the yurt of the border post, and killed 3 Reds. On September 29, a maneuvering platoon was sent there under the command of Batmunkh and Sangav. 320 insurgents were killed in the battle, 140 horses were taken from them, 1 was killed and 2 were wounded from the Reds [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 69-70].
In September 1932, the uprising was largely liquidated. On September 22, the Presidium of the Small Khural announced this. Special provisions were lifted in the Khubsugul, Archangai, Dzabkhan and Uverhangai aimags. At the end of October, the detachments were withdrawn from there [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 79]. In October and November, the uprising was finally suppressed. On November 16, the 35th plenum of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the MPRP issued a resolution on the elimination of counter-revolutionaries and stopping military operations [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 167, tal 199].
GOVERNMENT BODIES AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REBELS
Sambu-duvchin and his supporters in Rashant Somon organized their own authority-the Ochirbat Ministry, or War Ministry. In their documents, the rebels referred to it as the " Ochirbat Ministry that elevates faith and brings happiness to living beings "(Mong. "Шашныг мандуулах амьтныг жаргуулагч Очирбатын яам") [Batsaikhan, 2007, p. 260; Gadaadaas turkhirsai..., 2013, p. 118]. Thus, they added the official title of the last great khan of Mongolia - Bogdo-gegen VIII-to the name of the ministry.
The ministry included S. Buryat (chairman), Dandar, feudal lord Jamsran, S. Nyama, Taiji Dondogdorj, Ch. Sambu-duvchin (Commander-in-chief). They were followed by Gongor, Sosoryn Gombozhav, Tserendash, and B. Zhamsrandorj (Tserenbaljir, 1990, p. 87; Gadaadaas turkhirsai..., 2013, p. 118). According to other sources, it was headed by Jamsran, military affairs were managed by Taiji Damdinsuren, secretary-Jamsrandorj. In addition to them, S. Buryat from somon Tsetserleg and Erendendev from the Rashantyn-khure monastery were in the leadership. Higher School
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The power belonged to lamas Sambu-duvchin and Sansrai-gabju (Batsaikhan, 2007, p. 260). As the Soviet instructor Grossman noted in his report, under the leadership of the Ochirbat ministry there was a military commissar, an adviser, commanders of 100 soldiers, commanders of 50 soldiers, commanders of 20 soldiers, militia, posts, an armory, a mobilization circle, an agitprop circle, an intelligence circle, an armory workshop," organizations for robbing Arat cattle " [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 47].
The ministry acquired a seal, a guardian deity, and a banner that read: "The Yellow Warriors are led by Hutukhts, Khubilgans, who are representatives of the Panchen Lama." The Ministry issued decrees signed by the Chairman and the Commander-in-Chief. There were lists of people, an inventory of weapons, preserved letters, etc., there were flogging tools [Batsaikhan, 2007, p. 259; Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, p. 119; RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d.140, l. 18].
The Ministry expanded the area of the uprising after it began, sending detachments of 10-20 people to the somons of Khubsugul. As a result, there were rumors that the uprising began in several localities at once [Batsaykhan, 2007, p.259]. Rashantyn-khure became the center of the movement [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 18].
The rebels called themselves "warriors of the Yellow Faith", or " yellow warriors of religion "(Mong. "shashny shar tsereg") - Buddhism of the Galug school. Some detachments were called "soldiers of the Panchen Lama" (Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, p. 199). Squad leaders were called commanders, or warlords (Mong. zhanzhin). They had different ranks. For example, Purevtsaran and Sadbazar were colonels (Mong. huranda) from higher zhanzhins. Large detachments were organized in groups of 100, 50, and 10 people with individual commanders (MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116; Luvsan-Ochir, 2003). The detachments had banners and insignia. For example, on the banner of one detachment was depicted Burhan Lhamo [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116]. During the battle with Sodom, the "yellow warriors" had one yellow and two white banners, wore a white cloth on their left shoulder as a distinctive sign, and in other cases - special scarves around their necks (Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 50).
After the defeats, Ochirbat's ministry lost its former levers of power. Givapil wrote that a "religious ministry" or "religious party" (Mong. "shashny yaam", "shashny nam") was established in Duuregch-wangiin-khure, while the detachments at the monasteries of Hyalgant, Hashat, Bugsi and Jalkhantsi were called the "Ochirbat military committee", "yellow Panchen soldiers 'detachments".lamas" [Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, p. 122].
According to the testimony at the trial of Jamsrandorj, Sambu-duvchin was the head of the Ochirbat Ministry, and S. Buryat was the first minister. Recently, Sambu-duvchin was thinking of creating his own ministry in the Tombu area, he wanted to entrust the main work to Zhamtsu, and make the rest of them advisers. He wanted to include Lovon Shagdar and other lamas in the ministry. According to Prosecutor Yadamsuren, interrogations confirm that Sambu-duvchin was in charge of the headquarters and all organizational work; there was a split among the rebel leadership, so Sambu-Duvchin wanted to organize a separate ministry, and the Buryats decided to put Ochirbat as the head of the ministry; this secret organization had a center. Их жанжины - Тугж, Аюурзана, Магнай, Сумъяа, Самбудив, Тумэнбаяр, Норовсамбу, Бадрах, Тарав, Санжмятав, Ба-дамжав, Дарма, Пурэвцэрэн, Тугулдэр, Сэдбазар, Шагдар [МУYТА, ф. 4, д. 4, х.н. 301, тал 51-116]. Having occupied Tariatyn-khure in Archangay on May 9, D. Damdinsuren established his headquarters there.
The prosecutor stated at the trial: it was established that there were two headquarters. The first one is Sambu-duvchin, Zhamts, Ayuurzana. There were 4 senior and 4 junior zhanzhin (Mong. ih-zhanzhin, baga-zhanzhin) with their groups, they separated from the Ministry of Ochirbat. The Buryat did not confess, but he re-established the Ochirbat ministry, was the prime minister there, and planned to work in the Archangai and Khubsugul aimags. Military affairs there
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The "green - capped" Damdinsuren was in charge, and the "Bor-gegen" Samdan was in charge of political affairs. The zhanzhins of Tugj, Badrah, Magnay, and Sumyaa were subordinate to Damdinsuren. Each of them had its own departments [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116].
The goal of the rebels was to overthrow the revolutionary government. The ministry's slogans are to liquidate the people's government and bring the Panchen Lama to the MNR [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 18]. Sambu-duvchin pointed out these goals during the interrogation. According to his testimony, another headquarters, headed by Buryat and Damdinsuren, wanted to organize the power of the old noyons and officials. Buryat showed that their goal was to organize the monarchy, get help and weapons from Japan. According to the prosecutor, the Buryats also wanted to restore the old khoshun of the Dalai Van [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116; Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 86]. The latter was succeeded for a short time: a khoshun administration was created headed by the adopted son of the former Prince Dalai-wan, Zhigzhidsuren, and Taiji Udaizhav became his assistant (tuslagch) [TSAFSB, f. 65, d.700, l. 186-191].
Among the rebels, the highest positions were held by feudal lords, lamas and officials. Some were children of Arats, for example, hambo-gegen Ochirzhantsan [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116]. But there were also Arats and former civil servants, including members of the Small Khural in Uverkhangai, Uliassutai and Tariat: Zhamc, Sodnom, etc. [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-4]. A woman named Darsuren, a member of the Maly Khural, was one of Zhanzhin Sanzhzhav's assistants (Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 53). Purevzhav-secretary of the Zag somon [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 55]. B. Zhamsrandorzh-head of the Khyalgant cooperative, Sanjid-chairman of the collective farm, C. Zhamts, Dugerzhav, Sadbazar-military [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 32, 49, 87]. D. Damdinsuren-former lama, then chairman of the cooperative [TSAFSB, f 65, d. 700, l. 186-191]. B. Tugzh, B. Ayuurzana, D. Sumyaa (Samyaa), E. Ta-rav-araty [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116, kh. n. 184, tal 4016; Tserenbaljir, 1990, pp. 87-88]. Sh. Zhur-okhotnik [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116]. T. Samdan ("Bor-gegen", "Dogshin-Noyon-hutukhta") - a salesman in the somon Ar-Bulag store (memoirs of G. Erendo - in the book: [Lomakina, 1975, p. 98]).
The rank-and-file "yellow warriors" were mostly Arats. "The insurgent movement is a mass Aratian movement, organized and led by the feudal part of the upper nobility and secular feudal lords. < ... > In terms of number, the bulk of the rebels consists of poor and middle peasants." There were very few "kulaks" among the insurgents [TSAFSB, f. 65, d.700, l. 84-102]. "The rebel detachments consist mainly of arat, a significant part of the lamas who passed into the black state (in the world - S. K., J. O.) this year. A large percentage of employees of the Montsenkopa network and somon organizations." Collective farmers and poor Arats mobilized by the insurgents quickly became their active supporters [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 26]. Among more than 2 thousand By June 1932, 60% of the insurgents killed were Arats [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 150]. At this time, about 90% of local members of the MPRP and the Revolutionary Youth League and about 95% of collective farms took part in the uprising [ibid., p. 63].
The main method of the insurgents was agitation [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 84-102]. Their propaganda materials and songs have been preserved [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 185, tal 50-52, 213-214; Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, pp. 479-480]. The main directions are as follows: stop the destruction of religion; restore religion and the old order; the MPR will come (or has already come) The Panchen Lama with his soldiers; the uprising is a Shambhala war that is predicted and will end in victory.
Here are some slogans. "Long live the God-raising Lama and our warriors who raise the image of religion and hold the yellow banner." "We will destroy to the ground the savage people and demons who hold this people's power." "The banner of the yellow warrior who exalts the Yellow Faith will be sprinkled with the blood of a member of the revolutionary party and government." "From this day forward, we will destroy every single one of these brutes." "Long live the theocratic power that our yellow warriors organize" [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 184, tal 13-21].
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However, not all revolutionaries should be killed, but only activists who deliberately destroyed Mongolian traditionalism. This can be seen, for example, in the proclamation of Lama Sambu, who campaigned on behalf of the Ochirbat Ministry. Here is its content.
During the 11 years of Arat power, it did nothing for the benefit of religion, but came close to destroying it; it catches hutukhts, khubilgans, lamas, noyons, kills them and confiscates their property. The Arats are deceived: under the name of collective farms, half or a third of the Arats ' property is confiscated, and they are also taxed. They confiscate jass 3, waste and destroy them; they steal and sell monastic property; they close monasteries; there are many cases of beatings, reprisals, arrests, exterminations. Red Russia, under the guise of protecting Mongolia, completely took over its cattle, which goes to the needs of the army, refuses to import goods, which caused a shortage of them. Men are taken into the army, and when they return, they will be used to establish communes and transition to communism, and Noyons, taijis, and lamas will be completely destroyed. The establishment of order, tranquility, and the liberation of religion are inspired from Above. The time has come to destroy the enemy of religion. Those who do not believe in this will die from the weapons of Shambhala. We must immediately go over to the side of the Shambhala army. When capturing and exterminating revolutionaries, we must join the "yellow warriors" in Asato-khure (=Asgatyn-khure). "Members of the party and the Revolutionary Youth League, those who hold high and low positions, but who still have a connection with religion and want to serve and strive for us from the bottom of their hearts, should not be afraid of being killed and tortured, but on the contrary they will be received with cordiality. We don't kill everyone. We kill and exterminate only the enemies of religion who deserve it" [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 49-51].
The rebels claimed that they were connected with the Panchen Lama, believed in his coming (for example, the testimony of Sambu-duvchin, Samdan, Magnaya), that this uprising was the Shambhala War (the testimony of Ayuurzana, Magnaya) [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 196, tal 79-81; f. 4, D. 4, ch. n. 301, tal 51-116]. The rebels spread rumors that Panchen Bogdo had already taken Ulaanbaatar, that his soldiers had come [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 18; MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 184, tal 40-46, kh. n. 185, tal 180-191].
One of the tasks was to identify khubilgans [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 184, tal 40-46], which was prohibited by the MPRP. The rebels declared some of their leaders khubilgans-in violation of the identification procedure adopted in Buddhism. For example, among them in the Tariat monastery there were 2 lamas, one of whom they called Zaya-pandita-gegen, the other-Bogdo-Dambijantsan, i.e. Ja-lama [Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, p. 108]. T. Samdan showed that he took the title of Dogshiin-Noyon-hutukhta and campaigned under the title of "Dogshiin-Noyon-hutukhta". Later it was called Bor-gegen (MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, ch. n. 301, tal 51-116; Tserenbalzhir, 1992, pp. 91-92).
Images of famous counter-revolutionaries, including those who died, were also used. There was a rumor that the Tibetan Khubilgan Eregdelburelgu, Zaya-gegen (shot by the Reds) and Dilova-hutukhta (went abroad) were going with the soldiers, these are such wise Hutukhts that bullets do not take them [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 56-57]. It was said that two men with beards, the teacher Dambijantsan and zhanzhin Baron (i.e. R. F. Ungern), went to improve their power, they put a lot of Chinese and Japanese soldiers behind them [Tserenbaljir, 1990, p.12-13]. There were rumors that Yeguzer-khutukhta and Dambidzhantsan (both killed by the Reds) with soldiers were going to take Javkhlant (Uliassutai), seize cattle [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 184, tal 406].
It should be noted that rumors about the arrival of Ungern (shot by the Reds in 1921) were spread earlier. In 1929, the OGPU received a report that " according to documentary information, Baron Ungern's letters are being distributed in the MPR. In the latter, Ungern's double reports that another person was shot in his place, but he escaped and is in Tibet, where he received the blessing of the Dalai Lama and begins the work of uniting Buddhists " [TSAFSB, f. 2, op. 10, d. 531, l. 103].
Some prophecies were also used for agitation. The authenticity of some of them has not been established, others were forgeries, and still others represented old prophecies interpreted to represent the uprisings of the 1930s as long predicted. For this
3 Llama property reserves.
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The book "Zhalkhanzin sumbum" (Tserenbaljir, 1990, p. 12-13) and the Mongolian translation of "Prayers for Rebirth in Shambhala" based on the text of Panchen Lama VI (1738-1780) were used [TSAFSB, f. 2, op. 10, d. 531, l. 127-127ob., f. 2, op. 8, d. 378, l. 324-324ob.], and, apparently, the "treaty of 1889 on Mount Wutai-Shan" in China, which is now time to be fulfilled [Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, pp. 202-208, 214; Purevbat, 2009, pp. 136-141].
COMPOSITION, FORCES AND COMBAT LOSSES OF THE PARTIES
According to reports, more than 2000 people participated in the uprising in the monasteries of Rashant, Asgat, Bugsa, Jalkhantsi and Taes [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 52]. But Damid, in his report on June 6, indicated only about 1,000 people [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-4]. As of July 1932, however, there were up to 13 detachments totaling more than 3,000 men. The most powerful units were Dorjpalam, "Dobon" (lovon) Shagdara, "khalzana" (bald) Samdan and Zhamsrandorzha in 150, Erendendeva - 300, "choizhina" of Buryats, Tsagan-galun, Zhigzhid Tobu, Damdinbishrelya, "Bor-gegena" - 500 people, connections of zhanzhins of Ayuurzany, Tugzha, Zhur, Darin, Badarkho (Badrah), Badmazhava, Tumenbayar, Torva (Tarav), Sambutiba (Sambadiv), Sumyaa, Magnaya, etc. [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 82-82ob.]. According to other sources, the total number of rebels was 5 thousand people [Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, p. 109].
In Rashantyn-khure in April, there were 700-800 insurgents, by the time of the fighting - 700-800 [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 16, 18, 52]. After the defeat of Rashantyn-khure, the main centers of the uprising were in Bugsiyn-khure (400 people) and Jalkhantsa-khure (up to 500 people), in other places there were from 150 to 300 insurgents [ibid., p. 26]. By the time the Gombo detachment captured Jalkhantsa-khure, the number of insurgents there had decreased due to previous battles to 230 [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 185, tal 161-162]. Duuregch-wangiin-khure (=Tesiin-khure) was occupied by 400 rebels [ibid., tal 161-162]. In the battle there participated already approx. 700 or 900 fighters [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 52, 55]. In Asgat in April, there were 200 [ibid., l. 52] or 250 [MUUTA, f. 4, d.4, kh. n. 185, tal 84], in Darkhad - at least 300 [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 21].
In summer, in the Khubsugul aimag, the number of individual rebel detachments was 100-300, in Archangay-50-600 (the largest detachment was the Village of Damdinsuren), Uverhangay-106, Derbet-250, Altai - more than 300 people [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 184, tal 56, kh. n. 185, tal 186-187; RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 55; TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-4, 186-191; Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 53, 57-70]. After the defeat of the Reds, the rebel detachments decreased, then replenished in the summer, and by the fall the large detachments were mostly defeated.
The first red detachments were formed on the ground, and the GVO forces were also sent. These detachments were small, usually consisting of several dozen men [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 16, 55]. By the decision of the Military Council of the MNR of May 9, 1932, 4 detachments were formed from the soldiers of the Cape of the Republic of Armenia, 2 cavalry and 1 rifle regiment were sent from Kobdo, Dzabkhan and Uvsa. The total number of troops is 1,300 [Ganbold, 2002, pp. 45-46]. After the withdrawal of troops in July in Khubsugul, security detachments in the Somon centers consisted of 20-50 people [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 195, tal 10-13]. In August, in Archangai and Khubsugul, the number of red detachments was 130-200 people (Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 66-67).
In the detachments of both the Reds and the rebels, some Arats went voluntarily, some - forcibly. There was no unity among the Reds. On May 30, the entire Tsetserleg garrison of 1,195 people rose up, liquidated the government, and released 400 rebels. They were joined by posts outside the city [Stalin and Kaganovich, 2001, pp. 156-157]. Soldiers often did not want to suppress the uprising, some deserted, and there was a ferment [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l.61; TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 2-A; Ganbold, 2002, p. 49-51]. In the 8th Dzabkhan and 17th Archangai cavalry regiments of 600 and 500 men, only the commanders were military, and the privates were recruited as needed. They were kept as a reserve:
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these were local residents, many of whom supported the rebels. There were cases of hostile propaganda, disobedience, and desertion in the regiments. Several soldiers were shot [Ganbold, 2002, p. 51].
PUNITIVE MEASURES OF THE PARTIES
The rebels called for destroying the enemies of religion, but not those who were willing to cooperate with them. As a result, they were joined by many employees, members of the MPRP and the Revolutionary Youth League. However, they killed activists who zealously pursued the "left course" - some with great cruelty. Some zhanzhins (not lamas) cut out the hearts of their enemies and used torture [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116; Tserenbaljir, 1990, pp. 87-88; Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, pp. 338-341]. They attached a mystical significance to the removal of the heart. This is a gross violation of the precepts of Buddhism, although its performers claimed to be "yellow warriors".
There is no information about the use of torture by the Reds. In the first months, they carried out arrests and executions on the spot, without trial or according to the sentences of military field courts [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 185, tal 72]. They burned down several monasteries. There are reports that most of those who were imprisoned in Uliassutai prison died of starvation, and some were killed. Many were transported to the administrative centers of remote Khoshuns and Somons, where they were killed. Batsaikhan, letter to S. L. Kuzmin, 2014). According to archival data [Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, p. 111], 12-40% of those arrested were executed in various cases. On June 25, 1932, ye. A. Stulov, adviser to the Economic Council of the MPR, in a note about a trip to Archangel on June 1-10, 1932 with a government commission in Tsetserleg, reported on a number of cases of arbitrariness and lawlessness during the suppression of the uprising [TSAFSB, f. 65, d. 700, l. 87-96]. A commission was sent to restore order. On July 14, 1932, the HVO issued an order: the arrested leaders of the uprising should not be executed on the spot, but sent to the center of the HVO [Luvsan-Ochir, 2003].
One of the main decisions of the MPRP in the summer of 1932 was to work among the relatives of the rebels in order to force them to write letters so that the rebels would surrender [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 59]. On September 5, the 30th plenum of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the MPRP adopted a resolution on the confiscation of property from feudal lords who participated in the uprising, its distribution, familiarizing Arats with the reason for the confiscation and finding out their opinion about it [MUUTA, f. 4, d.4, kh. n. 167, tal 168-169].
On April 19-30, 1933, in the building of the Central Theater in Ulaanbaatar, 39 rebel leaders appeared before the court: C. Sambu, C. Zhamts, S. Buryat, B. Tugzh, B. Ayuurzana, Chimeddorj, H. Shirandev, Jamsrandorj, Vandansuren, V. Byamba, Endon, Bat Ochir, Togo, Lhajav, Aghvandorj, Buyandelgar, Ochirzhantsan, Magnai, Samyaa (Sumyaa), T. Sambadiv, Zhur, Tumenbayar, Norovsambu, Badrah, Tarva, Badamzhav, Darma, Purevtsaran, Tuguldur, Sadevbazar, Shagdar, Dolgor, Ochirbat, Ayuurzana, Dendev, Tserendamba, Tumurbaatar, Tudev, Sanjmyatav [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, pp. 80-83; Luvsan-Ochir, 2003; Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, pp. 113-114]. The main charges were rebellion against the government in favor of Japan, the defeat of Somoni, looting, torture and executions. Materials of interrogations have been preserved. The line of defense was based on the class principle and on the fact that the defendants fell under someone else's influence [MUUTA, f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116].
The court sentenced 15 people to various terms of imprisonment, 18 (the main leaders, including 8 zhanzhins) - to execution with the right of appeal, 6 were released [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 80-83; Gadaadaas turkhirsan..., 2013, p. 113-114].
conclusion
According to the Chairman of the Mongolian Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) Sh. Z. Eliava, approx. 70% of the population of the five most populated aimags of the MNR, 8-10 thousand people died [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 2, d. 221, l. 4-71]. According to the Archangay aimag administration, 602 people were killed during the uprising in five somons [MUUTA,
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f. 4, d. 4, kh. n. 301, tal 51-116], in 16 somons of the Khubsugul aimag - 609 people. According to other sources, from mid - April to July, 700 people were killed in the uprising in Archangai, Uverhangai, Khubsugul and Dzabkhan [Tserenbaljir, 1990, p.94], or 1,402 people were killed in the uprising in Archangai, Dzabkhan and Khubsugul [Gadaadaas turhirsan..., 2013, p. 111].
As of July 1932, the damage amounted to 10 million tugriks, 35 somon departments, 1 post office, etc. were destroyed [RGASPI, f. 495, op. 152, d. 140, l. 82-82ob.In 16 somons of Khubsugul, 79 villages, 11 somon departments, 26 collective farms, 16 artels, and 5 primary schools were destroyed. 13 somon departments, 17 artels, 1 branch of the court, 1 telegraph office, 14 cooperative committees, 13 branches (salbar), 2 departments of state trade organizations were destroyed in Archangay [Tserenbalzhir, 1990, p. 95].
There is an opinion that the uprising of 1932 was organized from abroad: by Japanese imperialists, Chinese militarists and Panchen Lama IX, who at that time was in Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and China, that these forces only used discontent in the MNR itself. An analysis of the trial of rebel leaders, intelligence reports and information about the activities of the Panchen Lama at that time shows that the rebels did not act on instructions from abroad, did not receive assistance from there, and were forced to rely only on their own forces. The reason for the uprising is the "left course", which was carried out and then canceled on the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Comintern.
The uprising of 1932 was the largest in Mongolia in the 20th century. It meets the criteria of civil war that distinguish it from other types of conflicts (see [Sambanis, 2004, p. 829-830]). It was a popular uprising that turned into a civil war.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AVPRF-Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow.
МУYТА - Монгол улсын γндэсний тов архив, МАН-ын Баримтын тов, Улан-Батор.
RGASPI - Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Moscow.
TSAFSB-Central Archive of the Federal Security Service, Moscow.
list of literature
Батсайхан О. Монгол ундэстэн бурэн эрхт болох замд (1911-1946). Улаанбаатар. 2007.
Гадаадаас тγрхирсан 1932 оны Сюслого (тγγх, дурдатгал, дурсамж, нийтлэл, тэмдэглэл. zahidalom). Улаанбаатар. 2013.
Галсанбаатар Ш. "Tank huldeg" Archangainhan harhan helmagdsen be? 2012. http://www.wikimon.mn/ content/5723, shtml.
Ганболд С. 1932 оны зэвеэгт бослого дахь цэргийнхний байр суурь // Тγγхийн судлал. Т. 33, fasc. 1-22. 2002.
Kotelnikov V. History of Soviet aviation. Polikarpov R-1 - the first mass-produced Soviet aircraft. 2012. http://topwar.ru/ 16259-istoriya-sovеtskoy-aviacii-polikarpov-r- l-pеrvyy-scriynyy-sovеtskiy-samolеt.html.
Lomakina I. M. Belye yurty v stepi [White Yurts in the steppe], Moscow, 1975.
Lomakina I. M. Mongolian capital, old and New (and Russia's participation in its fate). Moscow, 2006.
Luvsan-Ochir Ch. Аравхан насандаа аюулыг сорсон нь. Улаанбаатар. 2003. http://www.gia.gov.mn/articlcs/ mеdее/1066.
Монголыи сγм хийдийн тγγхэн товчоон. Улаанбаатар, 2009.
Purevbat G. (comp.). Их Монгол оронд уламжлагдеан ирээдуйг эш γзγγлеэн бошгууд. Улаанбаатар. 2009.
Simukov A. Notes on the situation on the periphery of the MNR for 1931. 1994. N 5.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence of 1931-1936, Moscow, 2001.
Цэрэнбалжир Д. 1932 оны зэвеэгт бослого. Улаанбаатар. 1990.
Эрдэнэсайхан А. Улс торийн хэлмэгдэгедийн намтрын товчоон. Боть 16. Лам нарыг егγγтгэсний учир. Улаанбаатар. 2013.
Dashpurеv D., Soni S. K. Reign of Terror in Mongolia 1920-1990. New Delhi, 1992.
Sambanis N. What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition // Journal of Conflict Resolution. V. 48, N 6. 2004.
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